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ABSTRACT
This dissertation focuses on understanding and modeling how contracts function
in practice. The existing principal-agent literature usually involves two players: a
principal (investors) provides capital to an agent (managers or entrepreneurs) on a
project subject to asymmetric information. However, many real financing arrange-
ments between firms and investors are intermediated by another agent - a bank, a
venture capitalist, or a fund family, etc. In these three-tier settings, there are two
contracts to deal with two conflicts of interest - a framework that simply hasn’t been
studied thoroughly in the principal-agent literature.
The first chapter is co-authored with my Ph.D. advisors Prof. Andrea M. Buffa
and Prof. Lucy White. In this chapter, we consider a general economic setting
in which a principal has all the bargaining power, and she has to hire two agents
exerting complementary efforts on her project. The principal chooses from two con-
tracting schemes - direct contracting and delegated contracting - whether to contract
directly with both agents or instead to contract with one agent alone and delegate
this agent to contract with the other agent. We find that delegated contracting can
be optimal when contracts are private. With direct contracting, each agent fears that
vii
the principal will opportunistically reduce the other agents’ bonus, muting incentives
to exert effort. With delegated contracting, one agent observes the contract of the
agent he hires, alleviating effort concerns, but allowing rent extraction. In delegating,
the principal trades off the losses of control and rent extraction by the hiring agent
against the gains from improved observability and effort. We find that it is optimal
for the principal to delegate when the hiring agent is sufficiently skilled or the effort
complementarity is sufficiently strong.
The second chapter considers an entrepreneurial finance setting in which an en-
trepreneur needs two things - expert advice and capital - in addition to her own idea
and effort. The entrepreneur has all the bargaining power, and she chooses to finance
her project from two sources: angels and venture capitalists. Venture capitalists
are different from angels in two aspects. First, angels are individuals investing their
own capital, while venture capitalists are intermediaries investing on behalf of limited
partners (LPs). Second, venture capitalists provide expert advice while angels don’t.
With angel financing, the entrepreneur obtains expert advice from a consultant who
is independent of the angels. With venture capital financing, the entrepreneur obtains
expert advice bundled together with capital from a venture capitalist only. I show
that when contracts are private, raising capital directly from angels is more expen-
sive because the entrepreneur has the incentive to cut down on expert advice to save
money. Angels optimally set a higher cost of capital to be compensated for the lack
of verifiability. On the other hand, LPs are able to infer the amount of expert advice
through the venture capitalist’s shares in the venture. I show that venture capital
financing is optimal for the entrepreneur in competitive labor and capital markets.
Moreover, convertibles arise endogenously as the optimal security held by the venture
capitalist. Convertible securities have features of both debt and equity, allowing the
entrepreneur to provide enough incentives to the venture capitalist while minimizing
viii
the cost of capital from the LPs.
The third chapter further analyzes the entrepreneur’s optimal financing problem in
which venture capital is scarce relative to angel capital. Compared with competitive
venture capital, the venture capitalist’s compensation stays the same while the LPs
demand a higher return. The entrepreneur and the venture capitalist share the extra
cost of financing, and their expected payoffs and the project’s profitability decrease in
the scarcity level of venture capital. With venture capital financing, the entrepreneur
trades off the loss due to the scarcity of venture capital against the gains from the
improved transparency in contracting. I find that angel financing is optimal when
venture capital is sufficiently scarce. Compared with angel financing, the investors as
LPs demand a higher return than angels only when venture capital is scarcer than
what it makes angel financing optimal.
ix
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Optimal Delegated Contracting (with
Andrea M. Buffa and Lucy White)
1.1 Introduction
Teamwork is a key feature of many firms and institutions in the modern economy.
In many of these teams, a team leader has wide latitude to hire and compensate the
team members who work with him. Yet standard principal agent theory has little
to tell us about why organizations are set up in this way. After all, any principal
can always do (at least) weakly better by contracting directly with all the agents
who work on her project. It never makes sense to allow one agent to contract with
other agents (“sub-contract”) because the principal could always choose to write
exactly the same contract with each “sub-agent” and moreover, the principal can
generally do better by writing a different contract whenever the incentives of the
contract-writing agent are not perfectly aligned with those of the principal. So why
do we see principals willingly delegating the power to contract with employees? In
this paper, we highlight one particular feature of real world contracts that is largely
absent from existing principal-agent models, which helps us to shed some light on this
issue: Compensation contracts are typically observed only by the two parties signing
them (i.e., the party agreeing to pay the compensation and the party receiving it).
This means that the principal is unable to make all agents’ compensation contracts
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publicly observable.1 We show that this single change can make it optimal for the
principal to delegate contracting to one of the agents. Why? By giving one agent the
power to hire and write a compensation contract another agent, the principal makes
that contract observable to both agents; and this turns out to be important when
those two agents’ efforts are complementary in production.
Why does the privacy of contracts matter? When efforts are complementary, each
agent naturally cares about how much effort the other is expected to make. In a
direct contracting situation – where the principal writes contracts with each agent
individually – each agent fears opportunism by the other principal-agent pair. The
principal would like to convince each agent that the other agent will be given a large
bonus to induce high effort: the complementarity of efforts means that the first agent
will work harder when he believes the second will make greater effort. But when
it comes to actually writing the contract, the principal is tempted to renege on any
cheap talk promises and economize on the rents that have to be provided to actually
induce the high effort. To see the problem, suppose that the first best is for each agent
to exert high effort. If each agent could see that the other agent’s effort is going to
be high, each would increase his effort accordingly (since efforts are complementary).
Therefore, the principal could obtain a high level of effort from each agent while using
a lower bonus payment because each agent knows that the increment to the overall
probability of success - and hence, of receiving the bonus - if he decides to make
effort is larger if the other agent also works hard. But a problem arises when neither
1Generally, an employee’s compensation contract is treated by the employing organization as the
private information of that employee, and as such, the contract is not shared with other employees.
While contracts can be verified in a court of law, verification is costly. Compensation contracts
are not usually public information and even if they could be made public on some occasion, they
could always be privately renegotiated with each agent afterwards ((Aghion et al., 1994)). The
important assumption of our theory is that each agent’s compensation cannot be made contingent
on the structure of other agents’ pay packages (i.e., extent of their bonus pay, or the strength of
the incentives provided to them). We believe that in many, though not all, circumstances, this
assumption is realistic, and we explore its consequences in this paper.
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efforts nor compensation are publicly observable. Then, while the principal might
try to promise each agent that the other will receive a bonus sufficient to make him
exert high effort – so that each is “fooled” into exerting higher effort – it is more
profitable for the principal to economize on each incentive payment relative to the
second best (since when one agent works hard, this exerts a positive externality on
the other agent which the first principal-agent pair do not internalize). Of course,
each agent has rational expectations and, in equilibrium, understands perfectly well
the principal’s incentive for such opportunistic behavior. As a result, when contracts
are private, the principal has to make larger payments to induce high effort and
equilibrium efforts will be lower. The inability to commit to publicly observable
compensation schemes makes it more difficult or expensive to induce agents to exert
high effort under centralized contracting.
The main contribution of this paper is to show under what conditions delegated
contracting can help mitigate this problem, and what particular form delegation
should take. Suppose, in contrast to the previous literature, that the principal uses
a two-tier structure, where the principal employs one agent, and provides that agent
with a compensation budget in case of project success. Now give this first agent the
responsibility for hiring a second agent to work with him on a team project, and
compensating the latter out of the budget he has received. Notice that this two-tier
structure provides greater transparency over contracts to the agents: the first agent
observes the second agent’s bonus scheme because he wrote the contract himself (and,
in our construction, pays the second agent out of the compensation budget allocated
to him by the principal). So the first agent is not afraid of the second agent being
given insufficient incentives. This generates stronger incentives for the first agent.
Thus the advantage of delegated contracting is that it improves the observability of
contracts among agents who care about how much effort they will each contribute to
4
a team project. It follows that there is no gain to delegated contracting when agents
work on unrelated projects. Rather, delegation is useful when it removes an agent’s
fear of opportunistic behavior by the principal regarding contracts with other agents
whose effort he cares about.
On the other hand, delegated contracting also has a clear disadvantage for the
principal: she loses control over the compensation scheme. The agent to whom com-
pensation is delegated keeps too much of the compensation budget for himself and
passes on inefficiently little to his co-worker(s). For a given budget, output could be
improved by a redistribution of bonuses. For example, with symmetric workers, a
principal contracting directly would surely offer symmetric compensation contracts.
But under delegated contracting, the agent to whom the principal delegates the power
to distribute compensation instead keeps a larger share of the compensation budget
for himself, even though the two workers have equal abilities and costs of effort. In
equilibrium, the “boss” always receives a larger bonus and works harder than the
“worker”. Despite the distortion, the principal benefits from delegating compensa-
tion with symmetric workers if agents’ efforts are sufficiently complementary and the
returns to effort are sufficiently convex.
The principal can also gain from delegation if the two agents differ in the impor-
tance of their efforts for output. We show that in such a case the principal will always
put the agent with the larger elasticity of output to effort on top of the hierarchy,
with the power to offer contracts to the agent with lower elasticity beneath. This is
natural because the agent who is higher up in the hierarchy endogenously receives
larger compensation, and so expected output is larger this way, because the agent
whose effort is more important gets a larger bonus. In the first best allocation of
compensation, the agent whose effort is less important gets a smaller bonus, but we
find that in this third best situation (where neither effort nor contracts are observ-
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able except by those exerting or signing them, respectively), the distortion away from
the first best gets larger as the productivity difference between the agents widens.
Surprisingly, therefore, the principal actually gains less from the hierarchical dele-
gation structure when the agents are asymmetric than when they are symmetric,
because the distortion associated with rent extraction by the agent administering the
compensation budget gets larger.
The advantage of delegation actually goes beyond increased contract observability.
We show that, even when the observability of contracts is the same across direct and
delegated contracting, as long as observability remains incomplete, delegation can
still be beneficial for the principal because it provides a commitment to a different
distribution of compensation. We compare the delegated contracting structure, where
both agents observe the Subagent’s contract, with a centralized contracting structure
where we impose that the Subagent’s contract is publicly observed. We show that
in this case centralized contracting results in the principal’s equilibrium choice of
compensation being skewed in favour of the agent with the public contract: although
he would like to promise higher compensation to the agent the private contract, this
promise is not credible. By contrast, delegating the division of the compensation
budget to the Agent allows the principal to commit to providing the agent with more
compensation. While delegated contracting results in rent extraction by the Agent,
under some conditions (and in particular, when both agents have high skill), this
distortion in pay allocation is less than the distortion under centralized contract-
ing. Hence delegated contracting can also dominate centralized contracting when
both structures have the same observability, because the former can help solve the
allocation problems induced by the fact that not all contracts are public.
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1.1.1 Related Literature
The problem of organizing contracting in a setting where agents have to work in a
team goes back at least to (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), who observe that the role of
an employer is to monitor individual employees’ efforts when the market only observes
joint output. (Holmstrom, 1982) observes that instead of monitoring, the employer,
or principal, need only provide a “budget breaking service” to the agents whereby he
writes a public contract with the agents to take all the agents’ output if and only if
output falls below the Pareto optimal level, but rewards the agents by dividing output
among them if output attains the desired level. This discrete drop in output resulting
from a slight reduction in effort can be sufficient to allow agents to attain the first
best.2 However, (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1984) point out that Holmstrom’s solution to
the problem of moral hazard in teams is prone to the potentially serious problem that
the principal could make an unobserved side contract with one of the agents where
that agent agrees to exert a lower effort than first best in exchange for a share of the
output the principal receives when output is below first best. They do not, however,
solve for the optimal contract when such secret side-contracting is possible. In our
paper, we explicitly take into account the opportunism problem faced by the agents
and solve for the optimal contract under the constraint that the contract offered by
the principal to one agent must be a best response to the contract offered to the
other agent, so that the principal has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium
contracts.
Our assumption of effort complementarities is a specific form of positive exter-
nality that the agents exert on each other. In a general model of contracting with
externalities, including vertical relations, takeover battles, debt workouts, and net-
2More recent work on moral hazard in teams includes (Rayo, 2007), (Garicano et al., 2017), and
(Edmans et al., 2013). The first two papers look at how relational contracts interact with providing
incentives in teams, whereas the third one looks at optimal team composition when agents’ effort
affects not only the probability of a successful outcome, but also other agents’ effort costs.
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work externalities, (Segal, 1999) explores the principal’s incentive to deviate from an
efficient trade profile when her contract offer to each agent is only privately observed.
However he does not consider how delegation may be used to solve the problem of
contractual privacy – instead he characterizes the optimal mechanism when agents’
contracts can be made contingent on other agents’ messages to the principal.3 In com-
mon with (Segal, 1999), we draw the notion of passive beliefs, and opportunism in
contracting, from the industrial organization literature on vertical relations between
supplying and purchasing firms. Following (Hart and Tirole, 1990), and (McAfee and
Schwartz, 1994), that literature observes that while an upstream monopolist would
like to restrict his supply to downstream firms to the monopoly quantity, doing so
with private (non-contingent) contracts is impossible when retailers have passive be-
liefs, and hence do not infer anything from their own offer about offers that their
rivals may have received. In particular, as long as contracts between the upstream
monopolist and the downstream firms are not public, or, if public, can be secretly
renegotiated, the monopolist will be unable to attain the first best without resorting
to vertical integration with one of the retailers.4
While the problem of opportunism between a principal and two agents has some
similarities to that between an upstream monopolist and two retailers, a key difference
is that in the principal-agent framework, the vertical foreclosure solution of integrating
3(Katz, 1991) studies delegation by a game-playing principal to an agent. He shows that when a
principal delegates his actions to an agent who shares the same preferences in a game, this has no
impact when the contract between the principal and the agent is private. It will of course affect the
game if their preferences differ, or if contract is public (e.g., (Spencer and Brander, 1983); (Brander
and Spencer, 1985); (Vickers, 1985)). Moreover, if the contract is public and can be made contingent
on the contracts written by other principals with their agents then a folk theorem obtains and a
plethora of equilibrium outcomes can be supported ((Katz, 2006)).
4The optimal contract between the upstream monopolist and a single retailer is a two-part tariff
contract with the product sold at a wholesale price equal to marginal cost, and a fixed fee equal to
the monopoly profit. Once one such contract has been signed, it is profitable for the monopolist to
approach a second retailer and offer him a contract as well, for example offering the best response
to the monopoly quantity and a fixed fee which extracts the profit from selling this quantity, to the
detriment of the first retailer.
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the principal with the agent is generally not available.5 Thus, if the principal contracts
directly with both agents, the principal is stuck with the third best outcome (because
neither effort nor contracts are observable). However, in the principal-agent setting, a
novel solution that has not been explored in the vertical relations literature presents
itself: in order to improve the transparency of contracts, contracting with a co-worker
could be delegated to one of the agents.6
If the principal decides to subcontract hiring one of the two agents to the other,
then formally the hiring agent’s problem is one of double-sided moral hazard, since
both the agent and the sub-agent must make effort in order for the project to be
successful. The double-sided moral hazard problem has been studied by a number of
papers, including (Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1995), (Casamatta, 2003), (Repullo
and Suarez, 2004), and (Hori and Osano, 2013). The last three of these papers have
venture capital as the leading example of their framework, and our paper too can be
applied to venture capital if we consider the principal as the investor, the venture
capitalist as the agent to whom the principal delegates the contracting, and the
entrepreneur funded by the venture capitalist to be the sub-agent.7 (Aghion and
Tirole, 1997) study a double-sided moral hazard problem where principal and agent
may both make effort to obtain information about which project should be adopted.
Their paper is related since it shows that the principal can encourage the agent’s effort
by delegating the choice of project to the agent, even though this involves a loss of
control when the principal and the agent’s optimal project choices are not aligned.
5Another important difference is that in the vertical integration framework, output, i.e., retailers’
strategic variable, is verifiable, whereas in our setting, agents’ efforts are not.
6This solution is typically unavailable in the vertical integration context because of anti-trust
concerns.
7(Liu, 2020) considers a more realistic setting in which the ownership of the project lies in the
hands of the entrepreneur (one of the agents who must make effort), and not with the principal,
while the funding is provided by competitive investors (rather than by a monopolistic principal).
The entrepreneur must choose whether to obtain funding through a venture capitalist (who raises
fund from investors and contributes to the project by giving advice), or directly from investors while
instead obtaining expert advice from independent consultants.
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The reasons for delegation, however, are quite different: in their model, delegation
commits the principal to making a lower effort, encouraging the agent to increase his
own effort because efforts are substitutes. In our setting, there are two agents whose
efforts are complements and the principal makes no effort contribution; he delegates
to increase the transparency of one agent’s contract to the other.8
Our paper is also related to the literature on delegation and hierarchies, sur-
veyed by (Poitevin, 2000) and (Mookherjee, 2006). They observe that the revelation
principle ensures that delegation is always weakly dominated by centralization, (e.g.,
(Baron and Besanko, 1992)), unless the centralized mechanism is undermined by (i)
costly communication with one or more agents or contract complexity (e.g., (Melumad
et al., 1995); (Melumad et al., 1997)); (ii) renegotiation by the principal due to lim-
ited commitment (e.g., (Beaudry and Poitevin, 1995); (Baliga and Sjöström, 2001));
or (iii) collusion between agents (e.g., (Tirole, 1986); (Laffont and Martimort, 1998);
(Ortner and Chassang, 2018); (Troya-Martinez and Wren-Lewis, )).9 In our paper,
communication is costless but the agents do not posses any information valuable to
the principal. Moreover, since the agents do not observe each others’ efforts, there is
no role for collusion between them. So, it is the inability of the principal to commit
not to secretly renegotiate contracts bilaterally that makes delegation in our model
the dominating contractual scheme.
8(Jehiel, 2015) argues that full transparency in organizations is never optimal: while has the
benefit of allowing agents to tailor their action to the particular problem they are facing, it also
makes incentive constraints more difficult to satisfy. (Prendergast, 1993) and (Prat, 2005) show in
single agent models where the agent receives additional information about the state of the world
before choosing his action that it can be harmful to the principal to improve transparency about
the agent’s action. Our model is different since there is no uncertainty about the state of the world,
only strategic uncertainty.
9In the context of hierarchies, (Qian, 1994) and (Rahman, 2012) investigate models of monitoring,
in which an agent must be incentivized to monitor the effort exerted by his immediate subordinates.
(Gryglewicz and Mayer, 2019) study a dynamic agency model where an intermediary monitors a
firm’s manager on behalf of a firm’s investor, and both the manager and the intermediary are subject
to moral hazard. A very different rationale for hierarchies is set out by (Garicano, 2000), where the
need for a hierarchical structure results from heterogeneous agents having differing abilities to solve
problems, such that difficult problems are passed up the hierarchy to more able agents.
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1.2 Economic Setting
We consider an economy with two dates. At date 0, a principal makes an investment
in a risky project and needs to hire two agents to implement it. The two agents can
individually exert effort to increase the project’s expected cash flow, which is realized
at date 1. The effort that each agent i = 1, 2 exerts at date 0, denoted by ei for
i = 1, 2, is unobservable to the other agent and to the principal. All three players in
this economy are risk-neutral and have limited liability.
Technology. We denote the cash flow of the risky project by X and we assume
that it follows a Bernoulli distribution. The project either succeeds or fails. The




1 with prob. π(e1, e2)
0 with prob. 1− π(e1, e2). (1.1)
Given the nature of the cash flows in the two states, π(e1, e2) coincides with the
expected cash flow of the project, E[X(e1, e2)].
Effort. For tractability, we model the probability of success π as a Cobb-Douglas
function of the two agents’ effort choices:





where αi ∈ (0, 1) represents the elasticity of π with respect to agent i’s effort ei. This
effort elasticity measures the agent’s ability to “transform” effort into output and so
can be interpreted as the agent’s skill level. The probability function π is strictly
increasing and concave in the effort level of each agent, ∂π/∂ei > 0 and ∂
2π/∂e2i < 0.
This implies that additional effort increases the expected cash flow with diminishing
11
returns. Notably, our specification exhibits complementarity between the agents’
effort levels, ∂2π/∂e1∂e2 > 0, so that one agent’s effort is more productive the higher
is the effort exerted by the other. Effort from both agents is needed for the project to
succeed since π(0, e2) = π(e1, 0) = 0. Moreover, to guarantee that π is a well-defined
probability function, we restrict the effort choice ei to be continuous in [0, 1].
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Exerting effort is costly for the agents. We assume that each agent faces a





which is strictly increasing and convex in ei.
11 Finally, we normalize each agent’s
reservation utility (i.e., their outside options) to zero.12
Contracts. The principal needs both agents to implement the project, but she can
choose whether to contract directly with both agents, or whether instead to hire only
one agent and let this agent hire (and hence write a contract with) the other agent.
We refer to the two contracting schemes as centralized contracting and delegated
10Cobb-Douglas functions are commonly used to represent the effect of the levels of inputs to
production on total output. In the context of agency theory, (Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1995),
for instance, consider a downstream Cobb-Douglas production function for a franchising business,
where the inputs of production are the effort levels of the franchisee and the franchisor. In the
context of venture capital, (Repullo and Suarez, 2004) adopt a specification similar to ours in to
capture the effort complementarities between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist.
11Our model can easily accommodate a more general heterogeneous cost function such as ci =
ei
κi/κi, where κi captures the elasticity of the effort cost with respect to the effort level of agent i.
Heterogeneous costs of effort (κ1 6= κ2) do not add additional insights to the problem since, as we
discuss in the next sections, the optimal contracts only depend on the ratios αi/κi. We therefore
normalize κ1 = κ2 = 2 and we analyze the implications of heterogeneous agents by use of different
effort elasticities (α1 6= α2).
12The setting can be extended to allow for positive reservation utilities for each agent. When
agents have positive reservation utilities, the results become stronger in the sense that the principal’s
temptation to cut promised bonuses in an ex post opportunistic way becomes worse, and so the need
to delegate contracting to improve observability becomes stronger. It can be shown that with strictly
positive reservation utilities, delegated contracting will sometimes be optimal even when agents’
efforts are substitutes rather than complements (details available from the authors on request). For
simplicity, we will work with a model with zero reservation wages.
12
centralized contracting delegating contracting
principal




Figure 1·1: Contracting Schemes
contracting, respectively. In the latter scheme, for ease of exposition, we will refer who
does the hiring as the Agent and to the agent who is hired by the other agent as the
Subagent. Depending on the setting, one can think of the Agent as the manager, or the
general contractor, and the Subagent as the worker, or subcontractor. Importantly,
when the agents are heterogeneous (α1 6= α2), the principal also chooses with which
agent she will contract directly if she decides to adopt a delegated contracting scheme.
Figure 1·1 illustrates the structure of the two contracting schemes. The centralized
contracting scheme corresponds to a flat hierarchy whereas the delegated contracting
scheme is a steeper hierarchy.
In both contracting schemes, only two contracts are written and we are interested
in exploring the case in which these bilateral contracts are private information to the
parties signing them. This means that each contract is observable only by the two
parties who sign it. Therefore, while in the case of centralized contracting it is the
principal who observes two contracts, in the case of delegated contracting it is the
Agent. Our model, therefore, features two types of hidden actions: unobservable effort
and unobservable contracts. Any enforceable contract is based on what is observable
by all three players, which is a realization x of the project’s cash flow X(e1, e2).
For a given realization x ∈ {0, 1} of the project’s cash flow, we denote by b(x) the
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principal’s total compensation budget for the agents, and by φi(x) the fraction of the
budget that is allocated to agent i, where
∑2
i=1 φi(x) = 1. It follows that agent i’s
contingent compensation is equal to φi(x)b(x). Since in the low state of the world the
project fails and does not deliver any cash flow, and the principal and agents all have
limited liability, the compensation budget and hence the payments to the agents are
all equal to zero in that state. Therefore, in what follows we drop the dependence of
the contracts on the cashflow x and we simply refer to b(1) and φi(1) as b and φi.
In the centralized contracting scheme, the principal chooses both the size of the
compensation budget b and its allocation between the two agents φi. The word
“centralized” indicates that both these decisions are retained by the principal. By
contrast, in the delegated contracting scheme, the principal only sets b, the fraction
of output that will be used for compensation, whereas the decision regarding the
division of the compensation budget φi is delegated to the Agent.
Note that our separation of promised payments to agents into budget b and share
φi is only for expositional convenience.
13 The offers that agents actually receive are
in dollar trems, so that under centralized contracting, an agent is promised a certain
dollar amount (equal to φib) when the project succeeds, but can infer neither φi nor b
from this offer. Similarly, under delegated contracting, the Subagent receives a dollar
offer and from this can infer nothing about the total compensation budget nor the
pay of the Agent. The Agent, on the other hand, observes the dollar amount that
the principal will pay him if the project succeeds and the dollar amount he promises
the subagent in that case, and hence both his own and the Subagent’s incentive pay.
Payoffs. The expected payoff of the principal, denoted by v, is given by the
13In particular, this represention will allow us to nicely distinguish the two effects of delegation:
the gain from observability, which comes in the form of a larger budget, from the cost from rent
extraction, which comes in the form of a distortion in the shares of the budget allocated to each
agent.
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project’s payoff if it succeeds minus the compensation budget, times the probability
of success,
v = (1− b)eαii e
αj
j . (1.4)
The expected payoff of agent i, denoted by ui, is given by his expected compensation









Before studying the optimal choice that the principal makes at date 0 between the
two contracting schemes, we first characterize the optimal contracts in two schemes
separately, and discuss the fundamental role played by the observability of these
contracts.
1.3 Centralized Contracting
In this section we consider the centralized contracting scheme in which the principal
contracts directly with both agents. We model the interaction between the principal
and the two agents as a noncooperative game. The sequence of events is as follows:
(i) The principal makes two simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to the two agents.
Each offer includes a compensation level, contingent on the success of the
project.
(ii) Each agent observes only his own offer and decides whether to accept the offer
and, in that case, how much effort to exert.
(iii) If the project succeeds, the principal uses the project’s cash flow to pay the
agents the compensation specified in the accepted contracts and collects the
residual. If the project fails, no player receives anything.
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We solve for the optimal contracts by working backwards. First, we take as given
the principal’s choice of compensation budget b and the allocation φi, and we derive
each agent i’s optimal effort choice ei which maximizes the agent’s expected payoff ui
given his belief about the other agent’s effort choice. Second, given the two agents’
optimal effort choices (e1, e2) thus derived, we derive the optimal choices of b and φ
which maximize the principal’s expected payoff v. Notice that since contracts are not
publicly observable, an agent’s choice of effort cannot be contingent on the effort level
exerted by the other agent, nor on the contract privately signed by the other agent.
This creates a role for beliefs about effort levels and contracts that has been missing
from the literature so far but which is central to our analysis.
Before proceding to the formal analysis, let us highlight the importance of being
able to observe the contracts of other complementary agents contributing to the same
project, by considering the case in which the principal is able to make and commit
to publicly observable contract offers to the agents. Consider the resulting pair of
optimal public contracts that the principal would choose in this case. (These are
second best contracts in that the agents can perfectly observe each others’ contracts
but still effort itself is not contractible; they are derived in Appendix A.1.2.1). Now
suppose that when contracts are private, the principal tries to offer agent i his optimal
public contract and promises agent i that she will also offer agent j the latter’s optimal
public contract. Would the agents in this setting continue to exert the same effort
they would if contracts were indeed public? The answer is no.
To see why, suppose that one of the agents were to exert the level of effort asso-
ciated with public contracts; then, it would be optimal for the principal to deviate
with the other agent and write him a better contract which economizes on incentive
payments. The principal can be made better off and the other agent no worse off
by this deviation, because the second agent’s compensation contract is not a best
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response to the first agent’s (and vice versa). Or, to put it another way, when the
second agent puts in more effort, he exerts a positive externality on both the principal
and the first agent (who are both more likely to receive a positive payoff at date 1),
and the principal’s contract with the second agent will internalize the exernality on
the principal but not on the first agent. Anticipating the “opportunistic” behavior
of the other pair, each agent demands more compensation to exert a given effort
than they would if contracts were public. If contracts were public, each agent could
confidently expect higher effort from the other agent (given the observed contract),
making the productivity of their own effort larger, and so making higher effort more
worthwhile for a given level of compensation. With private contracts, therefore, in-
centive provision in direct contracting schemes is more expensive than with public
contracts.
In solving the centralized contracting game, we will be looking for a Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) with strictly positive effort, in which consistency of
beliefs with Bayes Rule is required both on and off the equilibrium path. Notice,
however, that Bayes Rule does not pin down beliefs after probability zero events, and
so in principle different systems of out-of-equilibrium beliefs after such events exist
and these could be used to support different PBEs, so the game could have multiple
PBE. Intuitively, in our game, a system of beliefs characterizes how each agent re-
vises his beliefs about the unobservable contract offered to the other agent when he
receives an out-of-equilibrium offer from the principal. The willingness of an agent
to accept an “unexpected” offer depends on what he thinks about how, if at all, the
principal might change the contract she is secretly offering to the other agent when
she unexpectedly changes the offer made to him. In this paper, we select a PBE
which is supported by so called passive beliefs.14
14Passive beliefs, originally introduced by (Hart and Tirole, 1990), are have been widely used in
the industrial organization literature on vertical relations (e.g., (O’Brien and Shaffer, 1992), (McAfee
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An agent i with passive beliefs does not revise his beliefs about the unobservable
effort made to the other agent j when he receives an out-of-equilibrium offer from the
principal. Therefore, agent i’s conjecture about agent j’s effort level, denoted by êj,
remains the effort level which agent i expects the principal to induce in equilibrium.
In other words, regardless of the off-equilibrium offer, each agent believes that the
principal continues to offer the equilibrium contract to the other agent, and hence
believes that the other agent will exert effort at the equilibrium level.
Having defined our notion of equilibrium and the system of off-equilibrium beliefs,
we next discuss the optimization problems of the agents and the principal. We start
with agent i’s problem. After receiving the compensation offer φib from the principal,
agent i forms beliefs êj about agent j’s effort level. The optimal level of effort exerted
by agent i, therefore, is a function of his compensation and the conjectured effort of
agent j:













As in standard principal-agent problems under moral hazard, agent i’s optimal
effort increases with his compensation φib. The higher the compensation in the high
state of the world, the higher the agent’s desire to increase the likelihood of that
state. Moreover, agent i exerts more effort the higher the effort he believes agent j’s
will exert, reflecting the complementarities between their effort choices.
The principal’s problem is to choose the compensation budget b and how to split
the budget between the two agents (φi, 1−φi) so as to maximize the expected residual
cash flow from the project v, subject to the incentive compatibility (IC) and individual
and Schwartz, 1994), (Rey and Vergé, 2004)), and applied to other settings by (Segal, 1999). Other
belief systems include symmetric beliefs and wary beliefs ((McAfee and Schwartz, 1994)).
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rationality (IR) constraints of both agents,
(






ei(φib, êj), ej((1− φi)b, êi)
)
. (1.8)
The IC constraint of agent i is given by the optimal effort choice in (1.7). Agents’
IR constraints are always satisfied given their outside options of 0.15 The principal
rationally takes into account (through the IC constraints) that each agent has passive
beliefs about the unobservable contract offered to the other agent. The optimal
budget and allocation are therefore a function of the agents’ beliefs. In equilibrium,
each agent’s conjecture about the effort level exerted by the other agent must be





for i = 1, 2. Imposing (1.9) after solving the optimization problem in (1.8), we ob-
tain the optimal contracts in the centralized contracting scheme, which the following
proposition characterizes.
Proposition 1.1. With centralized contracting, the optimal compensation budget and
allocation are
bC =











αi + αj − αiαj
)
, (1.11)
respectively. It follows that:
(i) the compensation budget bC increases with both effort elasticities, αi and αj;
(ii) the allocation φCi increases with αi, decreases with αj and is larger than 1/2 iff
αi > αj;
15We assume that the principal can always choose not to implement the project, so we are only
interested in contracts which can generate a non-negative profit for the principal (b < 1).
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(iii) agent i’s compensation φCi b
C increases with αi and decreases with αj.
In our setting, the effort elasticities of the two agents (α1, α2) are the only drivers
of the optimal contracts. Proposition 1.1 shows that the higher are the agents’ skill
levels, the larger the total compensation budget. When the agents are more produc-
tive, the principal finds it more worthwhile to increase the probability of success of the
project (through stronger incentives) at the cost of a lower residual cash flow (1− b).
Moreover, it is optimal for her to pay the agent with the higher skill more. The higher
an agent’s skill, the larger the fraction of the compensation budget allocated to him.
This implies that an increase in the skill of one agent induces two competing effects
on the dollar compensation of the other agent: a positive effect through an increase
in the total budget, and a negative effect through a decrease in the fraction of the
budget he receives. Proposition 1.1 reveals that the latter effect always dominates.
The optimal budget and allocation obtained in Proposition 1.1 are based on the
maintained assumption that contracts are not publicly observable. How would they
compare to the budget and allocation if contracts were public? In Appendix A.1.2.1,
we derive the optimal public contracts in a centralized contracting scheme. These are
second-best contracts and are denoted by (b∗, φ∗). The next corollary provides the
comparison.
Corollary 1.1. Under centralized contracting, the optimal compensation budget is
lower with private contracts than with public contracts, bC < b∗, while the fraction
of the budget allocated to the most skilled agent is higher, φCi > φ
∗
i if αi > αj.
Overall, both agents receive lower compensation and exert lower effort when contracts
are private, φCi b
C < φ∗i b
∗, for any i.
Part of the intuition for the lower compensation and effort has already been ex-
plained above – it is not credible for the principal to propose the second-best public
information contracts when contracts are private as the agents are aware that these
second-best contracts are not best responses to one another, and so the principal will
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deviate from these contracts in favor of contracts with lower compensation. To see the
same result in a different way, note that with public contracts, there are two reasons
why the principal sets a relatively high compensation for (say) agent 1. First, in-
creasing agent 1’s bonus has a direct effect on agent 1’s effort. But second, increasing
agent 1’s bonus, by making agent 1 work harder in equilibrium, also increases agent
2’s effort. This gives the principal an extra reason to increase agent 1’s compensation
when contracts are public which is absent when contracts are private as agent 2 does
not then observe the increase in agent 1’s compensation (and does not anticipate any
such increase beyond the passive belief that agent 2’s compensation is set at the equi-
librium level). The same argument can be made for any potential increase in agent
2’s compensation. So compensation and effort are lower when contracts are private.
When contracts are private, the principal also skews compensation towards the
more skilled agent relative to what she would when contracts are public. This is
because the direct effect of increasing compensation on effort is now the driving force
behind the principal’s choice (the indirect effect on the other agent’s effort, mentioned
above, is now absent). The more skilled agent’s effort is more responsive to increases
in compensation than the unskilled agent’s (for whom the cost of effort is higher
relative to the effect of effort) and so it makes sense to concentrate more of the
budget on the more skilled agent.
1.4 Delegated Contracting
In this section we analyze a delegated contracting scheme in which the principal sets
only the total compensation budget. She contracts with only one Agent, promising to
pay to him the total budget if the project succeeds. That Agent then contracts with
a Subagent, and agrees to pay the Subagent a dollar amount if the project succeeds.
The payment to the Subagent will be drawn from the total compensation budget
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paid by the principal to the Agent and so must be less than this total compensation
budget by limited liability of the Agent. As with centralized contracting, we model
the interactions between the principal and the Agent, and between the Agent and the
Subagent as a noncooperative game. The sequence of events is as follows:
(i) The principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the Agent. The offer includes
a compensation budget, contingent on the success of the project. The Agent
decides whether to accept the offer or not. Contracting between the principal
and the Agent is not observed by the Subagent.
(ii) After signing a contract in stage one, the Agent makes a take-it-or-leave-it con-
tract offer to the Subagent. The offer includes a compensation level, contingent
on the success of the project. The Subagent decides whether to accept the offer
or not. Contracting between the Agent and the Subagent is not observed by
the principal.
(iii) If the Agent and the Subagent have accepted contracts in stage one and stage
two, respectively, they decide how much effort to exert.
(iv) If the project succeeds, the principal uses the project’s cash flow to pay the
Agent according to the contract signed in stage one and collects the residual.
The Agent uses what he receives from the principal to pay the Subagent ac-
cording to the contract signed in stage two and keeps the residual part of the
budget. If the project fails, no player receives anything.
Similarly to the centralized contracting case, we solve the principal’s contracting
problem by working backwards from the agents’ effort choices to the principal’s op-
timal choice. However, since it is now the Agent who decides how to allocate the
budget, there are two differences between the principal’s problem in the delegated
contracting scheme and in the centralized contracting scheme. First, the principal
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no longer has direct control over the allocation of the budget; and second, the Agent
now observes the contract that has been signed by the Subagent when he chooses
his own effort. The Subagent, however, still does not observe the contract between
the principal and the Agent, so he is in essentially the same situation as that in the
centralized contracting scheme.
The Subagent, therefore, forms beliefs about the unobservable contract between
the principal and the Agent and the induced effort level êA of the Agent.
16 The
optimal level of effort exerted by the Subagent is a function of his compensation and
the conjectured effort of the Agent:











Properties of the Subagent’s optimal effort eS parallel those characterizing the optimal
effort of an agent in the centralized contracting scheme (i.e., ei in (1.7)).
What is different from the centralized contracting scheme is that the Agent ac-
tually observes both contracts in the delegated contracting scheme. Therefore, when
the Agent receives an unexpected offer from the principal, he does not need to form
beliefs about the offer received by the Subagent as he actually observes that offer.
At the same time, the Agent also knows that the Subagent will form passive beliefs
about the Agent’s effort êA should the Agent decide to make an unexpected offer. As
a result, the Agent plays a best response to those beliefs by exerting an optimal effort
level which is a function of the budget he received from the principal, the allocation
he has offered to the Subagent, and the Subagent’s beliefs:
16In the delegated contracting scheme, we use subscript A and S when referring to the Agent and
the Subagent, respectively.
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For a given allocation of the budget, the Agent’s optimal effort level increases with the
size of the budget b. However, the budget allocation φA has a nonlinear effect on the
Agent’s effort choice. This is due to the complementarity in effort provision. Because
of complementarity, the Agent always benefits from a higher level of effort exerted
by the Subagent. On one hand, a large φA means the Agent keeps more budget to
himself which provides greater incentives for the Agent to exert more effort. On the
other hand, if he keeps too much, that will leave too little for the Subagent. As a
result, the Subagent will exert low effort, which, given complementarity, discourages
the Agent from much effort himself.
In the centralized contracting scheme, the two private contracts can be signed
either simultaneously or sequentially; the timing of the two contracts does not matter.
The principal can freely contract with either of the agents first or both at the same
time. As a result, the principal can determine the budget b and the allocation φi
jointly. However, in the delegated contracting scheme, a sequential commitment of
contracts is necessary. The Agent must sign a contract with the principal before
contracting with the Subagent.
We continue solving the problem by backward induction. For a given budget
b, which is specified in the contract between the principal and the Agent, we solve
for the optimal budget allocation φA that maximizes the Agent’s expected payoff,
conditioning on the best responses eA(b, φA, êA) in (1.15) and eS(φSb, êA) in (1.13):
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eA(b, φA, êA), eS((1− φA)b, êA)
)





As a last step, we solve the optimal compensation budget b that maximizes the
principal expected residual cash flow, conditioning on the chain of best responses
φA(b, êA) in (1.16), eA(b, φA, êA) in (1.15) and eS(φSb, êA) in (1.13):




eA(b, φA(b, êA), êA), eS((1− φA(b, êA))b, êA)
)
. (1.17)
As in the centralized contracting scheme, both the Agent’s and the Subagent’s IR
constraints are always satisfied given their outside options of 0. In equilibrium, the
Subagent’s conjecture about the effort level exerted by the Agent must be correct and




Imposing (1.18) after solving the optimization problem in (1.17), we obtain the op-
timal contracts in the delegated contracting scheme, which are presented in the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 1.2. With delegated contracting, the optimal compensation budget and
allocation are
bD =










respectively. It follows that:
(i) the compensation budget bD increases with both effort elasticities, αA and αS;
(ii) the allocation φDA is independent of αA, decreases with αS and is always larger
than 1/2;
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(iii) the Agent’s compensation φDAb





(iv) the Subagent’s compensation (1− φDA)bD increases with both αA and αS.
Proposition 1.2 reveals that, as in the centralized contracting scheme, the higher
the skill level of the agents (i.e., Agent and Subagent in this case), the larger the
compensation budget. The intuition remains the same: the principal gives stronger
incentives (by increasing the budget) when the agents are more productive. Notably,
though, the allocation of the budget, optimally chosen by the Agent, does not depend
on the Agent’s skill, but only on the skill of the Subagent. In particular, the Agent
always keeps one half of the budget and gives the Subagent a fraction of the second
half of the budget depending on the Subagent’s skill. Given our Cobb-Douglas spec-
ification for the probability of success, this fraction equals the Subagent’s skill level
αS. Therefore, the more skilled the Subagent, the lower the rents that the Agent
extracts from the compensation budget.
An increase in the Agent’s skill induces the principal to increase the compensation
budget, but it does not affect the allocation. This implies that, contingent on the
success of the project, the dollar compensation of both the Agent and the Subagent
are increasing in αA. An increase in the Subagent’s skill, instead, generates not only a
higher budget, but also a more balanced allocation since φDA approaches 1/2 when αS
approaches 1. While this always increases the dollar compensation of the Subagent
in the high state of the world, it can decrease that of the Agent. This is because the
decrease in rent extraction may dominate the increase in the budget.
We define the rent extraction of the Agent as the additional fraction of the com-
pensation budget that the Agent keeps for himself, compared to the second-best
allocation φ∗A = αA/(αA + αS). Denoting the rent extraction by ∆A, it follows that
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is always strictly positive since αi ∈ (0, 1) for any i. Moreover, the rent extraction ∆A
always decreases with the skill of the Agent, αA, whereas it decreases with the skill of
the Subagent, αS, only when the Subagent is sufficiently skilled. The trade-off between
rent extraction distortion, which results in an inefficient allocation of compensation
between the two agents, and observability gain, which increases incentives, is the key
driver of the optimal choice between centralized and delegated contracting, and is the
focus of the next section.
1.5 Optimal Contracting Scheme
Having analyzed the optimal (private) contracts in the centralized and delegated
contracting schemes, in this section we discuss the optimal choice that the principal
makes between the two hierarchical structures. In particular, we show that when the
skills of the agents are sufficiently high, the principal prefers to contract with only one
agent, delegating to that agent the power to compensate the other agent. Specifically,
we provide formal conditions under which delegated contracting is optimal.
1.5.1 Optimal Delegation Hierarchy
Before comparing the principal’s expected payoff under the two contracting schemes,
we first establish with whom, among the two agents, the principal prefers to contract
directly when relying on delegated contracting. This pins down who the Agent and
the Subagent are in this contracting scheme. Naturally, the principal is indifferent as
to whether she contracts with agent 1 or agent 2 when the agents are homogeneous
(α1 = α2). However, when the agents are heterogeneous (α1 6= α2), the principal is
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not indifferent but strictly prefers one of them as the Agent with whom to contract
directly. Lemma 1.1 below summarizes the principal’s optimal choice.
Lemma 1.1. With delegated contracting, the principal always delegates to the more
skilled agent, αA = max{α1, α2} and αS = min{α1, α2}.
Without loss of generality, in what follows we consider the case α1 > α2, i.e., agent
1 is more skilled than agent 2. Lemma 1.1 reveals that, in the delegated contracting
scheme, the principal finds it optimal to contract directly with agent 1 and to delegate
to him the power to contract with agent 2. In other words, it is optimal for the
principal to have the more skilled agent be the Agent, and consequently the less
skilled one be the Subagent. There are two opposing effects behind this result. For
a given rent extraction ∆, the principal would prefer to contract with the less skilled
agent, i.e., agent 2. This is because, compared to agent 1, agent 2 is more exposed
to opportunism if he does not observe the contract signed by the other agent. In
other words, effort complementarity is stronger for the less skilled agent because the
impact of the effort of the more skilled agent on the less skilled one is larger than vice
versa.17
The second effect is induced by the different rents that the two agents would
optimally extract in the role of the Agent. In particular, given the optimal contract
in Proposition 1.2, it follows that agent 2, the less skilled agent, would extract more
rents than agent 1: ∆2 = (1− α1/2)− φ∗2 > ∆1 = (1− α2/2)− φ∗1. So, the allocation
distortion induced by the rent exaction of agent 2 is larger and makes the principal
more inclined to contract directly with agent 1. Lemma 1.1 shows that overall the
second effect dominates: the higher rent extraction distortion from delegating to agent
2 is more detrimental to the principal than the lower observability gain through effort
17The elasticity of the marginal product of agent i’s effort, πei = ∂π/∂ei, with respect to agentj’s
effort, Eπeiej , is equal to αj . Therefore, if α1 > α2, a 1% increase in agent 1’s effort increases the
productivity of agent 2 by more compared to the increase in productivity of agent 1 induced by a
1% increase in agent 2’s effort.
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complementarity from delegating to agent 1. This makes it optimal for the principal
to delegate to the most skilled agent.
These effects are illustrated in Figure 1·2, where we plot the expected payoff of
the principal in the delegated contracting scheme, as a function of a generic allocation
of the budget to agent 1,
vD = K(bD) [φα11 (1− φ1)α2 ]
1
2−α1−α2 . (1.22)
The function K(·) does not depend on the allocation of the budget, and is given
explicitly in (A.18). Importantly, since the optimal compensation budget bD in (1.19)
does not depend on the principal’s choice for the Agent, K(bD) is taken as constant
across the two possible cases of delegation: (i) the principal delegates to agent 1
(a = 1), (ii) the principal delegates to agent 2 (a = 2). For each of these cases,
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where the last equality follows from the identity φ∗i = 1− φ∗j . A comparison between
(1.23) and (1.24) shows two differences. The first is the sign in front of the rent
extraction: when the principal delegates to agent 1, the rent extraction increases the
budget allocation to agent 1, whereas it decreases it when the principal delegates
to agent 2. The second difference is the extent of the rent extraction: ∆1 6= ∆2 if
α1 6= α2. These two differences correspond to the two opposing effects characterizing
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Figure 1·2: Optimal delegation hierarchy
In this figure we plot the principal’s expected payoff in the delegated contracting scheme,
as a function of the budget allocation to agent 1, φ1, for the optimal compensation budget
bD. The solid blue dots, corresponding to vDA=i for i = 1, 2, represent the principal’s
expected payoff under the optimal contracts (bD, φDA=i). The solid black dot, corresponding
to vDA=2(∆1), represents the principal’s expected payoff under the contracts (b
D, φ1 = φ
∗
1 −
∆1). Parameter values are: α1 = 0.8, α2 = 0.2.
the optimal delegation choice of the principal.
In order to isolate these effects, we also plot the expected payoff of the principal









Given the same rent extraction ∆1, the difference between (1.23) and (1.25) is meant
to capture the difference in observability gains through effort complementarity. Under
the maintained assumption that agent 1 is more skilled than agent 2 (α1 > α2), the
plot in Figure 1·2 shows that vDA=1 > vDA=2. In particular, it highlights that it is
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the larger rent extraction by agent 2 – compared to that of agent 1 – that makes the
principal worse off. Indeed, if the two agents were to extract the same rent ∆, then the
principal would prefer to delegate to agent 2, since vDA=2(∆) > v
D
A=1(∆) for any ∆ > 0
(see Proof of Lemma 1.1 in the Appendix). For instance, when the rent extraction
∆A = ∆1 for both agents, the plot in Figure 1·2 shows that vDA=2(∆1) > vDA=1.
1.5.2 Optimal Delegation
Given the optimal choice of the principal to delegate to the more skilled agent in the
delegated contracting scheme, we can now discuss the conditions under which she
prefers delegated contracting to centralized contracting. A simple comparison of the
compensation budgets and allocations characterizing the optimal contracts in the two
contracting schemes, yields that
bC < bD, φCi < φ
D
A=i, (1.26)
where, given the result in Lemma 1.1, agent i is the more skilled of the two agents.
So, compared to centralized contracting, the principal allocates a larger compensation
budget when delegating, and, in that case, the more skilled agent receives a larger
fraction of the budget.
The different compensation budgets and allocations across the two contracting
schemes affect the principal’s expected payoff in opposite ways. We first note that,
in our setting, the equilibrium expected payoff of the principal – as well as the equi-
librium effort levels, the probability of success, and the agents’ expected payoffs –
admit the same functional form across the two contracting schemes: vC = v(bC , φCi )
and vD= v(bD, φDA=i), where




For a given allocation φi, the function v(b, φi) is maximized at a level of the
compensation budget equal to (α1 + α2)/2, which corresponds to the optimal com-
pensation budget under second-best (public) contracts b∗. Since bC < bD < b∗, and
v(b, φi) is increasing in b in the interval (0, b
∗] and decreasing otherwise, the larger
budget associated with delegated contracting is beneficial to the principal. This re-
flects the fact that more contract observability allows the principal to credibly commit
to a larger budget, which increases agents’ incentives, and hence her expected prof-
itability. Indeed, since the Agent is the one offering the contract to the Subagent,
the Agent does not fear expropriation by the principal, who could, instead, (secretly)
save on the contract offered to the other agent with centralized contracting. This
makes the Agent’s effort respond more strongly to changes in compensation, which
in turn induces the principal to reduce her stake in the future cash flows, in exchange
of a higher likelihood of success of the risky project.
For a given budget b, instead, the function v(b, φi) is maximized for a budget
share equal to αi/(α1 +α2), which corresponds to the optimal budget allocation under






i , and v(b, φi) is increasing in
φi in the interval (0, φ
∗
i ] and decreasing otherwise, the larger budget share associated
with delegated contracting is detrimental to the principal. This reflects the distortion
in the efficiency of effort provision induced by the Agent, who under-incentivizes the
Subagent in order to extract rents. For instance, when the two agents are equally
skilled (α1 = α2), the principal allocates the compensation budget equally to these
agents when contracting with both of them directly, since their marginal productiv-
ities in generating expected cash flows are the same. With delegated contracting,
instead, the Agent allocates more than half of the budget to himself, as he finds it
optimal to increase his own stake in the future cash flows, despite the negative effect
that this has on the likelihood of success of the risky project.
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The principal’s loss of control over the budget allocation is the price to pay in
order to gain the benefits of more contract observability. Under what conditions it
is worthwhile for the principal to pay this price? The following proposition answers
this question.
Proposition 1.3. The principal chooses delegated contracting over centralized con-
tacting if and only if the Agent’s skill is sufficiently high, αA > ᾱA(αS), where the
threshold ᾱA(αS) decreases with the Subagent’s skill αS.
Proposition 1.3 states that it is optimal for the principal to delegate contracting
if the agent that is relatively more skilled (i.e., the Agent) is skilled enough. In-
deed, when αA is sufficiently large, the benefit induced by more observability under
delegated contracting dominates the cost of the loss of control. The intuition is as
follows. First, the additional compensation budget that the principal optimally gives
to the agents when choosing delegation, bD − bC , is increasing in the Agent’s skill.
This is because the higher transparency of contracts makes the Agent’s effort more
responsive to compensation, while the high skill of the Agent makes the probability
of success of the project more responsive to her effort. So, the principal benefits more
from the observability of contracts when the Agent is very skilled.
Second, the distortion in effort provision due the Agent’s rent extraction is also
reduced when the Agent is very skilled. In particular, since the optimal budget
allocation φDA in (1.20) is independent of αA, it is the increase in the second-best
allocation φ∗A in (A.29) that makes the rent extraction ∆A in (1.21) decrease with the
Agent’s skill. Intuitively, when the Agent is very skilled (relative to the Subagent),
it is optimal from the perspective of principal as well as the Agent to heavily tilt the
budget allocation towards the Agent. Therefore, in this case, the rent extraction due
to the loss of control becomes less of a problem, and consequently the principal loses
less from giving up control over the budget allocation.
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Figure 1·3: Optimal contracting scheme
In the left panel we plot the principal’s expected payoff in the delegated contracting scheme
(solid blue line) and in the centralized scheme (dashed red line), as a function of the budget
allocation to agent 1, φ1, for the optimal compensation budget b
D and bC , respectively.
The solid blue and red dots, corresponding to vD and vC , represent the principal’s expected
payoff under the optimal contracts (bD, φDA=1) and (b
C , φC1 ), respectively. The solid black
dot, corresponding to vC(bD), represents the principal’s expected payoff under the contracts
(bD, φC1 ). In the middle panel we plot the region of agents’ skill (αA, αS) in which dele-
gated and centralized contracting are optimal. The solid black line represents the threshold
ᾱ(αS). The dotted line delimits the relevant region αA > αS . In the right panel we plot
the percentage increase in the principal’s expected payoff when choosing delegated over
centralized contracting, vD/vC − 1, as a function of the Subagent’s skill αS . Parameter
values are: α1 = 0.8, α2 = 0.7.
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We illustrate these effects in Figure 1·3, where we consider the case α1 > α2. The
left panel shows the principal’s expected payoff in the delegated contracting scheme
(solid blue line) and in the centralized scheme (dashed red line), as a function of
the budget allocation to agent 1 (i.e., the Agent). The plot highlights how, fixing
the allocation φ1, the principal is always better off under delegated contracting. In
particular, we identify the difference between the two curves at the optimal allocation
under centralized contracting, vC(bD)−vC , as the benefit of making the contract of the
Subagent observable to the Agent. Moving to the right of vC(bD) along the solid blue
line captures the cost induced by the Agent’s rent extraction, which in equilibrium
is quantified by the difference vC(bD) − vD. For the chosen parameters (α1 = 0.8
and α2 = 0.7), the plot shows that the benefit of delegation is larger than the cost,
making vD > vC .
The middle panel provides a graphical illustration of the regions of the plane
defined by the agents’ skills (αA, αS) subject to the restriction αA > αS, in which
delegated contracting is preferred to centralized contracting and vice versa. The plot
shows that for any Subagent’s skill αS, there exists a level of the Agent’s skill above
which delegated contracting is chosen by the principal. This skill level is depicted
by the solid black line and corresponds to the threshold ᾱA in Proposition 1.3. This
confirms the above intuition that contracting with a very skilled Agent increases
the benefit of delegation and decreases its cost. The plot also highlights how the
threshold ᾱA is not constant but decreases with the Subagent’s skill αS. This means
that a more skilled Subagent can make up for a less skilled Agent in keeping the
principal indifferent between centralized and delegated contracting. Similar to the
effects induced by a higher αA, a higher αS increases the difference in compensation
budgets bD − bC and it decreases the Agent’s rent extraction when the Subagent is
sufficiently skilled. Intuitively, when contracting with a very skilled Subagent, the
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Agent has lower incentives to extract rents by allocating an excessively large fraction
of the compensation budget to himself, as he internalizes the higher cost caused by
the distorsion in effort provision.
Finally, the right panel plots the percentage change in the principal’s expected
payoff when she chooses delegated over centralized contracting, as a function of the
Subagent’s skill. That the percentage change is positive and increasing in αS when
the Subagent is sufficiently skilled confirms the forces at play discussed above. The
plot further reveals that the net benefit of more contract transparency can be signif-
icant when the agents are particularly skilled, making their effort complementarities
particularly important. The non-monotonic behavior of (vD − vC)/vC in this plot
reflects the fact that the Agent’s rent extraction ∆A decreases with αS when the
Subagent’s skill is sufficiently low.
In the next corollary we provide additional comparisons of equilibrium quantities
characterizing the two contracting schemes.
Corollary 1.2. Compared to the centralized contracting scheme, in the delegated
contracting scheme:
(i) the Agent always receives higher compensation and exerts higher effort;
(ii) the Subagent receives higher compensation iff the Agent’s skill level is sufficiently
high, αA > ᾱ
c
A(αS), and exerts higher effort iff αA > ᾱ
e
A(αS), where the thresh-
olds ᾱcA(αS) and ᾱ
e




(iii) the probability of success is higher iff the Agent’s skill level is sufficiently high,
αA > ᾱ
π
A(αS), where the threshold ᾱ
π
A(αS) decreases in αS, and is such that
1/2 < ᾱπA(αS) < ᾱA(αS).
Compared to centralized contracting, both the compensation budget and its al-
location to the Agent are larger in the delegated contracting scheme. Therefore, in




in turn makes him exert higher effort in equilibrium. Regarding the total compen-
sation and effort level of the Subagent, we have two competing effects. The larger
budget under delegated contracting tends to increase both, but the lower budget allo-
cation (due to the Agent’s rent extraction) tends to decrease them. When the Agent
is sufficiently skilled, the positive effect through the higher the compensation bud-
get dominates. Corollary 1.2 identifies two distinct thresholds for the Agent’s skill
αA above which the Subagent’s compensation and effort are higher under delegated
contracting. These thresholds are decreasing in the Subagent’s skill because when
αS increases the compensation budget and the Subagent’s allocation increase more
when the principal chooses to delegate. A similar argument holds for the equilibrium
probability of success of the risky project. In particular, the optimality of delegated
contracting, αA > ᾱA is a sufficient condition for the likelihood of success π to be
larger in that scheme.
1.5.3 Optimal Delegation with Common Observability
So far, we have seen that the principal’s choice between delegated and centralized
contracting is governed by the trade-off between improved observability of contracts
and more control over the division of the agents’ compensation budget. In this section,
we show that delegated contracting may also be preferred by the principal even when
the observability of contracts is the same across the two contracting schemes. To
this end, we allow the less skilled agent’s contract (i.e., the Subagent’s contract)
to be publicly observed. In particular, suppose that the Agent can observe (and
hence can condition his decision on) the contract signed by the Subagent in the
centralized contracting scheme as well as the delegated contracting scheme. We denote
the optimal compensation budget and allocation in the centralized scheme with one
public contract by (b′, φ′), and derive them in Appendix A.1.2.2.
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Proposition 1.4. If both the Agent and Subagent are sufficiently skilled, αA >
ᾱA(αS) and αS > ᾱS, the principal prefers delegated contracting over centralized
contacting, even when the contract of the less skilled agent is public. The threshold
ᾱA(αS) > ᾱA(αS) and decreases with the Subagent’s skill for αS > ᾱS.
Proposition 1.4 reveals that, even though the two contracting schemes have the
same observability of contracts, delegated contacting may still be preferable for the
principal. To see the reason for this result, note first that the principal gains from
the improved observability: his payoff from centralized contracting with one public
contract is higher than when both contracts are private, even though the total com-
pensation budget he chooses under this arrangement is also larger. This is because
the principal would really like to commit to offering both agents higher compensation,
because when each agent knows that the other is receiving strong incentive pay, the
complementarity between the agents’ efforts kicks in: the agents work harder for a
given prize, knowing that their own effort is more effective when the other agent is
working hard. The difficulty for the principal is that he is unable to commit to high
compensation for agents whose contracts are private because when their pay is unob-
servable by the other agent, the principal prefers to privately reduce it. So it is better
for the principal to have one contract observable than none. However, having only
one contract observable distorts the principal’s allocation of the compensation budget
in favor of the agent whose contract is public. For each dollar the principal publicly
promises to pay him, the principal anticipates both: the direct effect of more effort
from the recipient of the higher pay; and the indirect effect of more effort from the
other agent who observes his co-worker’s higher pay, anticipates the latter’s higher
effort and hence puts in more effort himself. By contrast, every dollar paid to the
agent whose contract is unobserved only generates the first, direct, effort response.
So the principal optimally skews the distribution of the compensation budget when
only one contract is observable.
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Figure 1·4: Optimal contracting scheme with one public contract
In the left panel we plot the principal’s expected payoff as a function of the budget allo-
cation to agent 1, φ1, for the optimal compensation budget b
D = b′. The solid blue dot,
corresponding to vD, represents the principal’s expected payoff under the optimal contracts
(bD, φDA=1). The solid black dot, corresponding to v
′, represents the principal’s expected
payoff under the contracts (b′, φ′1). In the middle panel we plot the region of agents’ skill
(αA, αS) in which delegated and centralized contracting are optimal. The solid black line
represents the threshold ᾱ(αS). The dotted line delimits the relevant region αA > αS .
In the right panel we plot the percentage increase in the principal’s expected payoff when
choosing delegated over centralized contracting, as a function of the Subagent’s skill αS .
Parameter values are: α1 = 0.9, α2 = 0.7.
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This compensation distortion creates room for delegation to improve matters even
when observability is held fixed. Because delegation allows rent extraction by the
agent, compensation is also distorted relative to the second best in this case. But if
the rent extraction is not too severe, then the distortion can be smaller than the dis-
tortion associated with centralized contracting. The first panel of figure 4 illustrates
one such case: compensation under centralized contracting is more distorted than
compensation under delegated contracting, resulting in a lower expected payoff for
the principal, v′ < vD. Why then, does the principal not offer the same, less distorted
compensation under centralized contracting? The answer is that such an offer would
not be credible: the Subagent would anticipate that the principal would secretly cut
the promised compensation to the Agent because it is not optimal for him to offer
such large compensation to the Agent individually and privately. By contrast, be-
cause the Subagent in the delegated hierarchy knows that the Agent engages in rent
extraction, he can be confident that the Agent is receiving a substantial portion of the
compensation budget even though the actual contract that the Agent receives is his
own private information. Thus the commitment to a structure where rent extraction
occurs allows the principal to commit to a different, and potentially less distorted,
division of the compensation budget from what he would choose in equilibrium under
centralized contracting.
Under what conditions is it useful for the principal to use the delegated contract
structure to commit to a different budget allocation even when one contract is observ-
able? Proposition 1.4 states that it is when both agents are particularly skilled. In
this case: (i) the rent extraction is low, and (ii) the complementarity between agents,
and the need to incentivize the Subagent more effectively is large. The plots in Figure
1·4 confirm this finding.
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1.6 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we have examined a principal-agent problem where the principal designs
bonus contracts for two agents who must work together on a joint project. The two
agents’ efforts are assumed to be complementary, that is, the effort of one agent
improves expected cash flow by more, the more effort the other agent makes. Neither
agent’s effort can be verified, so the setting can be considered to be a variant of
the classic moral hazard in teams problem first posed by (Holmstrom, 1982). The
novelty of our paper stems from two assumptions. First, we allow the principal
to contract individually with each of the two agents, but we do not require this –
instead, the principal can choose to contract only with one agent, granting that agent
a compensation budget and the power to hire the second agent and to pay that second
agent out of the compensation budget (with the first agent retaining the remainder
for himself). This can potentially turn what is a “moral hazard in teams” problem
with direct contracting between the principal and the agents, into a “double-sided
moral hazard” problem when the principal chooses to delegate contracting with the
second agent.
In a standard principal-agent setting, such a transformation would always be dis-
advantageous for the principal, who can always do at least as well by contracting
directly with the two agents (since she can always write the same pair of contracts
that would arise under delegated contracting). But in our setting this is not so. This
brings us to the second novelty of our analysis: we do not make the standard assump-
tion that all contracts are publicly observable by all parties. Instead, we assume that
the only parties who can observe a compensation contract are those parties that sign
the contract, i.e. the party receiving the compensation, and the party responsible
for paying the compensation. Then the difference between direct contracting and
delegated contracting is that in the former, the principal observes both agents’ com-
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pensation contracts, and each agent observes only their own, whereas in the latter,
one of the agents observes both contracts, whereas the principal only observes one of
them. This results in a real trade-off from switching to delegated contracts: by doing
so, the principal provides one of her agents with greater transparency of contracting,
but loses control over the terms of the other agent’s contract.
The cost of the loss of control is clear. Since the principal and the agents do not
share the same objective, the agent to whom contracting is delegated will choose the
wrong contract for the other agent, from the principal’s point of view.18 The benefit
of providing observability or transparency of contracting may be less clear. But in a
context where agents’ efforts are complementary, it turns out to be important. When
efforts are complementary in production, agents cares about how much effort the
other will make in choosing his own optimal effort. And he is concerned that while
the principal might say that she is going to provide the other agent with a generous
bonus to make the other agent work hard, when contracts are not observable, this is
pure cheap talk. Unless the principal’s contract with each agent is a best response to
the other agent’s contract, any promise by the principal to an agent about his peer’s
contract (and hence effort) is not credible. The need for each contract offer to be a
best response to the other imposes an extra constraint on the problem compared to the
case with public contracts, and turns out to lead to lower compensation on average
in our setting. With public contracts, the principal gains from choosing a high-
powered contract for one agent not only because that agent works harder, but also
from additional effort exerted by the other agent because of complementarity. When
contracts are unobservable, the second effect is lost and so the principal optimally
18The contract offered by the agent to the other agent is also wrong from a social point of view.
Socially, the principal always induces too little effort since he trades off providing incentives versus
rent extraction and does not internalize agents’ rent. So the compensation pool provided to the
agent-delegate is already socially too small. Then, when the agent-delegate offers a contract to his
peer, he faces the same trade-off between rent-extraction and incentives as the principal and keeps
too much for himself and gives too little effort incentive to his peer.
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chooses lower compensation, less high-powered incentives, and less effort, taking her
further away from the first best.
By moving towards contractual delegation, the principal restores observability
for one of the two agents (who now observes not only his own compensation but
also the compensation of the other agent to whom he offers a contract). Thus this
agent-delegate has higher-powered incentives than under direct contracting, and ex-
erts more effort. This is the source of the observability gain from direct contracting.
The principal trades off the observability gain, which increases incentives, against the
rent extraction distortion, which results in an inefficient allocation of compensation
between the two agents. When the observability gain is sufficiently large, which hap-
pens when complementarities between agents are sufficiently important, the principal
gains from choosing delegated contracting over direct (or centralized) contracting.
It is natural to extend our framework to a setting where agents have heterogeneous
skills. In that case, if the principal can choose which agent will undertake the dele-
gated contracting, the principal always chooses to have the more skilled agent employ
the less skilled worker. The intuition for this result is that since the agent-delegate
extracts too much rent, the incentives of the sub-agent are too small. Therefore, it
is best to have the less skilled agent receive the contract with poor incentives as the
impact of rent extraction on output is then mitigated.
Our main result highlights a novel trade-off between rent extraction and observ-
ability in contracting. But in the final part of the paper, we compared centralized
and delegated contracting with observability held constant, by artificially allowing the
less skilled agent’s contract to be publicly observable in the centralized contracting
setting. If the sole benefit of delegation were improving transparency, one would ex-
pect that centralized contracting with artificially enhanced observability of contracts
would dominate it. But in fact, delegated contracting sometimes does better. The
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reason is that delegation results in a different distribution of compensation as com-
pared to centralized contracting. In particular, with delegation, compensation will be
skewed towards the agent with the power to subcontract; whereas with centralized
contracting, it will be skewed towards the agent with the public contract (because that
agent’s compensation has both a direct effect on that agent’s effort and an indirect
effect on his co-worker’s effort). As long as observability is imperfect, the principal
cannot achieve the second best outcome in either case and – particularly when agents
are not too asymmetric and the returns to increasing effort are high – the skew that
results from delegation may be better for the principal. The principal cannot achieve
the same outcome under centralization without full observability because promises
to increase the pay of the more productive agent in this setting are merely cheap
talk: the less productive agent knows full well that the principal will not carry out
these promises in equilibrium when the contract in question is not observable to him.
By contrast, in equilibrium it is understood that the agent to whom contracting is
delegated will extract rents, and this provides a form of commitment for the principal
to providing higher pay for that agent.
Our theory helps improve our understanding of why delegation and subcontract-
ing are so common when standard theory suggests that such structures should be
dominated. We believe that this new insight will also be useful in addressing other
interesting research questions about the design of organizations, hierarchies, and in-
centive structures. What happens to the optimality of delegation versus centralization
as the number of agents increases, for example? How should the number of levels of
the hierarchy, and the number of agents in each level, be determined if three, or four,
or more, agents must work together, for example? How does the flatness or steepness
of the optimal hierarchy vary with the skill level of the agents, or with the asymmetry
between the agents? We hope to address some of these questions in future research.
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There are also a number of interesting applications which could be explored using
this new perspective. The decision within a firm as to whether to control salaries
centrally or whether to delegate these choices to divisional managers is a direct ap-
plication of the theory; as is the decision of a company undertaking a (real estate)
project as to whether to hire a general contractor or instead to deal with individual
contractors. Other settings can also be fitted into the framework. The make-or-buy
decision for a corporation, for example, appears very close to the direct-contracting
versus delegated contracting question. Less closely related, but still interesting, are
potential applications to the VCPE industry. There, limited partners contract with
general partners’ VCPE firm which then invest in (entrepreneurial) firms; where both
the general partners and the entrepreneurs must make effort in order for the venture
to succeed. This structure looks similar to the delegated hierarchy of principal-agent-
subagent in our model, where the principal provides the capital and the two agents
must make complementary efforts. Funds of funds, and even the relationship between
depositors, banks, and entrepreneurs, also have a similar structure, where the con-
tracts between the entrepreneur and the intermediary are often difficult or costly for
the ultimate investors (principal) to observe. While the efforts in these applications
may take a different form (e.g., efforts to screen adversely selected entrepreneurs),
the observability of contracts seems likely to remain important to the extent that
the success of the entrepreneur’s project involves complementary efforts between the
financial intermediary and the entrepreneurs.
Finally, our theory takes as given the difficulty in verifying other agents’ con-
tracts, or equivalently, the problems with making compensation public. We take this
difficulty as a fact about the world: people generally avoid discussing their compen-
sation with their colleagues,19 and indeed, when compensation contracts are made
19According to the (IWPR, 2017), two thirds of private sector employees report that they are
actively discouraged or could be punished for discussing their pay with other workers. (Cullen and
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public, this can lead to the leveling of pay and the departure of key staff.20 Since
the principal would be better off in our theory if compensation could be made pub-
lic, it is important to understand the costs that exist in the real world that prevent
some firms and institutions from doing so, and the problems that others endure as a
result of being obliged to make compensation contracts public. We conjecture that
envy of other agents’ contracts could be one such cost.21 It would be interesting to
explore, theoretically and experimentally, the trade-offs that arise when efforts are
complementary, between making the compensation of agents with unequal talents
transparent, in order to induce greater effort, and keeping them opaque in order to
efficiently match incentives to skills without inducing envy.
Perez-Truglia, 2020) provide revealed preference evidence that individuals at a large Asian bank
were unwilling to reveal their salary to their peers.
20Empirical evidence suggests that increasing pay transparency results in increased pay equality
but reduced pay levels. See for example, (Baker et al., 2019), and (Cullen and Pakzad-Hurson, 2019).
For a survey of some of the costs, including a discussion of the departure of key personnel from the
Harvard Management Company after their compensation was revealed, see (Zenger, 2016). The
Director General of the BBC testified to the UK Parliament that the 2017 decision to force the BBC
to reveal the pay of its highest earners was a factor in some high profile recent departures there, see,
e.g., https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-45482646. (Mas, 2017) documents that
mandated pay transparency in California cities resulted in pay reductions and a 75% increase in the
quit rate.
21(Perez-Truglia, ming) documents that when Norwegian income data become more easily avail-
able, lower-paid Norwegians’ happiness and life satisfaction was reduced relative to their higher-paid
peers. (Card et al., 2012) document that pay transparency reduces job satisfaction and increases
the probability of departure for lower-paid workers, while (Obloj and Zenger, 2017) suggest that
allowing bonus comparisons reduces employee productivity because of envy.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Financing Contracts in Venture
Capital Partnerships
2.1 Introduction
“Time, Talent, and Treasure (the three Ts of venturing) are required by both
the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist.”
– (Amit et al., 1990)
Two major sources of financing for start-up companies in the United States are angel
investors and venture capitalists. In an OECD study, (Wilson, 2011) estimates the
size of the angel market globally and concludes that the amounts of investments in the
angel market is extremely similar to those in the venture capital market.1 Moreover,
(Hellmann et al., 2019) show that angel financing and venture capital financing are
dynamic substitutes, and it is the companies who self-select into the financing path
that works the best for them. This paper studies the optimal source of financing for
entrepreneurs who need to raise capital and seek expert advice to implement and run
business ventures.
Venture capital financing is different from angel financing in at least two ways:
(1) Angel investors are wealthy individuals who directly invest their own money into
business ventures, whereas most of venture capitalists’ funding comes from the limited
partners (LPs), with the general partners (GPs) who make the investment decisions
1For instance, (Wilson, 2011) estimates the size of the angel market in 2009 is $17,700 millions,
compared to $18,275 millions of the total venture capital market, in the United States.
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investing only limited amounts of their own money into the fund ((Fenn et al., 1997),
(Robinson and Sensoy, 2013)). (2) The general partners of venture capital firms are
more actively involved in the management of the start-up firms than angel investors
((Ehrlich et al., 1994)).2
However, little is known about the financial intermediation role of venture capital-
ists aside from the services they provide to their portfolio companies ((Gorman and
Sahlman, 1989)). This paper explores the role of venture capitalists as intermediaries
between entrepreneurs and investors, shows how, by providing sufficient transparency
of contracts, venture capitalists can add value. This helps us to understand the preva-
lence of venture capital financing, in particular compared to other possible structures
such as the separation of investment and consulting services ((Casamatta, 2003),
(Chemmanur and Chen, 2014)).
Suppose a financially constrained entrepreneur, endowed with an innovative project,
is able to costlessly find a consultant who can provide the same expert advice3 as a
venture capitalist, will the entrepreneur fund her project through venture capital fi-
nancing, or hire the consultant and fund the project through angel financing? Figure
2·1 describes these two financing options for the entrepreneur. Standard principal-
agent theory implies that the entrepreneur should never choose venture capital fi-
nancing. First, for whatever contract the venture capitalist offers to the investors,
the entrepreneur can, if she wishes, always offer the same contract to the investors
2The community of angel investors is quite diverse, including individual angels, angel groups,
angel funds, etc. Although (Kerr et al., 2011) find that angel groups have adopted a similar hands-
on role like venture capitalists in the portfolio companies, we believe that the majority of angel
investors, especially those work individually or work with only a couple of others, is less involved in
the companies invested, compared to typical venture capitalists.
3Expert advice is broadly defined here and can include access to platforms, infrastructures, con-
nections to suppliers and users, and of course, human capital, including knowledge of the law,
business, etc. This is in line with venture capitalists’ different aspects of value-added role docu-
mented by (Barry et al., 1990), (Hellmann and Puri, 2002), (Hsu, 2004), (Gompers, 1995), (Kaplan
and Strömberg, 2004), (Lerner, 1994), (Lerner, 1995), etc. Moreover, (Sørensen, 2007) finds that the
expert advice provided by venture capitalists is significant and brings companies public at a higher
rate.
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that the venture capitalist would have offered. Second, since the venture capitalist’s
interest is not perfectly aligned with the entrepreneur’s, the entrepreneur can in gen-
eral do strictly better by offering a different contract to investors from the one that
the venture capitalist would have chosen. Thus, the prevalence of the venture capital
structure, where the design of the financial contract offered to investors is delegated
to the general partners represents something of a puzzle for corporate finance theory.
In this paper, we show that the above reasoning holds true only when all contracts
are verifiable by all parties. When instead verifiability is more difficult, the venture
capital contracting structure dominates the angel financing and separate advising
model.
Angel Financing Venture Capital Financing
Figure 2·1: “Replicating” Venture Capital Financing using Angel Fi-
nancing
When contracts between two contracting parties are always verifiable by third
parties, the entrepreneur can essentially write a contingent contract directly with the
consultant which specifies not only his compensation but also the investors’ payment
structure accordingly. Similarly, the investors’ contract offered by the entrepreneur
would also need to set out their pay package contingent on the consultant’s. In this
hypothetical world, both the consultant and the investors can verify how much the
entrepreneur offers to the other, so payment to one can be made contingent on the
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contract offered to the other, and each can costlessly sue the entrepreneur for any
contractual deviations.
However, the assumption of fully verifiable contingent contracts is too strong to
implement in practice. We show that with unverifiable contracts, that is, when the
entrepreneur cannot write contracts with one party contingent on contracts offered
to the other, then venture capital financing can become optimal for the entrepreneur.
With venture capital financing, the venture capitalist serves as the intermediary be-
tween the entrepreneur and the investors. This makes the venture capitalist the
signatory to both contracts (one is with the entrepreneur, the other is with the in-
vestors), and so the venture capitalist can by default, verify both contracts. As long
as the investors in the venture capital firm can also ultimately verify the payoffs from
the securities that the venture capitalist holds in the fund in which they invest, then
this is sufficient verifiability for the venture capitalist structure – in contrast to the
angel financing structure – to obtain the second best optimum.
The model we develop has several features that are consistent with the private
equity market. First, we assume that both the entrepreneur and the advisor (either
the consultant or the venture capitalist) must engage in costly effort to improve the
productivity of the project, and their efforts are complementary. This implies that
both have to be given appropriate incentives to exert effort, and the advisor will choose
to exert more effort if he believes the entrepreneur will also exert higher effort and vice
versa. Second, we assume that when the investors form a limited partnership with the
venture capitalist, they can verify how the entrepreneur implements the contract she
signs with the venture capitalist. To be more precise, the LPs can eventually confirm
the types and amounts of securities issued by the entrepreneur in exchange for their
capital investment. Third, we assume competitive capital and labor markets, so that
all the surplus is allocated to the entrepreneur.
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In this setting, we derive several interesting results about the entrepreneur’s opti-
mal financing choice and the implementation of the optimal financing contract. First,
with angel financing - where the entrepreneur contracts directly and separately with
the consultant and investors - the entrepreneur finds it expensive to raise money com-
pared to the second best with verifiable contracts. To understand the intuition for
this result, suppose that the investors agreed to fund the project for the same return
as with verifiable contracts. Then the entrepreneur would be tempted to reduce the
rent that the consultant requires to exert higher effort. The entrepreneur, in this way,
could be made better off without violating the consultant’s participation constraint
at the expense of sabotaging the investors’ expected payoff. Anticipating the “oppor-
tunistic” behavior of the other pair, the investors require a higher return to provide
the capital. If contracts were verifiable, the investors could confidently expect higher
efforts from both the entrepreneur and the consultant. Knowing the project becomes
more productive, the investors would be happy to receive lower compensation as a
compromise to give the others higher incentives. However, once the verifiability of
contracts by third parties assumption is dropped, raising capital becomes more ex-
pensive.
Next, we characterize the optimal contracts with venture capital financing. As the
entrepreneur, in this case, cannot write a contract directly with the investors, she is
constrained to offer a compensation budget with the venture capitalist which the latter
decides how to distribute the budget between himself and the investors. Nonetheless,
the entrepreneur knows that for whatever contract she writes, the venture capitalist
will play a best response to that: he maximizes the residual surplus without violating
the investors’ participation constraint. On one hand, the entrepreneur loses control
over the compensation structure; on the other hand, the investors, through verifying
the compensation budget, can calculate (hence eventually verify) the venture capital-
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ist’s pay package by comparing the payoffs on the owned securities with the payoffs
they themselves receive. Compared to angel financing, the entrepreneur trades off the
potential rent extraction from the venture capitalist against the improved verifiability
from the investors.
The result of the model is that the entrepreneur maximizes her expected payoff by
choosing venture capital financing. We find that the investors get more return while
the venture capitalist receives higher compensation with venture capital financing.
The result of the analysis is that with both financing schemes, the investors have to
obtain an expected payoff equal to their capital investment. They demand a larger
share of the returns due to unverifiability in the case of angel financing, yet they
are assured of increased productivity of the project from verifying the compensation
budget in the case of venture capital financing. From the entrepreneur’s perspective,
an increase in the investors’ compensation is a pure cost: it decreases her residual
value with no effect on the project’s productivity. Although an increase in the venture
capitalist’s compensation decreases the entrepreneur’s residual value as well, there is
an extra positive effect: the venture capitalist is incentivized to exert higher effort
which increases the productivity of the project. This increased productivity can off-
set some cost from a lower residual which makes the entrepreneur in favor of venture
capital financing. As for the advisor, a higher return to the investors decreases the en-
trepreneur’s residual value which lowers her motivation to exert effort. This decreases
the project’s productivity which further decreases the advisor’s expected payoff. On
the other hand, a higher compensation to the advisor can completely offset the neg-
ative effect from lower productivity. The advisor, accordingly, also prefers to become
a venture capitalist, instead of a consultant, so that he will receive a higher expected
payoff. There is no conflict of interest between the entrepreneur and the advisor in
terms of the financing choice.
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A surprising result is that there is no rent extraction by the venture capitalist when
the entrepreneur delegates contracting with the investors to the venture capitalist.
In other words, venture capital financing recovers the second-best contracts (optimal
verifiable contracts). The entrepreneur can essentially keep the optimal second-best
amount of residual and distribute all the rest to the venture capitalist, and the venture
capitalist will divide it between himself and the investors in a way that maximizes the
entrepreneur’s expected payoff in a second-best way. This result is again due to the
investors’ participation constraint and the fact that they can verify their investment in
the business venture. The intuition for the result is that although both a higher return
to the investors and a higher compensation to the venture capitalist can increase
the investors’ expected payoff, for the same amount of increase, the investors prefer
a higher return. If the venture capitalist keeps more budget to himself, then the
investors will decline this offer due to an insufficient return. If the venture capitalist
distributes more to the investors, then this increases the investors’ expected payoff
at the price of distorting his own. As a result, the venture capitalist will stick to the
entrepreneur’s optimal distribution of the budget.
Last, we offer a rationale for the use of convertible securities (e.g. convertible
preferred equity, convertible debt, etc.). With either financing choice, the investors’
optimal contract follows a standard debt form, while the advisor’s optimal contract
follows a standard equity form. The intuition is that the investors, as the capital
provider, maximize the entrepreneur’s expected payoff in the most efficient way with
debt compensation ((Innes, 1990)). The advisor, as an effort provider, aligns his per-
sonal interest to the entrepreneur’s with equity compensation ((Jensen and Meckling,
1976)). Ideally, the entrepreneur would like to issue different securities. However, the
entrepreneur’s preference for venture capital financing prevents her from writing a
separate contract with the investors. The use of convertible preferred equity (or con-
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vertible debt), with a carefully designed cumulative dividend (resp. deferred coupon)
pledged and conversion ratio, can essentially assist the entrepreneur in compensating
the investors and venture capitalist with different securities. When the performance
of the common stocks is bad, the venture capitalist will not convert into common
shares. The convertible securities act as debt and all the cumulative dividend or de-
ferred coupon pledged will be distributed to the investors. When the common stocks’
performance is good, the venture capitalist optimally chooses to convert his securities
into common stocks and shares them with the investors. The venture capitalist gets
paid only when the firm’s equity performance is good enough which fundamentally
depends on the productivity of the project. As a result, the venture capitalist would
like to exert more effort to improve the value of the common stocks and this moti-
vation aligns his interest with the entrepreneur. The investors, on the other hand,
only provide capital. To incentivize both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist
to improve the expected value of the project, the investors demand all the liquidity
preference. The contract between the venture capitalist and the investors describes
the investors’ liquidity preference and the venture capitalist’s carried interest : the
share of profits that will be distributed to the venture capitalist once the investors
receive their entire capital investment. By issuing convertible securities, the venture
capitalist gets equity-like securities while the investors get risky debt-like securities,
and the entrepreneur maximizes her expected payoff accordingly.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the existing literature in the following strands. First,
although (Sahlman, 1990) and (Gompers and Lerner, 1999b) have pointed out a
complete venture capital contractual relations includes (1) contracting between the
investors and the venture capital firm, and (2) contracting between the venture capi-
talist and the entrepreneurial venture, existing literature tends to focus on analyzing
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only one of them, without considering both of them altogether. What the scholars
doing are either making the venture capitalists solely responsible for the funds’ per-
formance (e.g., (Gompers and Lerner, 1999a); (Axelson et al., 2009); (Robinson and
Sensoy, 2013)), or approximating the venture capitalists as the investors of theory
(e.g., (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001); (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003)), and investigat-
ing the contracts between the venture capitalists (GPs) and the LPs or the contracts
between the venture capitalists and the entrepreneurs, respectively. To our knowl-
edge, our paper is the first one considering a complete venture capital entities: the
entrepreneur, the venture capitalist, and the LPs, and especially the delegated fi-
nancing nature of the venture capital in the sense that the entrepreneur funds her
project using the capital provided by the venture capitalist which is actually owned
by the LPs. We explicitly take into account that the venture capitalist’s incentive is
not perfectly aligned with the entrepreneur’s and he also needs to protect the LPs’
interest.
Second, this paper is also related to the strand of literature on the positive roles
of venture capitalists as intermediaries. Similar to the traditional financial interme-
diation theory ((Diamond, 1984) and (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997)), one category
of literature focuses on the venture capitalists’ information-based role, such as the
mitigation of moral hazard or adverse selection. (Chan, 1983) identifies the venture
capitalists as informed agents who increase the investors’ payoffs by inducing the en-
trepreneurs to offer high return projects. Another category of literature deals with
the venture capitalist’s active involvement in the portfolio companies in addition to
providing capital. (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989) presents that the venture capitalist
helps the entrepreneur raise additional funds and (Hellmann and Puri, 2002) shows
the venture capitalist’s assistance in the professionalization of the business venture.
In contrast to the above literature, our paper rationalizes the role of a venture cap-
55
italist as endorsing the entrepreneur to offer the second-best contracts in a credible
way. Making the venture capitalist as the intermediary between the entrepreneur and
the LPs reduces the verifiability considerations of the contracts.
Third, motivated by the empirical evidence that both entrepreneurs and venture
capitalists provide substantial efforts on implementing projects, our paper also con-
tributes the theoretical literature on the double-sided moral hazard ((Bhattacharyya
and Lafontaine, 1995)) in the sense that both have to be incentivized to exert costly
effort. (Casamatta, 2003) and (Casamatta, 2010) consider an additive specification
of simultaneous efforts on the project’s productivity and conclude the joint advent
of advising and financing by the venture capitalist. In a similar setting of (Renucci,
2006), he shows that the venture capitalist will be hired only if the moral hazard from
the entrepreneur is limited enough and there is sufficient residual incentive to induce
effort from the venture capitalist. (Repullo and Suarez, 2004) considers the joint re-
alization of simultaneous efforts from the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist in a
sequential investment setting and study the security design problem accordingly. (In-
derst and Müller, 2004) considers the various degree of complementarity between the
venture capitalist’s and entrepreneur’s efforts in an equilibrium framework and ana-
lyzes the effect of different capital market characteristics on the firm’s value. (Dessi,
2005) studies the venture capitalist’s monitoring role in reducing the entrepreneur’s
opportunistic behavior. (Schmidt, 2003) considers sequential actions setting where
the entrepreneur exerts effort before the venture capitalist and how convertible securi-
ties induce both to invest efficiently into the project. (Hori and Osano, 2013) explore a
continuous-time framework (based on (DeMarzo and Sannikov, 2006)) where the ven-
ture capitalist supplies effort and also chooses the optimal timing of IPO. Our paper
also recognizes the indispensable but unverifiable actions chosen by the entrepreneur
and the venture capitalist, and we consider a production technology which exhibits
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both complementarity of efforts and necessity of their joint realization, which is in
line with (Buffa et al., 2020). As the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist produce
different tasks for the business venture, it is suitable to assume their efforts are com-
plementary in the sense that one’s effort is more productive if the other exerts higher
effort. Since the main focus of our paper is to investigate the financing problem faced
by the entrepreneur, we limit our attention to the necessity of their joint realizations
of effort, emphasizing the team aspect of output. We examine the optimal financ-
ing scheme for the entrepreneur when she must (1) work on her project, (2) hire an
advisor to work with, and (3) raise capital from investors to implement the project.
We separate the role of advising and financing into two people which distinguishes us
from the existing literature.
Fourth, our paper is also related to the literature offering various rationales for
the pervasive use of convertible securities in venture capital financing, documented
by (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). In general, there are three categories. The first
category deals with moral hazard or adverse selection problems from entrepreneurs
only. For example, (Gompers, 1993) and (Gompers, 1997) show that the equity fea-
ture of the convertible debt limits the entrepreneur’s incentive to take risks, and the
debt feature helps the investors to select those entrepreneurs with high ability. (Cor-
nelli and Yosha, 2003) and (Trester, 1998) show that convertibles can be used as a
way to prevent the entrepreneur from manipulating performance and shifting risk
to the investors. The second category deals with moral hazard or adverse selection
problems from venture capitalists only. For instance, (Marx, 1998) shows a mixture
of debt and equity, where the equity is a convertible, enables an optimal level of
intervention compared with pure debt or pure equity. The third category considers
the double-sided moral hazard framework, such as (Casamatta, 2003), (Casamatta,
2010), (Dessi, 2005), (Hellmann, 2006), (Inderst and Müller, 2004), (Repullo and
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Suarez, 2004), and (Schmidt, 2003). All of these models recognize that both en-
trepreneurs and venture capitalists should be allocated some residual cash flows and
offer different explanations regarding the liquidation cash flow rights that come with
convertibles. This paper contributes to this category and provides another rationale
for the use of convertible securities. Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists are both
effort providers, while investors are capital providers. This implies that entrepreneurs
when designing securities have to consider the different incentives from venture capi-
talists and investors. However, venture capital financing prevents entrepreneurs from
contracting directly with investors. Our analysis shows that with a careful designed
convertible preferred equity or convertible debt can essentially assist entrepreneurs
in compensating venture capitalists with common equity-like securities and investors
with risky debt-like securities.
Fifth, our paper contributes to the literature regarding optimal financing choice for
new ventures, especially the comparison between angel financing and venture capital
financing. Although venture capital and private equity have been extensively studied
in the existing literature, angel financing, as one of the most common methods to fund
new ventures, is least studied both empirically and theoretically (e.g. (Wong et al.,
2009); (Wilson, 2011)). Literature differentiates angel financing from venture capital
financing in the sense that venture capitalists provide not only capital but also effort
while angels provide only capital. (Renucci, 2006) and (Casamatta, 2010) show that
entrepreneurs choose angel financing for inefficient pure effort providing advisors and
(Casamatta, 2003) finds venture capital financing is optimal when inefficient advisors
also provide capital. Adding one assumption that venture capital financing is scarce
relative to angel financing, (Chemmanur and Chen, 2014) characterize the optimal
financing path: depending on firm characteristics, a firm may use angel financing in
ite early stages and switch to venture capital financing in later stages, or vice versa.
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(Hellmann and Thiele, 2015), on the other hand, consider a special case where an-
gel financing and venture capital financing are complementary: angels have limited
funds which requires venture capital to provide follow-on funding for their companies.
However, using a unique tax credit program data from British Columbia, Canada,
(Hellmann et al., 2019) actually show that angel financing and venture capital financ-
ing are dynamic substitutes and the substitutes relationship is indeed company-led.
(Van Osnabrugge, 2000) empirically finds that when dealing with agency problems,
angel investors and venture capitalists use different approaches. Angel investors rec-
ognize the incomplete nature of contracts and focus on ex post allocation of control
((Hart and Moore, 1990), (Aghion and Bolton, 1992), (Hart, 1995)). Venture cap-
italists, on the other hand, use the classical principal-agent approach and focus on
ex ante screening and contract writing ((Jensen and Meckling, 1976), (Holmstrom,
1979), (Innes, 1990)). Our paper acknowledges his findings by recognizing that the
verifiability of contracts is different between angel financing and venture capital fi-
nancing. In the case of angel financing, entrepreneurs are unable to write angel
investors’ contracts contingent on advisors’ contracts, and vice versa. Unveriable
contracts are also one type of incomplete contracts. In the case of venture capital
financing, venture capitalists form limited partnerships with investors and contracts
become verifiable accordingly. This paper contributes to this strand of literature by
expliciting solving and comparing the optimal contracts in both financing schemes.
Finally, our paper also connects to the literature on organizational structure where
agents have to work in a team. (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) argues that moral haz-
ard from agents necessitates their supervision and moral hazard from the monitor
can be eliminated by making him a residual claimant. Similarly, (Holmstrom, 1982)
proposes an even simpler way, a “budget-breaking” scheme, that agents, all contract-
ing with a principal, will not get paid if their output falls below the optimal level.
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(Eswaran and Kotwal, 1984) points out the problem of moral hazard in team that the
monitor or principal can offer a secret contract to one of the agents which increases
their joint payoffs at the expense of lowering others’. (Hart and Tirole, 1990) and
(McAfee and Schwartz, 1994) formally introduce the notion of beliefs when contracts
are unobservable (hence unverifiable) and (Grossman and Hart, 1986) recognize the
incomplete nature of unverifiable contracts. They suggest a vertical integration be-
tween two parties as a solution to restore the higher profit. The most recent work by
(Buffa et al., 2020) formally solves the problem of moral hazard in teams and offers
a trade-off between direct contracting and delegated contracting. In our paper, angel
financing resembles direct contracting as entrepreneurs contract directly with advi-
sors and investors, and venture capital financing resembles delegated contracting as
entrepreneurs contract only with venture capitalists and venture capitalists contract
with investors. Our paper contributes to this string of literature as an application to
financial services.
2.2 The Model
We consider a one period economy. Ex-ante, an entrepreneur is endowed with a
profitable but risky project which requires another two players, investors and an
advisor, to implement. The investors are needed to fund the initial capital investment,
denoted by K. The advisor exerts expert advice, denoted by a, which combined with
the entrepreneur’s innovative effort, denoted by e, affects the project’s expected cash
flow, which is realized ex-post.
Technology. We denote the cash flow of the risky project by X, and for simplicity,
we assume the project’s realized cash flow takes only two values: higher cash flow and
lower cash flow. In both states, the project realizes a minimum cash flow, denoted by
XL > 0. There is an additional amount of extra cash flow, denoted by x > 0, when
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the higher cash flow state is realized. Once K is invested, both the entrepreneur
and the advisor can individually exert effort to increase the project’s probability of
reaching the higher cash flow state, denoted by π(e, a)
X(e, a) =
{
XL + x with prob. π(e, a)
XL with prob. 1− π(e, a). (2.1)
If K is not invested, π is equal to 0. The riskiness of the project implies that
XL + x > K > XL. (2.2)
Effort. We assume efforts are unobservable (and hence unverifiable). For the sake
of tractability, we model the probability of success π as the following:
π(e, a) = min{εea, 1}, (2.3)
where e and a are continuous in [0,∞) and ε > 0. This specification implies that
efforts from the entrepreneur and the advisor are complementary, ∂2π/∂e∂a = ε > 0:
one’s effort is more productive if the other exerts higher effort. ε measures the degree
of complementarity. Moreover, π(0, a) = π(e, 0) = 0 implies that both efforts are
necessary for the project to succeed, emphasizing the team aspect of output.4
Finally, we assume that the entrepreneur’s and the advisor’s disutility cost of






4Our production technology is in line with (Buffa et al., 2020). In their setting, π follows a







where β, γ > 0 and m,n > 2, both of which are strictly increasing and convex in
effort. Here, a larger m (resp. n) makes exerting innovative effort (resp. expert
advice) more costly.5
The social value of investing in the project is







Note that if efforts are verifiable, then from the view of the social planner, the optimal





































mn−m−n < 1, (2.9)
so the constraint min{εeFBaFB, 1} ≤ 1 is not binding at the first-best. We implement
assumption (2.9) throughout this paper, so the minimum operator can be ignored in
the analysis followed. To avoid credit rationing, we require S(eFB, aFB) ≥ 0, that is
x ≥ xFB.6 (2.10)
5Since we assume π to be affine in effort, the disutility of effort function has to be more convex
than the commonly used quadratic form, and m,n > 2 is simply one sufficient condition.
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Angel Financing Venture Capital Financing








Figure 2·2: Financing Schemes and Compensation Structures
Financing. Although the entrepreneur needs the two players to implement the
project, she can choose to finance the project from investors directly and seek expert
advice from an advisor independently, or instead to work with an advisor only who not
only brings expert advice but also capital from investors. We refer to the two financing
schemes as angel financing and venture capital financing, respectively. In the angel
financing scheme, the investors will be called angels and the advisor will be called a
consultant. In the venture capital financing scheme, we call the investors who provide
capital as LPs, which stands for limited partners, and the advisor who provides expert
advice as a venture capitalist. The investors form a limited partnership with the
venture capitalist. Figure 2·2 illustrates the structure of the two financing schemes.
Contracts. Although both financing schemes consist of two bilateral contracts,
the signatories of each are not the same. It is the entrepreneur who contracts with
the other two through angel financing, while through venture capital financing, it is
the venture capitalist. No contract is committed either between the angels and the
6The formal derivation, including the value of xFB , is in Appendix A.2.2.1
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consultant or between the entrepreneur and the LPs.
Moreover, the verifiability of the bilateral contract also differs in the two schemes.
Regarding angel financing, we assume each contract is verifiable only by the two
parties signing it. This means that neither the angels nor the consultant can verify the
contract which the entrepreneur offers to the other. One can think of the consultant
as an employee hired by the entrepreneur. A typical employment contract is not
contingent on how the entrepreneur actually raises the capital. Similarly, the investors
fund a project without specifying how much the entrepreneur should compensate her
employee. In most cases, these contracts are private information to the signatories.
Regarding venture capital financing, we assume that the entrepreneur cannot verify
the contract between the venture capitalist and the LPs. It is very unlikely that
the entrepreneur is completely informed of the true funding details of the specific
fund which provides the initial capital investment. As for the LPs, according to the
limited partnership agreement, they are not entitled to any firm-specific information.
However, the venture capitalist, as a general partner, periodically reports some high-
level descriptions regarding the portfolio companies, including but not limited to the
shares owned. The entrepreneur normally receives capital from the venture capitalist
by ceding a portion of ownership. Therefore, in our setting, the LPs can eventually
verify the contract between the other two.
This implies that any enforceable contract has to be based on what is verifiable
by all three players, which is the realization of the project’s cash flow X(e, a). We
assume that all players are risk-neutral with limited liability. This means that the
only cash flows that can be shared are no more than the outcome of the project. We
denote by S (resp. T ) as the amount of the cash flow accruing to the investors (resp.
the advisor). In order to be consistent with the notations representing the realized
cash flows, XL and XL+x, we call the investors’ compensation in the lower cash flow
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state as the investors’ guaranteed return, denoted by SL, and the extra amount they
receive in the higher cash flow state as their excess return, denoted by s. Similarly,
for the advisor, his compensation is referred as base pay, denoted by TL, and incentive
pay, denoted by t. In addition, we refer to the sum of the investors’ and advisor’s
compensation as a bundle, denoted by B, for which it is equal to BL and BL + b in
both states.
Payoffs. We assume competitive capital and labor markets: all capital (resp. la-
bor) providers obtain expected payoffs equal to their opportunity cost of investment
(resp. outside options), and the surplus is allocated to the entrepreneur. The intu-
ition is that there are many wealthy investors and skillful laborers looking for good
investment opportunities and only a few entrepreneurs with good projects. The en-
trepreneur has all the bargaining power and can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
them. For the sake of simplicity, we normalize the risk-free interest rate and the
advisor’s reservation utility to zero. 7
As depicted in Figure 2·2, with angel financing, the entrepreneur compensates
the angels S and the consultant T , and collects the residual cash flow X − S −
T . With venture capital financing, she distributes a compensation bundle B to the
venture capitalist and collects the residual cash flow X − B. The venture capitalist
compensates the LPs S and keeps the remaining od the bundle T ≡ B − S.
The expected payoff of the entrepreneur, denoted by E, is given by her expected
residual claim minus her cost of effort,




the expected payoff of the advisor, denoted by A, is given by her expected compen-
7(Ewens et al., 2019) consider a bargaining game between heterogeneous qualities of entrepreneurs
and VC investors, including certain contract terms and distribution of profit.
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sation minus his cost of effort,




and the expected payoff of the investors, denoted by I, is given by their expected
compensation
I = εea(SL + s) + (1− εea)SL. (2.13)
When both contracts are verifiable (and hence can be made contingent on each
other) by all three players, the entrepreneur is indifferent between angel financing
and venture capital financing. We will see later that this contrasts sharply with the
conclusions once the verfiability of contract is an issue. Before studying the optimal
choice that the entrepreneur makes at date 0 between the two financing schemes, we
first characterize the optimal contracts in two schemes separately, and discuss the
fundamental role played by the verifiability of these contracts.
2.3 Angel Financing
2.3.1 Optimal Contracting
In this section, we discuss the angel financing scheme in which the entrepreneur con-
tracts with the angels and the consultant independently. We model the interactions
among the three players as a noncooperative game. The timing of the game is as
follows:
(i) The entrepreneur simultaneously offers two take-it-or-leave-it compensation con-
tracts. Both the angels and the consultant can only verify their own offer.
(ii) Once the contracts are signed, the angels invest capital K, and both the en-
trepreneur and the consultant exert their levels of effort. Efforts are unobserv-
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able.
(iii) The outcome of the project is realized. Acccording to the realized state, the
entrepeneur uses the project’s cash flow to pay the angels and the consultant
the compensation specified in the contracts accepted and collects the residual.
We solve for the optimal contracts by working backward. First, for any contract T
committed to hire the consultant in advance, we derive the consultant’s optimal effort
choice a by maximizing his expected utility A given his beliefs about the contract S
offered to the angels. Similarly, for any contract S, we derive the angels’ expected
payoff I given their beliefs about T . Second, we derive the entrepreneur’s optimal
effort level e which maximizes her expected payoff E by playing a best response to
the contracts S and T agreed before as well as the consultant’s optimal effort choice
a determined in the first step. Third, given the effort levels e and a that determined,
we derive the optimal contract S and T which maximizes the entrepreneur’s expected
payoff E subject to delivering an expected payoff I, determined in the first step, to
the angels no less than their capital investment K.
Notice that we use the word “beliefs” here to describe the unverifiable contract
not signed by the player. This means that the consultant’s optimal effort choice and
the angels’ decision to invest capital into the project cannot be made contingent on
the unverifiable contract. This creates a role for beliefs about unverifiable contracts
that has been missing from the literature so far but is central to our analysis.
When both contracts are verifiable by all three players, this noncooperative game
has a proper subgame. As a best response to the two verifiable contracts, the optimal
effort choice from the consultant will be a function of S and T , whereby he can derive
his own effort and calculate the entrepreneur’s equilibrium effort choice accordingly.
As for the angels, they can also infer the entrepreneur’s and the consultant’s effort
choices based on the verifiable contracts so that they can determine whether or not to
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invest into the project. Therefore, the entrepreneur’s maximizing residual cash flow
problem must be employed in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.8
Now suppose that the verifiability of the contracts is dropped, the entrepreneur
tries to offer the optimal verifiable contracts and promises the angels and the con-
sultant that she will also stick to offer the optimal verifiable contract to the other.
Would the consultant exert the same level of effort as he would if the contracts are
verifiable? Would the angels agree to provide capital into the project?
The answer is No to both questions. To see why, suppose that the consultant
committed to exert the same level of effort as under the verifiable contracts, then it
would be optimal for the entrepreneur to “collude” with the angels by deviating to
a better contract which economizes on the incentive payments. The entrepreneur,
in this way, could be made better off without violating the angels’ participation
constraint. The consultant is made worse off as his effort choice is not a best response
to the deviating contract. Or, to put it in a different way, when the consultant puts
in more effort, he creates a positive externality effect on both the entrepreneur and
the angels, and the contract offered to the angels internalizes this externality on the
entrepreneur but not on the consultant. The entrepreneur could conduct a similar
“trick” to increase her expected payoff by deviating the consultant’s contract through
sabotaging the angels’ expected payoff. Anticipating the “opportunistic” behavior of
the other pair, the consultant demands more compensation to exert a certain effort
than he would with verifiable contracts, and the angels also require a higher return to
provide the capital. With verifiable contracts, the consultant could confidently expect
higher effort from the entrepreneur, which make the productivity of their own effort
larger due to complementary effect, and so makes higher effort more worthwhile for the
same level of compensation. Knowing that the project has a larger chance of reaching
8These are the second-best contracts in that the angels and the consultant can perfectly verify
each others’ contracts although efforts are still not verifiable. The formal derivation is in Appendix
A.2.2.2.
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the higher cash flow, the angels are also happy to receive a lower compensation to
compromise. However, with unverifiable contracts, incentive provision becomes more
expensive.
As a result, this noncooperative game no longer has a proper subgame. Although
the angels’ (resp. the consultant’s) expected payoff, in equilibrium, depends on the
contract the entrepreneur offered to the other, whether to invest in the project (resp.
how much effort to exert) cannot be conditioned on the unverifiable contract. Sub-
game perfection cannot be employed in this game. Of course, as there are many
ways to form beliefs about the unverifiable contract, there must be many Nash equi-
libria. However, most of them are noncredible. For instance, the beliefs that the
entrepreneur will stick to offering the verifiable contracts is not credible.
Therefore, as a refinement of Nash equilibrium, throughout, we consider only
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBE) in which consistency of beliefs with Bayes
Rule is required both on and off the equilibrium path.9 Notice, however, that Bayes
Rule does not pin down beliefs after probability zero events, and so in principle
different systems of out-of-equilibrium beliefs after such events exist and these could
be used to support different PBEs, so the game could have multiple PBEs. In this
game, a system of beliefs characterizes how the angels and the consultant revise their
beliefs about the unverifiable contract when receiving an out-of-equilibrium offer from
the entrepreneur. The willingness to accept an “unexpected” offer depends on what
they think about how, if at all, the entrepreneur might change the contract she
privately offered to the other. In this paper, we consider a PBE which is supported
by so-called passive beliefs.10
9To be more precise, it should be weak perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (weak PBE). We stick
to the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBE), because first there is no subgame with private
contracts, weak PBE is equivalent to PBE in this game. Second, PBE is what industrial organization
literature uses, we use PBE here as well serving as a good reference to the existing literature.
10(McAfee and Schwartz, 1994) propose three possible beliefs to consider: symmetric beliefs,
passive beliefs, and wary beliefs. Passive beliefs, originally introduced by (Hart and Tirole, 1990), is
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When the consultant, with passive beliefs, receives an out-of-equilibrium offer
from the entrepreneur, he does not revise his beliefs about the unverifiable offer made
to the angels. In other words, the consultant believes that the entrepreneur sticks to
offer the equilibrium contract to the angels, no matter what contract he receives from
her. Therefore, his conjectures about the angels’ contract, denoted by Ŝ, remains the
equilibrium one which he expects the entrepreneur to offer. The consultant chooses
his optimal effort level, denoted by a(Ŝ, T ), and calculates the entrepreneur’s effort
level, denoted by e(Ŝ, T ), using his contract T and the conjected contract Ŝ. Similarly
for the angels, they form passive beliefs about the unverfiable contract offered to the
consultant, denoted by T̂ . Using S and T̂ , the angels can calculate the entrepreneur’s
effort level, denoted by e(S, T̂ ), and the consultant’s effort level, denoted by a(S, T̂ ),
and conclude the project’s probability of success. Then, they determine their expected
payoff and decide whether to invest K into the project.11
Having defined our notion of equilibrium and the system of off-equilibrium beliefs,
we next discuss the optimization problems of the three players. We start with the
consultant’s problem in stage two. After receiving T from the entrepreneur, she forms
beliefs about the contract offered to the angels, Ŝ. Therefore, the optimal level of
effort chosen by the consultant, a(Ŝ, T ), is determined in the system of equations
below:
widely used in the industrial organization literature, including (O’Brien and Shaffer, 1992), (McAfee
and Schwartz, 1994), (Rey and Vergé, 2004) etc. We only focus on passive beliefs because symmetric
beliefs require homogeneous agents but we have heterogeneous players, the angels and the consultant,
in our setting, and the equilibrium outcome with wary beliefs is the same as with passive beliefs.
To be more precise, (Rey and Vergé, 2004) point out that wary beliefs are equivalent to passive
beliefs only when there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with passive beliefs. However, we do
not discuss nonexistence problems in this paper.
11(Buffa et al., 2020) also discuss unverifiable contracts in their setting. Instead of forming beliefs
on contracts, they form beliefs on the unverifiable effort directly.
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
e(Ŝ, T ) = arg max
e
εea(Ŝ, T )(XL − ŜL − TL + x− ŝ− t)




a(Ŝ, T ) = arg max
a






a(Ŝ, T ) =
ε
m







The consultant’s effort choice does not depend on the base pay TL, which is how
much he receives in both states. In order to induce effort from the consultant, the
entrepreneur has to compensate him more in the higher cash flow state serving as
incentive, which requires that
t > 0. (2.16)
The intuition is the same as in the standard principal-agent problems under moral
hazard: the agent would like to exert higher effort for a higher compensation. In
our two-state setting, the higher the compensation in the higher state of the world,
the higher the consultant’s desire to increase the likelihood of that state, and a lower
state compensation, in fact, reduces effort incentive. This is the direct effect of t
on incentive provision. However, due to our limited liability assumption, a higher
incentive pay t also reduces the entrepreneur’s residual value, x− s− t, in the higher
state, which further decreases her desire to exert effort. The complementarity between
efforts implies that the consultant’s willingness to exert effort decreases with the en-
trepreneur’s effort. This is the indrect effect of t. The entrepreneur has to tradeoff
the increased direct effect against the decreased indirect effect for an increased value
of t. Moreover, the consultant exerts lower effort if he believes that the entrepreneur
compensates the angels more in the higher state, ŝ. This is again due to the comple-
mentary effect of efforts as a higher beliefs of ŝ lowers the entrepreneur’s effort which
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further reduces the consultant’s desire to exert effort.
Next, we consider the angels’ problem in stage two after receiving S from the
entrepreneur. The angels must form beliefs about the contract offered to the consul-
tant, T̂ . Although the angels do not exert effort, they need to calculate their expected
payoff so as to determine whether to invest K into the project. To be more precise,
they need to infer the entrepreneur’s and the consultant’s effort levels in order to
determine their expected payoff.
Passive beliefs about T̂ implies that when the angels receive an off-equilibrium
contract S from the entrepreneur, they think that the entrepreneur sticks to offer
the equilibrium contract T̂ to the consultant. Moreover, as the consultant also holds
passive beliefs about the unverifiable contract S, the angels further infer that the
consultant forms passive beliefs about the contract Ŝ. Therefore, the angels think
that the consultant will exert the same equilibrium effort level regardless of what S
offered. We denote the angels’ inferred effort level from the consultant by a(Ŝ, T̂ ),
which is determined by the system of equations below:
e(Ŝ, T̂ ) = arg max
e
εea(Ŝ, T̂ )(XL − ŜL − T̂L + x− ŝ− t̂)




a(Ŝ, T̂ ) = arg max
a






a(Ŝ, T̂ ) =
ε
m







As for the angels’ inferred effort level from the entrepreneur, the angels think that
the entrepreneur will exert a different effort level when the entrepreneur offers an
off-equilibrium contract S to them, under the beliefs T̂ and the inferred consultant’s
effort level a(Ŝ, T̂ ). We denote the inferred entrepreneur’s effort level by e(S, Ŝ, T̂ ),
which is determined by
72
e(S, Ŝ, T̂ ) = arg max
e
εea(Ŝ, T̂ )(XL − SL − T̂L + x− s− t̂)














The associated value for the angels’ expected payoff, denoted by I(S, Ŝ, T̂ ), is











The angels’ expected payoff increases with their guaranteed return, SL. We
know from our previous analysis that efforts only depend on how much more the
entrepreneur and the consultant get in the higher state. This implies that how much
the effort providers receive in the lower state has no effect on the project’s probability
of success. In other words, the entrepreneur can increase the angels’ expected payoff
without changing the incentive provision of efforts.
We also restrict our analysis to the case where the investors get a monotonic
contract, that is the investors’ compensation is constrained to be monotonically non-
decreasing in the project’s realized cash flow. Here, it simply means that their excess
return is nonnegative,
s ≥ 0. (2.21)
This assumption is used to prevent the entrepreneur from secretly diverting cash
flows.12 A nonnegative excess return s also has two offsetting effects on the angels’
12As argued by (Innes, 1990), even with verifiable output, the entrepreneur has the incentive to
borrow risk freely and inject into the actual cash flow when the project turns out to be a failure. In
this way, the entrepreneur’s expected payoff increases as she compensates the investors less.
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expected payoff. A higher s increases what they actually get when the project reaches
the higher cash flow state but also decreases the probability of reaching the higher
state. The entrepreneur has to balance these two effects when offering s to the angels.
The angels’ beliefs about the incentive pay t̂ also have two opposite effects. On one
hand, a higher beliefs t̂ increases the direct incentive effect on the consultant’s effort
choice while it decreases the direct incentive effect on the entrepreneur’s effort level.
This is again due to the complementarity of efforts.
Then, we consider the entrepreneur’s optimal choice in stage two after offering
S and T . Being a signatory to both of the contracts, the entrepreneur does not
need to form beliefs about the contracts. At the same time, she also knows that the
consultant’s optimal effort choice is derived based on his contract T and his beliefs
about contract Ŝ. As a result, the entrepreneur plays a best response to those beliefs
by exerting an optimal effort level which is a function of S, T , and Ŝ, denoted by
e(S, Ŝ, T ):
e(S, Ŝ, T ) = arg max
e
εea(Ŝ, T )(XL − SL − TL + x− s− t)














Similar to the consultant’s, the entrepreneur’s optimal effort choice does not de-
pend on SL and TL. Moreover, the entrepreneur has to save enough residual in the
higher state in order to exert effort, that is
x− s− t > 0. (2.23)
She exerts higher effort if she compensates the angels less in the higher state, s, or
if the consultant believes that she compensates less, ŝ. How much the entrepreneur
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compensates the consultant, t, also has two offseting effects on her optimal effort
choice, which is again due to the complementary effect between efforts.
Last, we move back to stage one. In this stage, the entrepreneur’s optimization
problem is to choose the angels’ contract S and the consultant’s contract T so as to
maximize her expected residual cash flow from the project, denoted by E(S, Ŝ, T, T̂ ),
subject to the entrepreneur’s and the consultant’s incentive compatibility (IC), the
three players’ individual rationality (IR), the limited liability (LL), the angels’ mono-
tonic contract (MC), and positive effort (PE) constraints,
(S(Ŝ, T̂ ), T (Ŝ, T̂ )) = arg max
S, T




εe(S, Ŝ, T )a(Ŝ, T )(XL − SL − TL + x− s− t)
+ (1− εe(S, Ŝ, T )a(Ŝ, T ))(XL − SL − TL)− β





The IC constraint of the consultant is given by the optimal effort choice in (2.15)
and that of the entrepreneur is in (2.22). The IR constraints of the entrepreneur
and the consultant are always satisfied given their outside options of 0, and the IR
constraint of the angels is that their expected payoff should be no smaller than the
capital investment K,
I(S, Ŝ, T̂ ) ≥ K, (2.25)
where their expected payoff I(S, Ŝ, T̂ ) is defined in (2.20). Combining (LL), (MC),





x− s− t > 0,
SL ≥ 0,
TL ≥ 0,
XL − SL − TL ≥ 0.
(2.26)
The entrepreneur rationally takes into account, throught the IC and IR con-
straints, that the consultant and the angels each form passive beliefs about the unver-
ifiable contract offered to the other. Therefore, the optimal level of contracts, S and
T , are both a function of the beliefs, Ŝ and T̂ . In equilibrium, the consultant’s (resp.
the angels’) conjecture about the contract offered to the angels Ŝ (resp. the consul-
tant T̂ ) must be correct and correspond to the equilibrium contract level, denoted by
SA (resp. TA),
Ŝ = SA, (2.27)
T̂ = TA, (2.28)
where the superscript A stands for angel financing. Imposing (2.27) and (2.28) after
solving the optimization problem in (2.24) subject to (2.25) and (2.26), we obtain
the optimal contracts in the angel financing scheme, which the following proposition
characterizes.
Proposition 2.1. With angel financing, there exists a threshold x ≥ xA such that
the optimal compensations for the angels and the consultant are respectively equal to
SAL = XL, (2.29)






and sA > 0 exists and is determined uniquely in
ε
mn















+XL −K = 0. (2.31)
It follows that:
(i) The angels individual rationality constraint is binding, IA = K;
(ii) in the lower cash flow state, the angels receive all the cash flow, SAL = XL, while
neither the consultant nor the entrepreneur receives anything, TAL = XL−SAL −
TAL = 0;
(iii) in the higher cash flow state, the angels receive the minimum cash flow XL and
share the extra cash flow x with the other two players. tA decreases with n.
The optimal contracts obtained in Proposition 2.1 are based on the maintained as-
sumptions of (2.9) and that contracts are not verifiable in the angel financing scheme.
The IR constraint of the angels is obviously binding, because if it is not, the en-
trepreneur can always increase her expected payoff by decreasing the angels’ compen-
sation without affecting her and the consultant’s incentives. Both the entrepreneur
and the consultant receive nothing in the lower state, due to our monotonic con-
tract assumption (2.21) and its “maximal high-profit-state payoff” property ((Innes,
1990)). As discussed in our analysis before, their incentives solely depend on how
much more they would receive when the project succeeds, (2.23) and (2.16). The
riskiness of the project, defined in (2.2), also limits the maximal amount of cash flow
that can be distributed to the angels in the lower state. Combining these two fac-
tors, it is optimal to compensate the effort providers only in the higher state. In our
setting, a larger n means that the consultant has a more convex cost function which
implies that exerting effort becomes more costly for him. When n increases, it means
that the consultant is getting less productive, and the entrepreneur finds it better to
decrease the project’s probability of success with the benefit of an increased residual
cash flow x− s− t and an increase of excess return s.
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In the next section, we first analyze the venture capital financing scheme, and
then compare the optimal contracts between these two schemes.
2.4 Venture Capital Financing
2.4.1 Optimal Contracting
In this section, we discuss the venture capital financing scheme in which the en-
trepreneur contracts only with the venture capitalist, who has formed a limited part-
nership with the LPs to raise funds. As with angel financing, we model the interac-
tions among the three players as a noncooperative game. The timing of the game is
as follows:
(i) The venture capitalist forms a limited partnership with the LPs by offering
a take-it-or-leave-it contract in exchange for a certain amount of committed
capital.
(ii) The entrepreneur offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the venture capitalist,
who has signed a limited partnership agreement with the LPs in stage one. The
entrepreneur cannot verify the contract between the venture capitalist and the
LPs.
(iii) Once the LPs and the venture capitalist have accepted contracts in stage one
and stage two, respectively, capital K is invested, and both the entrepreneur
and the venture capitalist exert their levels of effort. Efforts are unobservable.
(iv) The outcome of the project is realized. According to the realized state, the
entrepreneur uses the project’s cash flow and pay the venture capitalist the
compensation specified in the contract accepted in stage two and collects the
residual. After the LPs verify the contract between the entrepreneur and the
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venture capitalist, the venture capitalist uses what he receives from the en-
trepreneur to pay the LPs according to the contract signed in stage one and
keeps the residual part.
A typical venture capital cycle begins with fund-raising, followed by investing and
exiting stages. The venture capitalist raises funds from the LPs, by pooling their
capital into a venture capital fund, and then invests the fund into a business venture,
through contracting with the entrepreneur. Our timeline described above is also
consistent with what happens in practice.
However, in our setting, since we assume competitive capital and labor markets,
we can think of the problem as the entrepreneur offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to
the venture capitalist first and then the venture capitalist offers a take-it-or-leave-it
contract to the LPs conditioning on his contract with the entrepreneur. The intuition
is that the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power and she can always find a venture
capitalist who would like to accept her offer. In practice, there are many venture
capitalists who have already completed the fund-raising stage. Depending on time,
the funding market, the relative bargaining power between the venture capitalists
and LPs, and most importantly the venture capitalists’ past performance, different
venture capitalists can raise funds from different LPs under different contracts. The
venture capitalist would like to accept the entrepreneur’s offer if he knows that both
his and the LPs’ individual rationality constraints can be satisfied.13 Therefore, we
rewrite stage one and stage two of the game as the following:
(i)’ The entrepreneur offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract B to the venture capitalist
as an exchange of an investment capital K. The venture capitalist decides
whether to accept the offer or not.
13Another way to rationalize our analysis is by assuming this is a simultaneous move game, as
argued by (Casamatta, 2003), since efforts are unobservable (and unverifiable). For a simultaneous
game, it is irrelevant to consider the ranking of the stages, such as which stage comes first.
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(ii)’ After committing a contract in stage one, the venture capitalist makes a take-
it-or-leave-it offer S to the LPs. B − S is essentially his compensation T which
is defined in Section 2. The LPs can verify the contract B and decide whether
to accept the offer or not. The entrepreneur cannot verify S.
Similar to the angel financing case, we solve the entrepreneur’s venture capital
financing problem by working backward. First, for any contracts B and S committed
in advance, we derive the LPs’ expected payoff I. Second, we derive the venture
capitalist’s optimal effort level a which maximizes his expected payoff A by playing a
best response to the contracts B and S. Third, given the effort level a determined in
the second step and B committed , we derive the optimal contract S which maximizes
the venture capitalist’s expected payoff I subject to delivering the LPs an expected
payoff I determined in the first step no less than the capital investment K. Fourth,
for any B, we derive the entrepreneur’s optimal effort level e which maximizes her
expected payoff E by playing a best response to the contract S determined in the
third step. Last, given the effort levels e, a, and S determined, we derive the optimal
contract B which maximizes the entrepreneur’s expected payoff E subject to the
venture capitalist’s individual rationality constraint.
In the angel financing scheme that the entrepreneur contracts with the other two
players, both of whom form beliefs about the contract offered to the other. By
contrast, in the case of venture capital financing, it is the venture capitalist who
contracts with the other two players. Obviously, the venture capitalist does not need
to form beliefs since he is the signatory to both contracts. The LPs also do not need to
form beliefs. Even though they do not contract directly with the entrepreneur, they
can verify the contract signed between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist.
Then, the question is will the entrepreneur form beliefs about the contract between
the venture capitalist and the LPs? Will the venture capitalist extract rent from the
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entrepreneur?14
The answer is No to both questions. Too see this, we begin with the LPs’ problem
in stage two. After receiving S from the venture capitalist, the LPs knows that the
venture capitalist keeps B−S, since the contract B is verifiable to the LPs. Similar to
the angels, although the LPs do not exert effort, they need to derive the entrepreneur’s
and the venture capitalist’s effort levels, respectively denoted by e(B, S) and a(B, S),
in order to determine their expected payoff, denoted by I(B, S). Therefore, the
optimal effort levels are determined in the system of equations below:
e(B, S) = arg max
e
εea(B, S)(XL −BL + x− b)




a(B, S) = arg max
a
εe(B, S)a(BL − SL + b− s)





The associated value for the LPs’ expected payoff is











We also restrict the LPs’ contract to be monotonic, therefore,
s ≥ 0. (2.34)
Next, we consider the venture capitalist’s problem in stage three. After receiving
contract B from the entrepreneur in stage one and committing to pay the LPs S








the entrepreneur delegates contracting with the LPs to the venture capitalist. Please refer to (Buffa
et al., 2020) Section 4 for a further discussion.
81
in stage two, the venture capitalist’s optimal effort choice will be a best response to
B and S, denoted by a(B, S). Therefore, the optimal level of effort chosen by the











Similar to the angel financing, the venture capitalist’s effort choice only depends
on how much extra he will get in the higher cash flow state. In order to save enough
residual cash flow to exert effort, he also needs
b− s > 0. (2.36)
The venture capitalist exerts more effort if he distributes less to the LPs, a lower
s, when the project is in higher state. b also has two effects on his effort choices:
direct and indrect effect. A large b increases the venture capitalist compensation,
b − s, which further increases his incentive to exert effort, while it decreases the
entrepreneur’s compensation, s− b, which lowers his effort incentive.
Next, we analyze the two optimal contracts. One is offered by the entrepreneur;
the other is offered by the venture capitalist. Note that in the angel financing scheme,
it is the entrepreneur who offers both two contracts S and T . Both contracts can be
signed either simultaneously or sequentially; the timing of the two contracts does not
matter. The entrepreneur can freely contract with either the angels or the consultant
first or both at the same time. The reason for this is the contracts in the case of
angel financing are unverifiable to them. In one words, the entrepreneur cannot offer
one contract that is contingent on the other contract. As a result, the contract S
and T must be determined jointly. However, in the venture capital financing scheme,
a sequential commitment of contracts is necessary. In our setting, the entrepreneur
must sign a contract B with the venture capitalist before him contracting with the
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LPs. We can think of B as the total compensation budget that the entrepreneur
forfeit in order to implement the project, and the venture capitalist decides how to
split the budget between him and the LPs. As a result, the LPs’ contract S, offered
by the venture capitalist, must be contingent on B. We donote the optimal contract
which the venture capitalist offers to the LPs as a best response to B as S(B).
We move back to stage two and analyze the venture capitalist’s problem again.
In this stage, his optimization problem is to choose the LPs’ contract S so as to
maximize his expected residual cash flow from B, denoted by A(B, S), subject to his
incentive compatibility (IC), the LPs’ individual rationality (IR), the limited liability
(LL), the LPs’ monotonic contract (MC), and positive effort (PE) constraints,





εe(B, S)a(B, S)(BL − SL + b− s)




The IC constraint of the venture capitalist is given by the optimal effort choice in
(2.35) and e(B, S) is determined in the system (2.32). The IR constraints of the LPs
is that their expected payoff is no smaller than the capital investment K,
I(B, S) ≥ K, (2.38)
where their expected payoff I(B, S) is defined in (2.33). Combining (LL), (MC), and
(PE) constraints, we get 
s ≥ 0,
b− s > 0,
SL ≥ 0,
BL − SL ≥ 0.
(2.39)
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After that, we consider the entrepreneur’s optimal effort choice in stage three
after committing to offering B to the venture capitalist. The entrepreneur knows
that the venture capitalist will offer S(B) to the LPs. At the same time, she also
knows that the venture capitalist’s optimal effort choice is derived based on B and
S(B), denoted by a(B, S(B)). As a result, the entrepreneur plays a best response to
those by exerting an optimal effort level which is a function of B only, denoted by
e(B):
e(B) = arg max
e
εea(B, S(B))(XL −BL + x− b)














Similar to the angel financing scheme, the entrepreneur’s optimal effort choice
depends only on how much extra she has when the project succeeds. As a result, the
entrepreneur has to save enough residual in the high state in order to exert effort,
that is
x− b > 0. (2.41)
Moreover, how much compensation budget she offers to the venture capitalist in the
high state, b, has two offseting effects on her optimal effort choice, which is again due
to the complementary effect between efforts.
Last, we move back to stage one. In this stage, the entrepreneur’s optimization
problem is to choose the compensation budget B so as to maximize her expected
residual cash flow from the project, denoted by E(B), subject to the entrepreneur’s
and the consultant’s incentive compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR), the
limited liability (LL), and positive effort (PE) constraints,
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B = arg max
B
E(B),
= εe(B)a(B, S(B))(XL −BL + x− b)




The IC constraint of the venture capitalist is given by the optimal effort choice in
(2.35) and that of the entrepreneur is in (2.40). Their IR constraints of the them are
always satisfied given their outside options of 0. Combining (LL), (MC), and (PE)
constraints, we get 
b > 0,
x− b > 0,
BL ≥ 0,
XL −BL ≥ 0.
(2.43)
Unlike in the case of angel financing, no player in the venture capital financing scheme
forms beliefs about the contract committed between the other two players. We denote
SV C and T V C as the equilibrium compensation levels for the LPs and the venture
capitalist, respectively, where the superscript V C stands for venture capital financ-
ing. We solve the optimization problem in (2.42) subject to (2.43) and the following
proposition summarizes the optimal contracts in the venture capital financing scheme.
Proposition 2.2. With venture capital financing, there exists a threshold x ≥ xV C
such that the optimal compensations for the LPs and the venture capitalist are respec-
tively equal to
SV CL = XL, (2.44)























+XL −K = 0. (2.46)
It follows that:
(i) The LPs individual rationality constraint is binding, IV C = K;
(ii) in the lower cash flow state, the LPs receive all the cash flow, SV CL = XL, while
neither the venture capitalist nor the entrepreneur receives anything, T V CL =
XL − SV CL − T V CL = 0;
(iii) in the higher cash flow state, the LPs receive the minimum cash flow XL and
share the extra cash flow x with the other two players. tV C decreases with n.
The optimal contracts derived in Proposition 2.2 are based on the maintained
assumptions of (2.9) and the fact that the LPs can eventually verifiy the contract
signed between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. Similar to the case of
angel financing, the IR constraint of the LPs is binding. Both the effort providers,
the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist, receive compensation only in the higher
state. The intuition remains the same as that given after Proposition 2.1.
However, an interesting result which differentiates venture capital financing from
angel financing is that the venture capitalist’s compensation, tV C = x
n
, depends only
on how productive he is. The productivity, defined in our setting, corresponds to the
convexity of his effort cost function n. In the case of angel financing, the consultant
compensation, tA = x−s
A
n
, depends not only on his productivity level but also on the
angels’ compensation sA.
2.4.2 Optimal Financing Scheme
Having analyzed the optimal contracts in the two financing schemes, a natural ques-
tion arised is which scheme the entrepreneur should choose? What about the other
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equilibrium quantities between these two schemes? The following proposition and
corollary answer these questions.
Proposition 2.3. ∀x ≥ {xV C , xA}, the entrepreneur maximizes her expected payoff
by choosing the venture capital financing scheme,
EV C > EA. (2.47)
Moreover, the credit rationing threshold is smaller with venture capital financing
scheme,
xV C < xA. (2.48)
Corollary 2.1. ∀x ≥ xA, compared to the angel financing scheme, with venture
capital financing,
(i) the entrepreneur gets a lower residual value while exerting a higher effort level,
x− sV C − tV C < x− sA − tA, (2.49)
eV C > eA; (2.50)
(ii) the venture capitalist receives a higher amount of compensation, exerts a higher
effort level, and reaches a higher expected payoff,
tV C > tA, (2.51)
aV C > aA, (2.52)
AV C > AA; (2.53)
(iii) the LPs receive a lower amount of compensation when the project succeeds while
the probability of success is higher,
sV C < sA, (2.54)
πV C > πA. (2.55)
Proposition 2.3 states that the entrepreneur is willing to finance her project
through a venture capitalist, instead of angel investors with whom she also needs
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to hire a consultant. To grasp the intuition, we first note that, in our setting, all
three players’ equilibrium expected payoffs - as well as the effect levels and the prob-
ability of higher cash flow state - admit the same functional form between the two
financing schemes:










+XL − SL − TL, (2.56)
I(S, T ) =
ε
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where EV C = E(SV C , T V C), EA = E(SA, TA), IV C = I(SV C , T V C), and IA =
I(SA, TA). We also know from Proposition 2.1 and Proposition 2.2 that SV CL =




L = 0, and I(S
V C , T V C) = I(SA, TA) = K. As a result, in the
following analysis, we consider only the parts which differ between the two financing
schemes, that is,





Ī(s, t) = (x− s− t) nmn−m−n t mmn−m−n s, (2.60)
Ā(s, t) = (x− s− t) nmn−m−n t
n(m−1)
mn−m−n , (2.61)
where we call Ē(s, t), Ī(s, t), and Ā(s, t) the effective expected payoff of the en-
trepreneur, the investors and the advisor, respectively. Moreover, the investors’
IR constraint being binding in both financing schemes implies that Ī(sV C , tV C) =








(K −XL) ≡ k.
First, let’s determine the levels of s and t which maximize the entrepreneur’s
effective expected payoff Ē(s, t). Figure 2·3 displays how Ē(s, t) responses to t for
given levels of s. Without considering the investors’ individual rationality condition,
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Figure 2·3: Entrepreneur’s Effective Expected Payoff
In this figure, we plot the entrepreneur’s effective expected payoff Ē(s, t) as a function of the
advisor’s compensation t, for a fixed level of the investors’ compensation (1) s = 0 (black
line), (2) s = sV C (red line), and (3) s = sA (blue line).
Ī(s, t) ≥ k, it is easy to see that the levels are s∗ = 0 and t∗ = x
n
. The intuition
is quite straight forward. The advisor’s compensation in the higher state has two
opposite effects on the entrepreneur’s expected payoff. A higher t induces higher
effort from the advisor which further increases the probability of success, while at the
same time, a higher t decreases the entrepreneur’s residual cash flow. t∗ = x
n
is a
result of balancing these two effects. However, compensating the investors is a pure
cost for the entrepreneur. A higher s decreases the total amount of compensation
that can be distributed to the entrepreneur and the advisor, x− s− t, while it has no
direct impact on the probability of success since the investors are not effort providers.
Hence, the entrepreneur will not leave anything for them s∗ = 0.
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However, it is obvious that the levels s∗ = 0 and t∗ = x
n
violate the investors’
individual rationality constraint. Due to the riskiness of the project, defined in (2.2),
the entrepreneur has to leave a positive amount for the investors in the higher state,






corresponds to the optimal level in
the angel financing and x
n
corresponds to that in the venture capital financing, the
investors’ effective expected payoff Ī(s, t) is increasing in both s and t. s has a direct
effect while t has an indirect effect on their effective expected payoff: A higher s
directly increases the investors’ realized cash flow in the higher state; While, a higher
t increases the advisor’s compensation, inducing higher effort from him, which further
increases the probability of success. As a result, the entrepreneur has to compensate
either the investors or the advisor more in order to satisfy the investors’ individual
rationality constraint. Both the solutions (sV C , tV C) and (sA, tA) meet the investors’
expectation, Ī(sV C , tV C) = Ī(sA, tA) = k.
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We can see that a higher s decreases Ē(s, t) in the way that it lowers the entrepreneur’s
realized cash flow x−s− t, which we call a negative compensation effect. In the same
way, a higher t also has a negative compensation effect. However, a higher t also
increases the advisor’s compensation which induces her to exert higher effort. Due
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to our complementary assumption of effort in our setting, a higher effort from the
advisor increases the probability of the higher state which further increases Ē(s, t).
We call this a complementary effect. As a result, although both s and t have a





< 0 ∀s ∈ (0, mn−m−n
mn




]. A simple comparison of the
optimal contracts between the two financing schemes, which are characterized in
corollary 2.1, yields that
sV C < sA, tV C > tA. (2.64)
The venture capitalist receives higher compensation while the angels receive more.
Accordingly, the entrepreneur optimizes her expected payoff by choosing the venture
capital financing scheme.
Then, a question raised is why the entrepreneur pays less to the consultant but
more to the angels in the angel financing scheme? To put it in another way, can the
entrepreneur replicate the optimal contracts in the venture capital financing scheme
and compensate sV C to the angels and tV C to the consultant, respectively, to reach
a higher expected payoff? The answer is NO due to the unverifiability of contracts.
Figure 2·4 displays the entrepreneur’s opportunistic behavior if angels agree to fund
the project under compensation sV C .
Suppose the entrepreneur offers sV C to the angels and offers tV C to the consultant
in the angel financing scheme. How would the angels and the consultant repond
to their out-of-the-equilibrium offers? For the angels, since they cannot verify the
contract t, we think that they form passive beliefs about t. This means that when
the angels receive an unexpected offer from the entrepreneur, they think that the
entrepreneur has made an mistake but she will continue to offer the equilibrium
contract to the consultant, which is tA. Therefore, the angels calculate their effective
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Figure 2·4: Entrepreneur’s Opportunistic Behavior
In this figure, we plot the entrepreneur’s effective expected payoff Ē(sV C , t) as a function of
the consultant’s compensation t. If the angels agree to fund the project with sV C , then the
entrepreneur has the incentive to cut down on expert advice in order to save money which
further increases her own expected payoff at the expense of making the angels worse off.
expected payoff as Ī(sV C , tA) < Ī(sA, tA) = k. As a result, they will decline the offer
and not invest capital into the project. As for the consultant, he also thinks that the
entrepreneur continue to offer sA to the angels. From the consultant’s prespective, he
thinks that the entrepreneur keeps less compared to the equilibrium level, x − sA −
tV C < x − sA − tV C , and the direct effect for her is to exert less effort accordingly.
The complementary of effort implies that the consultant exerts less effort compared
to what he will do with venture capital financing. In the end, the entrepreneur cannot
commit sV C and tV C in the angel financing scheme as the angels would decline the
offer and the consultant would not exert enough effort which further decreases the
entrepreneur’s expected payoff.
Last, we further examine the two financing schemes by comparing some other
equilibrium quantities, given the results in Corollary 2.1. The venture capitalist
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receives a higher compensation compared with what the consultant gets, tV C > tA,
which in turn makes him exert higher effort in equilibrium, aV C > aA. We also find
out that the entrepreneur distributes a larger compensation budget, defined as s+ t,
through venture capital financing. This is consistent with (Buffa et al., 2020). The
intuition is again due to the verifiability of contracts. A large compensation budget
has a direct income effect and indirect complementary effect on effort with verifiable
contracts while it has only a direct income effect with unverifiable contracts. The
venture capital as a signatory to both contracts would like to exert more effect under
the same compensation as in the angel financing. The LPs are also not afraid of being
expropriated since they can verify the contract t and are happy to receive a lower
return in the case of success, sV C < sA. Regarding the compensation and effort level
of the entrepreneur, we find that she keeps less residual, x− sV C − tV C < x− sA− tA,
while exerts higher effort level, eV C > eA in the case of venture capital financing.
This is again a result of the additional complementary effect of t. Accordingly, the
probability of success, πV C > πA, as well as the venture capitalist’s expected payoff,
AV C > AA, are larger in that scheme.
2.4.3 Delegated Contracting
So far, we have showed that the entrepreneur always chooses venture capital financing
to fund her project and we have analyzed how the different compensation contracts af-
fect her expected payoff. However, one key feature between the two financing schemes
is that the entrepreneur contracts directly with the other two players in the angel fi-
nancing scheme while she contracts only with the venture capitalist and delegates to
him the contracting with the LPs in the case of venture capital financing. The conflict
of interest between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist leaves room for rent
extraction by the ventue capitalist in his case. Similar to the definition introduced
by (Buffa et al., 2020), we define the rent extraction of the venture capitalist as the
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additional compensation that the venture capitalist keeps for himself, compared with
his second-best compensation. In particular, we would like to know how the optimal
contracts derived in the venture capital differs from the second-best contracts. The
following proposition summarizes the finding.
Proposition 2.4. The venture capital financing scheme recovers the second-best con-
tracts.
Proposition 2.4 states an interesting result: there is no rent extraction from the
venture capitalist. The entrepreneur can essentially keep the optimal second-best
amount of residual and distribute all of the rest to the venture capitalist, and the
venture capitalist will divide it between himself and the LPs in a way that maximizes
the entrepreneur’s expected payoff in a second-best way. This outcome is due to
two factors: competitive investors market and the verifiability of the contract. Since
we assume a competitive capital market, neither the entrepreneur and the venture
capitalist will compensate the LPs such that their expected payoff exceed their capital
investment K. As the LPs can verify the amount the entrepreneur keeps, they can use
their contract offered by the venture capitalist to determine the venture capitalist’s






























Similar to Ē(s, t), both s and t have a negative compensation effect on Ā. However,
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t also has a positive direct incentive effect which can completely offset the negative
compensation effect. As a result, the only way that the venture capitalist can generate
a higher expected payoff is to increase the amount he keeps for himself out of the
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compensation effect





















As before, both s and t have a negative compensation effect on Ī. However, there is
also a positive direct incentive effect from s and a positive complementary effect from
t. Although either positive effect can offset the negative effect, the direct incentive




> 0. This means that, keeping the total value
of s + t as fixed, the LPs would have a higher expected payoff if a part of t can be
transferred to s, and they would have a lower expected payoff the other way around.
Suppose the venture capitalist keeps more budget for himself, denoted by δ > 0,
and offers a contract sSB−δ which is strictly less than sSB, then the LPs would decline
that offer since Ī(sSB− δ, tSB + δ) < Ī(sSB, tSB) = k. However, if he distributes more
to the LPs, this increases their expected payoff at the price of distorting his own. As a
result, the venture capitalist will stick to offering the second-best contract to the LPs
and the venture capital financing scheme coincides with the second-best contracts.
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Throughout this paper, we have maintained the assumption that neither the angels
nor the consultant can verify the other contract in the angel financing scheme, while
both the LPs and the venture capitalist can verify both contracts in the venture capital
financing scheme. This is a realistic assumption which describes exactly the financing
schemes the entrepreneur of a startup can choose from in practice. One question
is how do the other industries value these two financing schemes, in the sense that
only the direct signatories can verify the bilateral contracts? The following corollary
presents the result.
Corollary 2.2. If the LPs cannot verify the contract signed between the entrepreneur
and the venture capitalist, then the optimal contracts coincide with those in the angel
financing scheme.
The result is still a consequence of the competitive capital market assumption
that the investors’ expected payoff is strictly equal to K. Since the LPs cannot
verify how much the entrepreneur distributes to the venture capitalist, they form
passive beliefs about it and will not revise their beliefs even though they receive a
different offer from the venture capitalist. ∂Ī(s,t)
∂s
> 0 implies that the LPs agree
to invest into the project only when they receive compensation no smaller than sA,
Ī(s, tA) ≤ Ī(sA, tA) = k ∀s ≤ sA. As analyzed before, the venture capital will
not offer a higher compensation to the LPs unless he receives a larger budget from
the entrepreneur, ∂Ā(s,t)
∂s
< 0 < ∂Ā(s,t)
∂t
. Now, let’s suppose the entrepreneur indeed









she can reach a higher expected payoff with a larger budget if the venture capitalist
keeps more to himself t > tA, and compensates the LPs less, s < sA. However, this
is not feasible as the LPs only accept offers that are larger than or equal to sA. As a
result, the optimal contracts coincide with the optimal angel financing contracts.
(Buffa et al., 2020) investigate a similar setting where two agents exert comple-
mentary efforts on a principal’s project. The principal can choose to contract directly
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with both agents, or contract with only one agent and delegate this agent to contract
with the other agent. They refer to them as “centralized contracting” and “delegated
contracting” schemes, respectively. They have maintained the assumption that only
the direct signatores to the contract observe (and hence can verify) the contract. Our
setting in Corollary 2.2 is similar to their setting in the sense that the entrepreneur
can be viewed as the principal, and the advisor and the investors can be treated as the
two agents. The entrepreneur’s financing scheme decision to fund the project: angel
financing versus venture capital financing, is analogous to the principal’s centralized
contracting versus delegated contracting schemes, respectively.
However, as a comparison, in the setting of (Buffa et al., 2020), the principal
has to trade-off between the benefit of improved observability of contracts and cost
of loss of control over the compensation budget when deciding between centralized
contracting and delegated contracting. This is different from our setting in Corollary
2.2 as the entrepreneur is essentially indifferent between the two contracting schemes.
There is no benefit or cost from delegating to the venture capitalist. The reason is
that although the entrepreneur and the principal are both the residual claimants to
their projects, the entrepreneur is also an effort provider while the principal is not. At
the same time, the investors have to obtain an expected payoff at least equal to their
investment K but the Subagent’s reservation utility is zero.15 This means that the
Subagent will accept any offer from the Agent while the LPs won’t. The Agent, as a
result, can exploit the Subagent by keeping more budget to himself which decreases
the principal’s expected payoff. Meanwhile, the Agent observing both contracts gives
the principal the ability to commit to distribute a larger budget which increases
her expected payoff. However, in our setting of Corollary 2.2, the venture capitalist
cannot exploit the LPs and the entrepreneur cannot increase her profit with a larger
15(Buffa et al., 2020) define Agent as the agent who contracts directly and Subagent as the agent
who does not contract directly with the principal in the delegated contracting scheme.
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budget.
Up until now, our model provides a rationale for the existence of venture capital
firms. If the venture capitalist provides the same quality of expert advice as an outside
consultant and there is no differential cost of financing, the entreprenur should strictly
prefer venture capital financing over angel financing in a competitive capital and labor
markets. Note that the rationale provided here is different from the one introduced by
(Casamatta, 2003). In her setting, the advisor provides less efficient effort compared
to what the entrepreneur does and the existence of venture capital firms is the result
of the joint provision of effort and wealth. She treats the venture capital firm as a
whole who interacts with the entrepreneur altogether, while in our case, we work on a
more realistic setting in which we consider the venture capital firm as a partnership:
the venture capitalist (GP) forms a limited partnership with the investors (LPs),
whereas the GP exerts managerial effort and the LPs provide capital.
The next section investigates the type of securities the entrepreneur would like to
offer to the venture capitalist and how she markets those securities with the double-
sided moral hazard financing problem studied here.
2.5 Optimal Financial Contracts in Venture Capital
Partnerships
So far, we have characterized the optimal contracts in two different financing schemes
and demonstrated the optimality of the venture capital financing scheme in the en-
trepreneur’s innovative project. In this section, we show how these contracts can be
implemented using financial claims that are widely issued by venture capital backed
business ventures.
For the sake of simplicity, we restrict ourselves to only one type of security. An
illustration of this is that some securities can be replicated using other securities, for
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instance, the payoff of a convertible debt can be replicated using a combination of
debt and equity plus a conversion option. Differences between these two types of
claim usually the allocation of control rights in case of a liquidation event, which is
irrelevant in our setting. The implementation we present in the following is just one
but not the unique way for the entrepreneur to finance her project.
2.5.1 Optimal Security Design
The entrepreneur raises initial capital K by issuing a security ex-ante. Her objective
is to determine which financial assets will not only replicate the exact payoff of the
optimal contracts and thereby provide powerful incentives for the entrepreneur, the
venture capitalist, and the LPs.16
The optimal contracts with venture capital financing derived in Proposition 2.2
imply that the LPs obtain XL when the project fails, and the entrepreneur and
the venture capitalist are compensated only when the project succeeds. All three
players share the higher state outcome. These results are a direct consequence of
the riskiness assumption, defined in (2.2), and the “maximal high-profit-state payoff”
property, introduced by (Innes, 1990). The LPs’ optimal contract is shown to take
a standard debt form, while the entrepreneur’s and the venture capitalist’s contracts
are shown to take a standard equity form. However, the entrepreneur contracts only
with the venture capitalist and we restrict her to issue one type of security. As a
result, the entrepreneur can implement the optimal contracts by issuing convertible
preferred stocks to the venture capitalist.17
16Since the optimal contracts are written on the realized output, which is verifiable to all three
players, the implementation described here holds regardless of who designs the security, as long as
the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power.
17Note that convertible debt can also implement the optimal contracts in our setting as we focus
on cash flow rights and optimal incentive provisions, instead of control rights and liquidation rights
here. Although the payoffs and conversion to common equity triggers between convertible debt and
convertible preferred equity are basically the same, the differences arise in the events of liquidation.
First, convertible debt has priority over convertible preferred equity if both claims are issued. Second,
if the convertible debt has a coupon which cannot be deferred, fail to honor the coupon payment
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Define D as the cumulative dividend pledged on each convertible preferred stock
multiplied by the total number of convertible preferred stocks issued.18 Denote α as
the fraction of convertible preferred stock in the firm’s equity. Therefore, the fraction
of common stock is 1− α. For the sake of simplicity, we assume the conversion ratio
is one: one share of convertible preferred stock can be exchanged into one share of
common stock. In order to distinguish between the convertible preferred stock and
common stock, we assume
αXL < D < α(XL + x), (2.69)
and
D ≤ XL. (2.70)
Here, αXL is the convertible preferred shareholders’ payoff if they convert their shares
in the lower state of the world and α(XL+x) is their payoff if converting in the higher
state. (2.69) implies that the venture capitalist will not convert his shares only if the
project succeeds. (2.70) implies that the outcome in the lower state is sufficient
enough to cover the cumulative dividend required for the convertible preferred stock.
The contracts must match the payoffs of the convertible preferred stocks, therefore
would put the firm into a default stage, while fail to distribute the dividend pledged is a less severe
problem. Third, when issuing convertible debt, collateral is required. Collateral is not required
when issuing convertible preferred equity.
18(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003) find cumulative preferred dividends are present in 43.8 % of the
venture capital financings. In general, start-ups rarely pay out dividends or coupons as they are cash
poor. Paying dividends or coupons might cause them to raise another round of financing. However,
sometimes venture capitalists can ask entrepreneurs to make their preferred dividends cumulative
(rather than non-cumulative) as a way of making the liquidation rights stronger. Even though these
are dividends that do not have to be paid out periodically, they accumulate and are added to the
liquidation claims. If we implement the optimal contracts using convertible debt, D will be defined
as deferred coupon or deferred interest. Our implementation is also in line of (Casamatta, 2003)
who defines D as minimum dividend pledged.
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
SV CL = D,
SV CL + s
V C + T V CL + t
V C = α(XL + x).
(2.71)
When the project fails, the entrepreneur uses the cumulative dividend as the LPs’
compensation; when the project succeeds, the entrepreneur shares the higher output
with the LPs and the venture capitalist as their compensation. The riskiness of the
project, defined in (2.2), also implies that the LPs would also like to convert the
preferred shares into common shares. There is no conflict of interest beween the LPs
and venture capitalist regarding the conversion time. Denote by β the fraction of
those converted shares that will be distributed to the venture capitalist. In practice,
β is frequently referred to as carried interest. To match the payoff, we also need
T V CL + t
V C = β(α(XL + x)−K). (2.72)
Replacing SV C and T V C by their values derived in Proposition 2.2, the following
proposition describes the financial claim that is optimally issued by the entrepreneur.
Proposition 2.5. The entrepreneur can raise initial capital K by issuing convertible
preferred stocks to the venture capitalist, which represents
α =
XL + s




of the firm’s equity. The cumulative dividend pledged on these convertible preferred
stocks is
D = XL, (2.74)
and the conversion ratio is 1. The convertible preferred stocks will be optimally con-
verted into common stocks when the project is a success. The venture capitalist charges









and the left portion will be distributed to the LPs,
1− β = XL + s
V C




Our implementation is consistent with the empirical observation that convertible
preferred stocks are extensively used in the venture capital industry, as evidenced by
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003) and (Sahlman, 1990). The use of carried interest is
also widely documented in the alternative management literature, such as venture
capital, private equity, mutual funds, and hedge funds.
The intuition for the convertible preferred stocks implementation is the follow-
ing. If the venture capitalist and the LPs inside the venture capital firm contract
individually with the entrepreneur, like the angel financing scheme we described in
Section 2.3, then based on the optimal contracts, the entrepreneur would like to issue
common stocks to the venture capitalist and standard debt to the LPs. The venture
capitalist, as an effort provider, aligns his personal interest to the entrepreneur’s with
equity compensation, according to (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The LPs, as the
capital provider, maximize the entrepreneur’s expected payoff in the most efficient
way with debt compensation, according to (Innes, 1990). However, due to the lack
of verifiability of the contracts, the entrepreneur is unable to reach for highest profit
using angel financing scheme.
The use of venture capital financing scheme, although it helps the entrepreneur
recover the second-best contracts (Proposition 2.4), prevents the entrepreneur from
contracting directly with the LPs. A direct consequence is that the entrepreneur
cannot issue common stocks to the venture capitalist. The optimal contracts derived
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in Proposition 2.2 imply that the entrepreneur does not receive any cash flow if the
project fails. As a result, the entrepreneur must issue some securities that are senior
to common stocks, such as preferred stocks or debt. But straight debt-like or debt
securities do not align the venture capitalist’s interest to the entrepreneur’s.
The convertible preferred stocks essentially assist the entrepreneur in compensat-
ing the venture capitalist and the LPs with different securities. Figure 2·5 shows the
return pattern for a typical convertible security as a function of the realized output
X. When the project fails, it means that the performance of the common stocks
is bad, the venture capitalist will not convert his shares. The convertible preferred
stocks act as debt and the LPs receive all the cumulative pledged dividend. When
the project succeeds, the venture capitalist optimally chooses to convert shares into
common stocks and shares the outcome with the LPs. The venture capital gets paid
only on the success of the project. In other words, the venture capitalist’s compen-
sation depends on the firm’s equity performance and he would like to exert effort to
improve the value of the common stocks. This motivation aligns his interest with
the entrepreneur. By issuing convertible preferred stocks, the venture capitalist gets
equity-like securities while the LPs get risky debt-like securities, and the entrepreneur
maximizes her expected payoff accordingly. We also respectively depict the payoffs
for the entrepreneur (Figure 2·6), the LPs (Figure 2·7), and venture capitalist (Figure
2·8) below.
Several theoretical papers on venture capital contracts also offer different expla-
nations for the use of convertible preferred stocks in the venture capital financing.
(Gompers, 1993) and (Gompers, 1997) show that convertible debt dominates common
equity and standard debt in the sense that convertible debt combines the advantages
of the other two. Using a model of venture capital financing combining both moral
hazard and adverse selection, he shows that the equity feature of the convertible debt
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Figure 2·5: Convertible security’s payoff (red line) responses to real-
ized output
Figure 2·6: Entrepreneur’s payoff (green line) responses to realized
output
limits the entrepreneur’s incentive to take risks, and the debt feature helps the in-
vestors to select those entrepreneurs with high ability. Similarly, (Marx, 1998) shows
that pure debt gives the venture capitalist too much incentive to intervene, and pure
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Figure 2·7: LPs’ payoff (pink line) responses to realized output
Figure 2·8: Venture capitalist’s payoff (yellow line) responses to real-
ized output
equity too little. A mixture of debt and equity, where the equity is a convertible,
enables an optimal level of intervention.
Recognizing the effort provision from both the entrepreneur and the venture cap-
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italist, some other work, such as (Casamatta, 2003), (Dessi, 2005), (Inderst and
Müller, 2004), (Renucci, 2006), (Repullo and Suarez, 2004), and (Schmidt, 2003),
also consider a framework of double-sided moral hazard. All of these models empha-
size the importance of having both the effort providers be residual claimants when the
project succeeds, and they offer different explanations of the use of convertible pre-
ferred stocks accordingly. In (Casamatta, 2003), (Dessi, 2005), (Inderst and Müller,
2004), and (Renucci, 2006), they find that in parts of the parameter space can the
convertible preferred stocks be issued optimally. In the setting of (Casamatta, 2003),
when the amount of venture capital financing is large enough do the optimal con-
tracts resemble convertible bonds or preferred stocks and the entrepreneur’s resemble
common shares. In a similar setting, (Renucci, 2006) shows that a mix of debt and
equity financing is optimal only when the entrepreneur’s private benefit from shirking
is within a certain range. In the setting of (Dessi, 2005), the entrepreneur uses a con-
vertible or a combination of debt and equity when the entrepreneur’s endowed capital
bounded between a certain range. In the setting of (Inderst and Müller, 2004), the
venture capitalist holds debt when his equilibrium equity share is large enough. (Re-
pullo and Suarez, 2004) consider the a sequential investment model. They find that
when the venture capital investing happens at a later stage, it is optimal to compen-
sate the initial stage investors with convertible claims while preserving the incentives
for the venture capitalist later. The analysis of (Schmidt, 2003) also explains that a
convertible induce the venture capitalist to intervene precisely in those states where
his action is desirable.
Similar to the convertible securities’ mitigating risk-shifting motivation, intro-
duced by (Brennan and Schwartz, 1988) and (Green, 1984), another strand of the-
oretical work, such as (Cornelli and Yosha, 2003) and (Trester, 1998), shows that
convertibles can be used as a way to prevent the entrepreneur from manipulating
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performance and shifting risk to the investors. In the setting of (Cornelli and Yosha,
2003), the entrepreneur has the incentive to boost interim performance in order to
attract additional rounds of financing. As a high performance makes the venture cap-
italist convert his convertible debt into equity, this dilutes the entrepreneur’s equity
stake and prevents her from wanting to manipulate earnings. (Trester, 1998) also rec-
ognizes the higher probability of asymmetric information between the entrepreneur
and the venture capitalist. The foreclosure feature of debt will push the entrepreneur
into opportunistic behavior by taking all assets available which decreases the venture
capitalist’s expected return. Preferred equity, acting like a debt but without the fore-
closure right, allows the venture capitalist to receive some positive return rather than
a big loss.
One more theoretical approach, represented by (Berglof, 1994) and (Hellmann,
2006), considers convertible securities as a way to avoid inefficient exit from ventures.
In the model of (Berglof, 1994), convertible debt enables the entrepreneur and the
venture capital to capture the maximum amount of rents in the presence of a sale.
Built on (Aghion and Bolton, 1992), (Hellmann, 2006) mentions the conflicts between
the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist about cash flow rights, depending on
whether exit occurs by an IPO or acquisition. The venture capitalist has to give
up a cumulative amount of equity in the case of an IPO, which makes him in favor
of an acquisition. The use of (participating) convertible preferred equity, including
automatic conversion at IPO, aligns his interest to the entrepreneur’s.
2.5.2 Empirical Predictions
The analysis of our model presented here implies the following testable predictions:
(1) An entrepreneur with more bargaining power chooses venture capital financing.
First, there should be a relationship between the relative competitiveness of the
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business venture to the markets and the choice of financing scheme, conditioning
on the joint involvement of the entrepreneur and an advisor being required. Our
model predicts that in competitive capital and labor markets, the entrepreneur
should always prefer venture capital financing rather than angel financing. That
is to say, an entrepreneur with more bargaining power chooses venture capital
financing.
In order to measure the entrepreneur’s bargaining power, two measurements
can be considered: the management team and the financing history. First, as
suggested by (Gompers et al., 2020), the management team has been seen by
the venture capitalists as the most important factor when they select invest-
ments. For instance, the entrepreneur’s ability, industry experience, passion,
entrepreneurial experience, and teamwork are some important qualities in a
management team. A company with a stronger management team would at-
tract more investors hence should have more bargaining power in the capital
market. Alternatively, we can use the company’s financing history, including the
number of funding rounds, the amount of money raised in the previous rounds,
etc., to measure the entrepreneur’s bargaining power. A company that has a
better financing history typically indicates that it has been recognized in the
capital market, therefore, should have more bargaining power over investors.
To test the hypothesis that an entrepreneur with more bargaining power chooses
venture capital financing, we need firm-level data and we should examine com-
panies on a round by round basis. For each round of financing, we check (1)
whether the company receives venture capital financing, and (2) whether the
company receives angel financing, controlling for industry, calender time, com-
pany age, etc.,
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1{V CFinancing}f,t = BargainingPowerf,t + Controlsf,t + εf,t (2.77)
1{AngelF inancing}f,t = BargainingPowerf,t + Controlsf,t + εf,t (2.78)
We predict a positive coefficient for the venture capital financing (probit) re-
gression and a negative coefficient for the angel financing (probit) regression.
This prediction is consistent with the received wisdom about the entrepreneurial
ecosystem: start-up companies receive angel financing at the beginning (e.g.,
seed stage) and gradually shift toward venture capital financing for later rounds.
Facebook and Google, two of the most successfully start-ups in the history, both
received angel financing before obtaining venture capital financing ((Hellmann
and Thiele, 2015)). At the same time, we rarely witness the reverse pattern that
a company receives venture capital financing first and migrates to angel financ-
ing later. This stepping stone pattern from angel to venture capital financing
can be interpreted using our model. At the early stage of the company, the bar-
gaining power is largely on the investors’ side due to the high uncertainty of the
business venture. Therefore, the company does not necessarily have to choose
venture capital financing at the beginning as raising capital directly from angels
could be cheaper. Once the company has proven to be a promising business,
the bargaining power is now on the entrepreneur’s side, and it is optimal for
her to choose venture capital financing.
(2) Angel groups outperform individual angels and venture capital funds.
Our model finds that angel financing - a direct financing scheme - is suboptimal
due to the unverifiability of contracts. If contracts are verifiable, the direct
financing scheme which the entrepreneur raises capital directly from investors
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should become optimal.
One way to make the contract between the entrepreneur and the consultant
verifiable to the angels is to “mimic” the venture capital structure, which is
the bundling of capital together with advice. This is exactly what angel groups
are doing. Beginning in mid-1990s, individual angel investors are increasingly
structured as semiformal networks, aka angel groups ((Kerr et al., 2011)). These
groups pool capital from individuals to make larger investments. At the same
time, they also adopt a role that is similar to venture capitalists in providing
expert advice to entrepreneurs.
Angel groups, by definition, are groups of individuals investing their own money.
Although (Wilson, 2011) estimates the size of the angel market to be similar
to the venture capital market, the size of angel group market, as a subset of
the total angel market, should be smaller than that of the venture capital mar-
ket.19 Accordingly, we shift our focus from portfolio companies to investors. As
there is no verifiability nor delegation problem with angel groups, angel groups
are supposed to offer the best bundle of capital and advice to entrepreneurs.
This implies that angel groups can attract many good entrepreneurs and we
predict that angel groups should outperform individual angels and venture cap-
ital funds. After collecting investor level data, we can examine their outcomes
during certain periods.
There are two ways to measure investment performance: returns to investments
and exit rates. For example, (Kerr et al., 2011) compare the performance of
angel groups to venture capital funds using the sum of distributed capital and
current remaining value of investments to the amount invested. They conclude
19(Hellmann et al., 2019) use a unique data set from British Columbia, Canada, and find that of
all investors, 13 % of them are angel groups (which they refer to as angel funds in the paper) while
29 % are individual angels.
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that angel groups outperform. Alternatively, we can measure the exit rates, such
as the number of IPOs and acquisitions to the number portfolio companies.
2.5.3 Policy Implications
There is no doubt that the venture capital industry in the U.S. is mature and very
successful. (Gornall and Strebulaev, 2015) estimate that one-fifth of the U.S. market
capitalization public companies have previously received venture capital. However,
in the rest of the world, especially in developing countries, venture capital hardly
exists. Raising funds for new ventures from family members or private groups, aka
angels, is common. There is no doubt that private equity is very expensive there.
Therefore, it is important for policymakers who want to incentivize their domestic
entrepreneurial ecosystem to adopt this venture capital structure, like in the U.S., to
support start-up companies. Our model shows that it is important that the LPs are
able to fully transparent about how venture capitalists invest their money. If LPs are
not able to verify the investment of funds within the venture capital partnership, the
entrepreneur and venture capitalist can collude together against the LPs and venture
capital financing may perform no better than angel financing or separate provision of
advice and capital. So empirically, the prevalence and out-performance of the venture
capital industry should depend on the legal and institutional environment, which
allows investors’ transparency into the venture capital partnership. If policymakers
want to promote the venture capital industry, they need to help with ensuring the
proper legal and accounting standards must be established and maintained.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed a double-sided moral hazard problem in which the
entrepreneur must (1) work on her project, (2) hire an expert advisor to work with her,
and (3) raise capital from investors to implement the project. Both the entrepreneur
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and the advisor must individually exert unverifiable effort to increase the project’s
expected cash flow and their efforts exhibit complementarity. In the angel financing
scheme, the entrepreneur offers contracts individually to the consultant and the angels
where neither agent can verify the contract offere to the other agent. In the setting
of venture capital financing, the entrepreneur offers a verifiable contract to a venture
capital firm. This venture capital firm is structured as a partnership in which the
venture capitalist is the general partner, while the investors are the limited partners
(LPs).
Because angels cannot verify the contract offered to the consultant, and vice versa,
both financing and incentive provisions become more expensive, and it is difficult for
the entrepreneur to offer the optimal verifiable contracts. In the case of angel financ-
ing, the angels fear that the entrepreneur has the tendency to economize her incentive
payment to the consultant and hence would only agree to fund the project with a
strictly higher return; the consultant is afraid that the entrepreneur and the investors
would deviate to another contract which internalizes his effort and hence demands
more compensation to exert the same level of effort. As a result, the entrepreneur
offers suboptimal contracts. In the venture capital setting, both the venture capital-
ist’s and the LPs’ concern for verifiability disappears. The venture capitalist, being
the signatory to both contracts, can verify the contracts by default, and the LPs
can eventually verify the specific ownership of their investment in the venture capital
fund according to limited partnership agreement through periodic reports or maturity
of the fund. This implies that the entrepreneur always prefers to fund her project
through venture capital financing rather than angel financing.
Our result challenges the standard principal-agent theory that the entrepreneur
should always do at least weekly better by contracting directly with the advisor and
investors. This result holds only when the entrepreneur can commit to verifiable
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contracts with different contractors, which is rarely the case in practice. A contract
is usually private information, verifiable only by its direct signatories. This implies
that each agent’s compensation cannot be made contingent on the structure of the
other agents’ contracts. We offers an explanation to the prevalence of venture capital
industry in the sense that the limited partnership agreement, although forbids the
LPs from participating in daily operations (not exerting effort), mandates the venture
capitalist (the general partner) to disclose some high-level details about the portfolio
companies, including the specific ownership of their investment. This implies that the
institutional structure of venture capital financing assists the entrepreneur in restoring
the verifiability of contracts, which is very hard to achieve in the contracting structure
of angel financing.
This paper also offers an explanation of the pervasiveness of convertible securities
in venture capital financing. The payoff structure of the optimal contracts implies that
the entrepreneur would like to issue an equity-like security to the venture capitalist
while providing debt-like securities to the LPs to maximize the higher state payoffs
for herself and the venture capitalist. This is hard to implement as the entrepreneur
neither contracts directly with the LPs nor can verify the contract signed between the
venture capitalist and the LPs. Properly designed convertible securities can help the
entrepreneur essentially issue two different securities even she only signs one contract
with the venture capitalist. When the project has a lower output, it means that the
performance of the common stocks is bad. The venture capitalist will not convert his
shares. The convertibles act as a straight debt, and the LPs collect all the cumulative
dividend pledged. When the project generates a higher output, it means that the
common stocks are worth more. The venture capitalist optimally converts his shares
into common stocks and shares the cash flows with the entrepreneur and the LPs. The
venture capitalist gets paid only when the firm’s equity performance is good enough
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and he would like to exert effort to improve the value of the common stocks. This
motivation aligns his interest with the entrepreneur. The LPs, on the other hand,
only provide capital. To incentivize both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist
to improve the productivity of the project, it is optimal to distribute all liquidation
cash flows to the LPs.
It is natural to extend our framework by introducing an intermediate period be-
tween the project implementation date and the project harvest date. Stage financing
is a widely used financing technique by the venture capitalist in which the venture
capitalist is given an option to liquidate an unpromising project earlier, something
the entrepreneur will never do. Similarly, for the LPs, they typically only commit to
providing a certain amount of capital, and they always have the option to decline a
capital call from the venture capitalist for poor portfolio performance. It is interesting
to explore how the abandonment threat affects the entrepreneur’s and the venture
capitalist’s incentive provision, and how the early and delayed compensation aligns
their interest with the LPs. Another interesting dimension is to consider how the
relative efficiency of incentive provision varies with the characteristics of projects as
well as the economic environment for start-up ventures. We could obtain comparative
static analyses regarding the frequency of venture capital financing and the type of
securities issued by the entrepreneur.
114
Chapter 3
Scarcity of Venture Capital Financing
3.1 Introduction
Up till now, we assume a competitive capital market. We assume that investors,
no matter as angels or LPs, only obtain an expected payoff equal to their initial
capital investment K. We should notice that, by nature, the angel market and the
venture capital market are private and highly illiquid. The venture capital market is
relatively visible to the public, especially to policymakers, largely due to the attention
it attracts. On the other hand, the angel market has the tip of the iceberg problem
which we could only observe a tiny bit of angel investing. Currently, the “visible”
market is the investments made by super angels or angel groups which represents
only a fraction of the total angel market. The majority of angel investments are
private and made by private individuals representing the “invisible” fraction. Our
competitive capital market assumption is based on the estimation by (Wilson, 2011)
that the angel market is as big as the venture capital market.
However, that is not the only opinion. (Barry, 1994) mentions the non-existent of
venture capital partnerships in many developing countries. (Lerner, 2016) and (Lerner
et al., 2018) believe that the estimated total size of angel investments has already
surpassed venture capital investments in the U.S.. That is to say the angel market
could be more competitive than the venture capital market. An entrepreneur might
find it easier to raise capital directly from individuals rather than from professionals
like venture capitalists. In addition, investments made by venture capitalists are
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highly concentrated, compared to angels. Venture capitalists, though hold a large
pool of money, typically fund a handful number of firms each year (Lerner, 1998).1
As a result, fewer companies get venture capital in the end compared to those who
get angel financing.
3.2 Model Setup
In this section, we relax the competitive capital market assumption and assume that
venture capital financing is scarce relative to angel financing. This implies that the
opportunity cost of venture capital should be higher than that of angel capital. For
the sake of simplicity, we normalize the opportunity cost of angel financing to K and
that of venture capital financing to K + κ. Here, κ > 0 stands for the minimum
additional required payoff to LPs from providing capital K to the project. One can
think of K + κ as what the LPs could attain if they invest K in some alternative
opportunities. On the other hand, angels would like to invest K as long as they can
break even in expectation. As κ represents the relative level of scarcity of venture
capital financing to angel financing, a larger value of κ implies that venture capital
is more scarce, while a smaller value of κ implies less scarce.2 We denote SSV C and
T SV C as the equilibrium compensation levels for the LPs and the venture capitalist,
respectively, where the superscript SV C stands for scarce venture capital financing.
The following proposition summarizes the optimal contracts in the scarce venture
capital financing scheme.
1For example, in (Hellmann et al., 2019)’s data, the average investment per company by venture
capital funds is $660,320, while the average size is $28,131 by angel individuals and $151,341 by
angel funds.
2(Chemmanur and Chen, 2014) also use the same way to represent the scarcity of venture capital
financing. In their setting, the venture capitalist requires a minimum net present value of R2 > 0.
What is different from our setting is that they treat the venture capitalist as the investor of theory
by considering the venture capitalist and LPs as a whole entity.
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3.3 Scarce Venture Capital Financing
Proposition 3.1. With scarce venture capital financing, there exists a threshold x ≥
xSV C such that the optimal compensations for the LPs and the venture capitalist are
respectively equal to
SSV CL = XL, (3.1)





and sSV C > 0 exists and is determined uniquely in
ε
mn














+XL −K − κ = 0. (3.3)
It follows that:
(i) The LPs individual rationality constraint is binding, ISV C = K + κ;
(ii) in the lower cash flow state, the LPs receive all the cash flow, SSV CL = XL, while
neither the venture capitalist nor the entrepreneur receives anything, T SV CL =
XL − SSV CL − T SV CL = 0;
(iii) in the higher cash flow state, the LPs receive the minimum cash flow XL and
share the extra cash flow x with the other two players. tSV C decreases with n.
Similar to the case of competitive venture capital financing, the IR constraint of
the LPs is binding at the level of their opportunity cost. Both the effort providers, the
entrepreneur and the venture capitalist, receive compensation only in the higher state,
and sSV C decreases with n. All intuitions remain the same as those in Proposition
2.2. The following corollary summarizes how the scarcity of venture capital financing
affects the entrepreneur’s payoff and the other equilibrium quantities.
Corollary 3.1. ∀x ≥ {xSV C , xV C}, compared to the case of competitive venture cap-
ital, with scarce venture capital financing,
(i) the entrepreneur gets a lower residual value, exerts a lower effort level, and
receives a lower expected payoff,
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x− sSV C − tSV C < x− sV C − tV C , (3.4)
eSV C < eV C , (3.5)
ESV C < EV C ; (3.6)
(ii) the venture capitalist receives the same amount of compensation, exerts a lower
effort level, and reaches a lower expected payoff,
tSV C = tV C , (3.7)
aSV C < aV C , (3.8)
ASV C < AV C ; (3.9)
(iii) the LPs receive a higher amount of compensation, have a higher expected payoff,
while the probability of success is lower,
sSV C > sV C , (3.10)
ISV C > IV C , (3.11)
πSV C < πV C . (3.12)
Moreover, the credit rationing threshold is larger with scarce venture capital financing,
xSV C > xV C . (3.13)
Figure 3·1 describes how the scarcity of venture capital affects the optimal con-
tracts and the entrepreneur’s expected payoff. Corollary 3.1 states that with scarce
venture capital, the entrepreneur offers the same incentive pay to the venture capi-
talistist as that with competitive venture capital (Proposition 2.2), tSV C = tV C = x
n
.
This result is a consequence of the assumption that the entrepreneur has all the bar-
gaining power and investors only obtain an expected payoff equal to their opportunity
cost of investment. Combined with our model specification, the venture capitalist’s
compensation depends only on how productive he is, which is represented by the
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convexity of his effort cost function n.
As the LPs demand a higher expected payoff due to the scarcity of capital, the
entrepreneur has to modify the LPs’ excess return s accordingly. As analyzed in
Section 2.4, both s and t have a positive effect on the LPs’ payoff. An increase in
the LPs’ excess return s has a strong direct incentive effect (2.67) which increases
the LPs’ actual compensation. An increase in the venture capitalist’s incentive pay
t has a strong complementary effect (2.68) which increases the LPs’ probability of
getting their excess return. As the entrepreneur finds that it is optimal to keep
the venture capitalist’s incentive pay the same, she has to increase the LPs’ excess
return sSV C > sV C in order to satisfy the augmented cost of capital. As a result, the
entrepreneur is left with a lower residual cash flow x− sSV C − tSV C < x− sV C − tV C .
As a higher excess return s has a negative compensation effect on both the en-
trepreneur’s and the venture capitalist’s expected payoffs (2.62 and 2.65), the en-
trepreneur ends up sharing the extra cost of financing with the venture capital-
ist, ESV C < EV C and ASV C < AV C , through each exerting a lower effort level,
eSV C < eV C and aSV C < aV C , respectively. The profitability of the project decreases
as a result.
Having found that with scarce venture capital financing, the entrepreneur’s ex-
pected payoff decreases. Our next step is to measure how the degree of this decrease
responds to different scarcity levels, including some other equilibrium quantities. We
know from Proposition 2.3 that in a competitive capital market, the entrepreneur
always prefer venture capital financing over angel financing. Since the entrepreneur’s
expected payoff strictly decreases when venture capital becomes scarce, we are also
interested in exploring how different scarcity levels affect the entrepreneur’s optimal
financing choice. Proposition 3.2 summarizes our findings.
119
Figure 3·1: Entrepreneur’s Effective Expected Payoff
with Scarce and Competitive Venture Capital
In this figure, we plot the entrepreneur’s effective expected payoff Ē(s, t) as a function of
the venture capitalist’s compensation t, for a fixed level of the LPs’ compensation with (1)
competitive venture capital (red line), s = sV C , and (2) scarce venture capital (purple line),
s = sSV C .
3.4 Optimal Financing Scheme
Proposition 3.2. ∀x ≥ {xSV C , xA}, with scarce venture capital financing,
(i) the entrepreneur’s residual value, effort level, and expected payoff decrease in
the relative level of scarcity of venture capital financing to angel financing, κ;
(ii) the venture capitalist’s compensation stays the same, while his effort level and
expected payoff decrease in κ;
(iii) the LPs’ compensation increases, while the probability of success decreases in κ.
The entrepreneur gets a lower residual value, while the advisor as the venture capitalist
gets a higher compensation,
x− sSV C − tSV C < x− sA − tA, (3.14)
tSV C > tA, (3.15)
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compared to those with angel financing. Moreover, there exist thresholds κs, κe, κπ,
and κa, such that,
(i) the entrepreneur receives a higher expected payoff and exerts a higher effort level
as long as the scarcity level is less than κe,
ESV C > EA, and eSV C > eA, ∀ 0 < κ < κe; (3.16)
(ii) the venture capitalist receives a higher expected payoff and exerts a higher effort
level as long as the scarcity level is less than κa,
ASV C > AA, and aSV C > aA, ∀ 0 < κ < κa; (3.17)
(iii) the LPs receive a higher compensation as long as the scarcity level is larger than
κs, while the probability of success is larger as long as the scarcity level is less
than κπ,
sSV C > sA, ∀ κ > κs, (3.18)
πSV C > πA, ∀ 0 < κ < κπ; (3.19)
where
0 < κe < κs < κπ < κa. (3.20)
In order to understand the intuition, let’s first take a look at how the excess
return sSV C and incentive pay tSV C respond to the relative level of scarcity of venture
capital financing to angel financing, κ. As explained in Corollary 3.1, the entrepreneur
sticks to offer tSV C = x
n
to the venture capitalist no matter the venture capital
market is competitive or scarce relative to the angel market. This result is driven
by our model technology and the assumption that the entrepreneur is the ultimate
residual claimant. Therefore, in order to respond to different levels of scarcity, the
entrepreneur has to modify the LPs’ excess return s accordingly. We know from our
previous analysis that (2.67) implies the LPs’ expected payoff increases with s. When
the venture capital becomes more scarce, a larger κ, the LPs will demand a larger
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Figure 3·2: Entrepreneur’s Effective Expected Payoff
with Scarce and Competitive Venture Capital and Angel Capital
In this figure, we plot the entrepreneur’s effective expected payoff Ē(s, t) as a function
of the advisor’s compensation t, for a fixed level of the investors’ compensation with (1)
competitive venture capital (red line), s = sV C , (2) lower scarcity level of venture capital
(green line), s = sL, (3) higher scarcity level of venture capital (pink line), s = sH , and (4)
angel capital (blue line), s = sA. ĒM (black dot) corresponds to that with scarce venture
capital at the level equivalent to the optimal angel capital s = sA.
compensation s, and at the same time, the entrepreneur’s residual value will decrease.
Figure 3·2 shows that with a higher scarcity level of venture capital (pink line), the
entrepreneur offers the same incentive pay tH = tL to the venture capitalist, while
offers a larger excess return sH > sL, compared with those with a lower scarcity level
(green line). The entrepreneur’s residual cash flow, x − sSV C − tSV C , also decreases
in κ.
As analyzed before, a higher excess return s has a negative compensation effect on
both the entrepreneur’s and the venture capitalist’s expected payoffs (2.62 and 2.65),
combined with the property that sSV C increases in κ, we know that both ESV C and
ASV C will decreases in κ, through each effort level decreasing in κ, respectively. The
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profitability of the project decreases in κ accordingly. Figure 3·2 shows that with a
higher scarcity level of venture capital (pink line), the entrepreneur’s expected payoff
gets flatten: for a given level of incentive pay t, her expected payoff strictly decreases,
compared with a lower scarcity level (green line).
In order to see how κ affects each equilibrium quantities differently, we first com-
pare s and E. Proposition 2.1 implies that the entrepreneur chooses tA which max-
imizes her expected payoff given sA due to the unverifiability of contracts, while
Proposition 3.1 implies that tSV C is larger than the (unconstrained) optimal level,
tSV C > tA. That is to say, for a scarcity level κs that makes the entrepreneur de-
livers an excess return which is equal to sA to the LPs, the entrepreneur’s expected
payoff is less than that under angel financing, EM < EA. Figure 3·2 displays that
with s = sA (blue line), the entrepreneur’s expected payoff with angel financing (blue
dot) is higher than that with scarce venture capital financing (black dot). There-
fore, the scarcity level that makes the entrepreneur in favor of angel financing must
be larger than what makes investors as angels receives lower excess return those as
LPs, κe < κs. Next, we compare E and π. Recall that the entrepreneur gets a lower
residual value with all scarcity levels of venture capital financing than that with angel
financing, x − sSV C − tSV C < x − sA − tA, and the entrepreneur’s expected payoff
is simply equal to her expected residual value, E = π(x − s − t). This implies that
the entrepreneur’s expected payoff will be higher with angel financing as long as the
probability of reaching the higher cash flow state is not too lower with angel financ-
ing, unnecessary to be strictly higher. Therefore, it must be that κe < κπ. Then, we
compare A and π. The advisor as the venture capitalist receives a higher incentive
pay with all scarcity levels, and the advisor’s expected payoff is simply his expected
incentive pay, A = πt. Similarly, we must have κπ < κa. Last, we compare s and
π. We know that I = πs + XL. With the scarcity level κ
s, we get the same excess
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return sSV C = sA, and in order to satisfy the investors’ participation constraints




A.1 Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.1. In the centralized contracting scheme with private contracts,
agent i’s maximization problem is















j − ei = 0, (A.2)
and the second order condition is
φib αi(αi − 1)eαi−2i ê
αj
j − 1 < 0, (A.3)
since αi < 1. Therefore, solving for ei from (A.2), we obtain (1.7).
In order to induce positive effort from each agent, we consider (and later verify that)
b > 0 and φi ∈ (0, 1). Substituting (1.7) into (1.8) for i = 1, 2, the principal’s maximization
problem becomes
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4− αiαj
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= −1. Hence, bC maximizes the principal’s

































Since b = 1 is not an optimal choice for the principal, and αi, and αj are bounded in (0, 1),






















2αi + 2αj − 2αiαj
. (A.5)







































since αi and αj ∈ (0, 1) imply αi2−αi < 1 and
αj
2−αj < 1. Hence, φ
C maximizes the principal’s
objective function. Since αi and αj ∈ (0, 1), bC and φC ∈ (0, 1).
Agent i’s equilibrium compensation is φCbC =
2αi−αiαj
4−αiαi ∈ (0, 1), while agent j’s equi-









Substituting (A.6) and (A.7) into the first order conditions of each agent’s effort (A.2), we
















Solving the system of equations in (eCi , e
C








































j ∈ (0, 1). Substituting (A.8)



















The principal’s expected payoff, vC = (1 − bC)πC , is strictly positive since bC and
πC ∈ (0, 1). So, implementing the risky project under the centralized contracting scheme














respectively. Since αi, αj , φ
C , bC , and πC are ∈ (0, 1), the agents’ expected payoffs are
strictly positive. So, both agents’ participation constraints are satisfied.
The optimal compensation budget, the budget allocation, as well as the agents’ total






















= − αi(2− αi)
































Proof of Corollary 1.1. The optimal private contracts in the centralized contracting
scheme are given in Proposition 1.1 and are equal to
bC =




2(αi + αj − αiαj)
.
The optimal public contracts in the centralized contracting scheme, instead, are given in








We compare these optimal contracts along the following dimensions:
(i) Compensation budget, b: bC < b∗ since αi and αj ∈ (0, 1).




i since 0 < αj < αi < 1.










implies that φCi b
C < φ∗i b
∗ since αi and αj ∈ (0, 1).
(iv) Agent j’s compensation φjb:
φCj b








implies that φCj b
C < φ∗jb
∗ since αi and αj ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof of Proposition 1.2. In the delegated contracting scheme with private contracts,
the Subagent’s maximization problem is the same as that in the centralized contracting
scheme. Therefore, the Subagent’s optimal effort level is determined as









The Agent’s maximization problem with respect to his effort level is given by
eA(b, φ, êA) = arg max
eA




The first order condition with respect to eA is
φb αAe
αA−1
A eS((1− φ)b, êA)αS − eA = 0, (A.11)
and the second order condition is
φb αA(αA − 1)eαA−2A eS((1− φ)b, êA)αS − 1 < 0,
since αA < 1. Solving (A.11) for the effort level eA, we obtain















which corresponds to (1.15). Given his optimal effort choice, the Agent’s maximization
problem with respect to the budget allocation is given by
φDA = arg max
φ
φb eA(b, φ, êA)



























































Since, as we show later, the Agent’s equilibrium effort choice is bounded in (0, 1), the first
order condition can be reduced to
2
2− αA





































































Hence, φDA maximizes the Agent’s objective function.
The principal’s maximization problem is given by
bD = arg max
b













































Since φDA , αA, and αS are all bounded in (0, 1), the first order condition can be reduced to
−b
2αA+2αS−αAαS









2αA + 2αS − αAαS
4
. (A.14)














2−αA (1− φDA )
2αS
(2−αA)(2−αS)




















= −1. Hence, bD maximizes the principal’s
objective function. Since αA and αS ∈ (0, 1), bD and φDA ∈ (0, 1).






4 ∈ (0, 1),
while the Subagent’s equilibrium compensation is (1− φDA )bD = αS2
2αA+2αS−αAαS
4 ∈ (0, 1).




Substituting (A.15) into the first order condition of the Agent’s effort (A.11) and the first





















2−αS ((1− φDA )bD)
1
2−αS .
Solving the system of equations in (eDA , e
D




























S ∈ (0, 1). Substituting (A.16)






























since bD ∈ (0, 1). So, implementing the risky project under the centralized contracting
scheme is profitable (in expectation) for the principal. The expected payoffs of the Agent















respectively. Since αA, αS , φ
D
A , b
D, and πD are ∈ (0, 1), the agent’s expected payoffs are
strictly positive. So, both agents’ participation constraints are satisfied.
The optimal compensation budget, the budget allocation, as well as the agents’ total




















































αA(1− αS) + 2αS
4
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.1. Without loss of generality, we assume that
0 < α2 < α1 < 1.
We denote by vDA=i the principal’s expected payoff in the delegated contracting scheme
where she delegates contracting to agent i (i.e., agent i is the Agent). Accordingly, the
optimal contracts in Proposition 1.2 imply that
bD =
2α1 + 2α2 − α1α2
4
, φDA=1 = 1−
α2
2













































































































The following steps allows us to prove that the RHS of (A.19) is always higher than 1 for
α1 > α2.






where 0 < y < x < 12 . Hence, limx→y+ f(x, y) = 1.
























− 1 + y1−y where y ∈ (0, 12 ]. Taking the first order
derivative, we obtain gy(y) = − 1−2yy(1−y)2 < 0, for any y ∈ (0, 12). Therefore, g(y) is
decreasing in (0, 12 ]. Hence, g(y) > g(
1
2) = 0, for any y ∈ (0, 12). This implies that
limx→y+ fx(x, y) > 0.
















1− y(2y)y where y ∈ (0, 12 ]. Taking




1− y [2(1− y) (log(2y) + 1)− 1] .
Define k(y) ≡ 2(1− y) (log(2y) + 1)− 1. Taking the first order derivative, we obtain
ky(y) =
2
y − 2 log(2y) − 4 > 0 for any y ∈ (0, 12). Therefore, k(y) is increasing in
(0, 12 ]. Hence, k(y) < k(
1
2) = 0. This implies that hy(y) < 0 ∀y ∈ (0, 12). Therefore,
h(y) is decreasing in (0, 12 ]. Hence, h(y) > h(
1




− f(x, y) > 1.





















































− 1x where 0 ≤ y <
x ≤ 12 . Taking the first order derivative with respect to y, we obtain
gy(x, y) =
2x2 + 2(1− x)(x− y) log(1−yx ) + 1− 2x+ y(1− 2y)
(1− x)2(1− y) > 0,
for any 0 ≤ y < x ≤ 12 . Taking the first order derivative with respect to x, we obtain
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gx(x, y) =
−2x4 + 5x3 + x2(2y2 + 4y − 3)− x(2y + 1)
(1− x)3x2
+
1− 2(1− x)x(x2 − x(y + 2) + 1) log(1−yx )
(1− x)3x2 .
Define q(x) ≡ gx(x, 0) = (2x + 1 − 2x log(1/x))/x2 where x ∈ (0, 12 ]. Define m(x) ≡
x log( 1x) where x ∈ (0, 12 ]. Taking the second order derivative, we obtain mxx(x) =
− 1x < 0 for any x ∈ (0, 12 ]. Therefore, there must exist a unique maximal value of
m(x), which is equal to 0.3679. Hence, q(x) > (2x + 1 − 2 × 0.3679)/x2 > 0 for
any x ∈ (0, 12 ]. Since we have proved that gy(x, y) > 0, this implies that gx(x, y) >
gx(x, 0) = g(x) > 0 for any 0 < y < x <
1




2) = 0, which
further implies that fxx(x, y) < 0. So, f(x, y) is concave.
4. Since limx→y+ f(x, y) = 1, limx→y+ fx(x, y) > 0, limx→ 1
2
− f(x, y) > 1, and f(x, y) is






A=2, ∀ 0 < α2 < α1 < 1.






i + ∆, for any rent extraction ∆ where
0 < ∆ <
αj
αi+αj
. The allocation φ∗i is the second-best allocation obtained in the centralized
contracting scheme with public contract, as derived in Appendix A.1.2.1, and is equal to
αi/(α1 + α2).
Taking the ratio of the principal’s expected payoff vDA=i(∆) for the two cases A = 1 and






















α1 + ∆(α1 + α2)




α2 −∆(α1 + α2)










α1 + ∆(α1 + α2)
α1 −∆(α1 + α2)
)α1(α2 −∆(α1 + α2)
α2 + ∆(α1 + α2)
)α2
.








where 0 < y < x < 1 and 0 ≤ z <
y














y + z(x+ y)
)(
y − z(x+ y)
) < 0,
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for any 0 < y < x < 1 and 0 < z < yx+y . Therefore, f(x, y, z) is decreasing in z ∈ [0,
y
x+y ),




for any 0 < α2 < α1 < 1 and 0 < ∆ < α2/(α1 + α2).
Proof of Proposition 1.3. Without loss of generality, we assume that
0 < αj ≤ αi < 1.


































































































where 0 < y < x ≤ 12 . Taking the first
order derivative with respect to x, we obtain








(1− x)(x+ y − xy)(1− xy)2×[
y
(
x2(1− 2y)− y(1− 2x)
)
+ (1− x)(1− xy)(x+ y − xy) log
(










(1−x)(x+y−xy)(1−xy)2 > 0, since 0 < y < x <
1
2 .
Define g(x, y) ≡ y
(







0 < y < x < 12 . The domain 0 < y < x <
1
2 implies that
g(x, y) > y
(
x2(1− 2y)− x(1− 2y)
)
+ (1− x)(1− 2y)(x+ y − xy) log
(




> (1− x)(1− 2y)
[
−xy + (x+ y − xy) log
(




Define h(x, y) ≡ −xy+(x+y−xy) log(x+y−xyx ) where 0 ≤ y < x ≤ 12 . Taking the first order
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derivative with respect to x, we obtain hx(x, y) = [x(1−y) log(x+y−xyx )−(x+1)y]/x. Taking
the second order derivative with respect to x, we obtain hxx(x, y) =
y2
x2(x+y−xy) > 0 for any
0 ≤ y < x ≤ 12 . Therefore, hx(x, y) is increasing in x ∈ (y, 12 ]. It follows that hx(x, y) <
hx(
1
2 , y) = (1−y) log(1+y)−3y for any 0 ≤ y < x < 12 . Define k(y) ≡ (1−y) log(1+y)−3y
where y ∈ [0, 12). Taking the first order derivative, we get ky(y) = −
2(2y+1)
y+1 − log(1 + y) < 0
for any y ∈ [0, 12). Therefore, k(y) is decreasing in y ∈ [0, 12). Hence, k(y) < k(0) = 0 for any
y ∈ (0, 12). This implies that hx(x, y) < g(y) < 0 for any 0 < y < x ≤ 12 . Therefore, h(x, y)
is decreasing in x ∈ (y, 12 ]. As a consequence, f(x, y) > f(12 , y) = 12 (−y + (1 + y) log(1 + y))
for any x ∈ (y, 12). Define q(y) ≡ −y + (1 + y) log(1 + y) where y ∈ [0, 12). Taking the first
order derivative, we obtain qy(y) = log(1 + y) > 0 for any y ∈ [0, 12). Therefore, q(y) is




2g(0) = 0 for any y ∈ (0, 12). This implies
that g(x, y) > (1− x)(1− 2y)h(x, y) > 0 for any 0 < y < x < 12 , which further implies that




(1− x)(x+ y − xy)(1− xy)2 g(x, y) < 0,
for any 0 < y < x ≤ 12 . Therefore, f(x, y) is decreasing in x ∈ (y, 12 ]. Hence, f(x, y) >






2 for any x ∈ (y, 12).
Define w(y) ≡ 22−y ( 11+y )y+
1






4 − (y − 12)2
)




(2− y)2(1 + y)y+1.5
]
< 0 for any y ∈
[0, x). Therefore, w(y) is decreasing in [0, x). Hence, w(y) < w(0) = 1 for any y ∈
(0, 12). This implies that f(
1




− f(x, y) = f(12 , y) < 1 for any y ∈ (0, x). Therefore, f(x, y) < 1 for any
0 < y < x < 12 as long as x is close enough to
1
2 . As a result, there exists a unique
ᾱi ∈ (0, 1) such that {
vC ≥ vD for αi ≤ ᾱi,
vC < vD for αi > ᾱi.
Next, consider the implicit function f(x, y) = 1 where 0 ≤ y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Take the
logarithm on both sides of the implicit function, we get that F (x, y) ≡ log(f(x, y)) = 0,
where
F (x, y) = − log(1− xy) + x log(x)− x log(x+ y − xy) + y log(1− x)− y log(x+ y − xy).
Taking the first order derivative of F (x, y) with respect to x, we obtain
Fx(x, y) = −
1
(1− x)(1− xy)(x+ y − xy)×[
y
(
x2(1− 2y)− y(1− 2x)
)
+ (1− x)(1− xy)(x+ y − xy) log
(





(1− x)(1− xy)(x+ y − xy)g(x, y).
Since in the previous step we have shown that g(x, y) > 0 for any 0 < y < x < 12 , it follows
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that Fx(x, y) < 0 for any 0 < y < x <
1
2 . Taking the first, the second and the third order





x+ y − xy + log(
1− x




(1− x)(x+ y − xy + x2)




(1− x)2[(1− x)y + x(2x+ 1)]
(x+ y − xy)3 > 0,
respectively, for any 0 < y < x < 12 . Therefore, Fyy(x, y) is increasing in y ∈ [0, x]. Hence,
Fyy(x, y) < Fyy(x, x) =
3x5−6x4+4x2+2x−2
(2−x)2x(1−x2)2 for any x ∈ (0, 12 ]. Define G(x) ≡ 3x5 − 6x4 +
4x2 + 2x − 2 where x ∈ [0, 12 ]. Taking the first, the second and the third order derivatives
of G(x) with respect to x, we obtain
Gx(x) = 15x
4 − 24x3 + 8x+ 2,
Gxx(x) = 60x
3 − 72x2 + 8,
Gxxx(x) = 36x(5x− 4) < 0,
respectively, for any x ∈ [0, 12 ]. Therefore, Gxx(x) is decreasing in [0, 12 ], and Gxx(x) >
Gxx(0) = 8 > 0 for any x ∈ (0, 12 ]. This implies that Gx(x) is increasing in [0, 12 ], and
that Gx(x) > Gx(0) = 2 > 0 for any x ∈ (0, 12 ]. As a consequence, G(x) is increasing
in [0, 12 ], and G(x) < G(
1
2) = −0.28125 < 0. Therefore, it follows that Fyy(x, y) < 0
for any 0 < y < x < 12 , which implies that Fy(x, y) is decreasing in y ∈ [0, x]. Since
{x = y = 0.3454} and {x = 12 , y = 0} are both solutions to F (x, y) = 0, and since
Fy(0.3454, 0.3454) = −0.2633 and Fy(12 , 0) = 0, it must be that Fy(x, y) < 0 for any





< 0, for any




Proof of Corollary 1.2. Without loss of generality, we assume that
0 < αj ≤ αi < 1.
The optimal contracts in the centralized contracting scheme are given in Proposition 1.1
and are equal to
bC =




2(αi + αj − αiαj)
.
The optimal contracts in the delegated contracting scheme, instead, are given in Proposition
137
1.2 and are equal to
bD =
2αi + 2αj − αiαj
4




where the principal optimally chooses to delegate to agent i (Lemma 1.1). Given these
optimal contracts, we compare the two contracting schemes with respect to the following
equilibrium quantities:
(i) Compensation budget, b: bC < bD since αi, αj ∈ (0, 1).




A=i since αi, αj ∈ (0, 1).







(2− αj)(2αi + 2αj − αiαj)
8
.
Define f(x, y) ≡ x2y−2xy−2x2−4x+8 where 0 ≤ y ≤ x ≤ 1. Taking the first order
partial derivative with respect to y, we get fy(x, y) = x
2−2x = (1−x)2−1 < 0, for any
0 < x ≤ 1. Therefore, f(x, y) is decreasing in y ∈ (0, x]. Hence, f(x, y) > f(x, x) =
x3 − 4x2 − 4x + 8 for 0 ≤ y < x ≤ 1. Define g(x) ≡ x3 − 4x2 − 4x + 8 for x ∈ [0, 1].
Taking the first order derivative, we get gx(x) = 3x
2 − 8x− 4 = 3(x− 43)2 − 283 < 0,
for any x ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, g(x) is decreasing in [0, 1] and g(x) > g(1) = 1 for any
x ∈ (0, 1). g(x) > 0 implies that f(x, y) > 0 for any 0 < y < x < 1. Rearranging








(iv) The Subagent’s compensation, φjb:
φCj b




D = (1−φDA=i)bD =
αj(2αi + 2αj − αiαj)
8
.
Define f(x, y) ≡ x2y2 − 2x2y − 2xy2 − 4xy + 16x + 8y − 16 where 0 ≤ y ≤ x ≤ 1.
Taking the first order partial derivative with respect to y, we obtain fy(x, y) = 2x
2y−
2x2 − 4xy − 4x+ 8. Taking the second order partial derivative with respect to y, we
obtain fyy(x, y) = 2x
2 − 4x = 2(x − 1)2 − 2 < 0 for any 0 < x ≤ 1. Therefore,
fy(x, y) is decreasing in y ∈ [0, x] and fy(x, y) > fy(x, x) where y ∈ [0, x). Define
g(x) ≡ fy(x, x) = 2x3−6x2−4x+8 where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Taking the first order derivate,
we obtain gx(x) = 6x
2 − 12x − 4 = 6(x − 1)2 − 10 < 0 for any x ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore,
g(x) is decreasing in x ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, g(x) > g(1) = 0 where 0 ≤ x < 1. This implies
that fy(x, y) > 0 for any y ∈ [0, x). Therefore, f(x, y) is increasing in y ∈ [0, x).
Hence, f(x, 0) < f(x, y) < f(x, x) for any y ∈ (0, x), where f(x, 0) = 16(x − 1) < 0
for any x ∈ (0, 1). Define h(x) ≡ f(x, x) = x4− 4x3− 4x2 + 24x− 16 where x ∈ [0, 1].
Taking the first order derivative, we obtain hx(x) = 4x
3− 12x2− 8x+ 24. Taking the
second order derivative, we obtain hxx(x) = 12x
2 − 24x − 8 = 12(x − 1)2 − 20 < 0
∀x ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, hx(x) is decreasing in x ∈ [0, 1], and hx(x) > hx(1) = 8 > 0.
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Hence, h(x) is increasing in x ∈ [0, 1]. Since, f(1, 1) = h(1) = 1 > 0, combined with
f(x, 0) < 0 for any x ∈ (0, 1], it follows that f(x, y) > 0 for any 0 < y ≤ x < 1 as long
as x is close enough to 1. As a result, there exists a unique ᾱci (αj) ∈ (0, 1) such that{
(1− φCi )bC ≥ (1− φDi )bD for αi ≤ ᾱci (αj),
(1− φCi )bC < (1− φDi )bD for αi > ᾱci (αj).
Next, consider the implicit function f(x, y) = 0 where 0 ≤ y ≤ x ≤ 1. From the
above derivation, fy(x, y) > 0 for any 0 < y ≤ x < 1. Taking the first order partial
derivative with respect to x, we obtain fx(x, y) = 2xy
2− 4xy− 2y2− 4y+ 16. Taking
the second order partial derivative with respect to x, we get fxx(x, y) = 2y
2 − 4y =
2(y − 1)2 − 2 < 0 for any 0 < y < 1. Hence, fx(x, y) is decreasing in x ∈ (y, 1), and
fx(x, y) > fx(1, y) = −8y + 16 > 0 for any 0 < y < 1. Therefore, fx(x, y) > 0 for
any 0 < y ≤ x < 1. Using the Implicit Function Theorem, dxdy = −
fy(x,y)
fx(x,y)
< 0, for any

















































Define f(x, y) ≡ x1−y(1 − x)y/[(1 − xy)(x + y − xy)] where 0 < y ≤ x < 12 . Taking
the first order partial derivative with respect to x, we obtain
fx(x, y) =
(1− y)y(−x3 + x2(y + 1)− x(y + 2) + 1)
(1− x)1−yxy(1− xy)2(x+ y − xy)2 .
Define g(x, y) ≡ −x3 +x2(y+ 1)−x(y+ 2) + 1 where 0 ≤ y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Taking the first
order partial derivative with respect to x, we obtain gx(x, y) = −3x2 + 2x(y + 1) −
y − 2 = −3(x− 13)2 − (1− 2x)y − 53 < 0 for any 0 ≤ y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Therefore, g(x, y) is





(1− x)1−yxy(1− xy)2(x+ y − xy)2
]
g(x, y) > 0,
for any 0 < y ≤ x < 12 . It follows that f(x, y) is increasing in x ∈ [y, 12) and






























































Define f(x, y) ≡ xx(1 − x)1−x/[(1 − xy)(x + y − xy)] where 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Taking
the first order partial derivative with respect to x, we obtain
fx(x, y) =
xx(1− x)1−x














1−x where 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Taking the first






(x+y−xy)2 > 0 for any 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Therefore, g(x, y) is increasing in x ∈ [y, 12 ],










(1− xy)(x+ y − xy)
]
g(x, y) < 0,
for any 0 < y ≤ x < 12 . It follows that f(x, y) is decreasing in x ∈ [y, 12 ], and
f(x, y) > f(12 , y) for any 0 < y ≤ x < 12 , since f(12 , y) = 2(2−y)(1+y) < 1 for any
0 < y ≤ x < 12 . Continuity of f(x, y) implies that limx→ 1
2
− f(x, y) = f(12 , y) < 1 for
any y ∈ (0, x]. Therefore, f(x, y) < 1 for any 0 < y ≤ x < 12 as long as x is close
enough to 12 . As a result, there exists a unique ᾱ
e
i (αj) ∈ (0, 1) such that{
eCj ≥ eDj for αi ≤ ᾱei (αj),
eCj < e
D
j for αi > ᾱ
e
i (αj).
Next, consider an implicit function f(x, y) = 1 where 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . From the
above derivation, fx(x, y) < 0 for any 0 < y ≤ x < 12 . Taking the first order partial
derivative with respect to y, we obtain
fy(x, y) = −
xx(1− x)1−x
(1− xy)2(x+ y − xy)2
[




Define h(x, y) ≡ x2(2y−1)−x(2y+1)+1 where 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Taking the first order
partial derivative with respect to x, we obtain hx(x, y) = 2x(2y− 1)− 2y− 1. Taking
the second order derivative with respect to x, we obtain hxx(x, y) = 2(2y − 1) < 0
for any 0 < y ≤ x < 12 . Therefore, hx(x, y) is decreasing in x ∈ [y, 12), and hx(x, y) ≤
hx(y, y) = (1 − 2y)2 − 2 < 0 for any 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Hence, h(x, y) is decreasing in
x ∈ [y, 12 ] and h(x, y) > h(12 , y) = 14(1 − 2y) > 0 for any 0 < y ≤ x < 12 . It follows
that,
fy(x, y) = −
xx(1− x)1−x
(1− xy)2(x+ y − xy)2h(x, y) < 0,



































































Define f(x, y) ≡ xx(1−x)y/[(1−xy)x+y(x+y−xy)x+y] where 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Taking
the first order partial derivative with respect to x, we obtain
fx(x, y) =
xx(1− x)y


















(1−xy)(x+y−xy) +1 where 0 < y ≤ x ≤
1
2 , and define h(x, y) ≡ 1−x−x(x+y−xy) where 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Taking the first order
partial derivative with respect to x, we obtain hx(x, y) = −1−y−2x(1−y) < 0 for any
0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Therefore, h(x, y) is decreasing in x ∈ [y, 12 ], and h(x, y) ≥ h(12 , y) =
1
4(1−y) > 0 for any 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . The fact that h(x, y) = 1−x−x(x+y−xy) > 0
implies that x(1−xy)(x+y−xy) < 1, which further implies that log
x
(1−xy)(x+y−xy) < 0 for
any 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Hence,
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x+ y − xy + 1,
=
y(x3y − x3 + x2y2 − 2x2y + x2 − 2xy2 + 2xy − x+ y2)
(1− x)(1− xy)(x+ y − xy) .
Define k(x, y) ≡ x3y−x3+x2y2−2x2y+x2−2xy2+2xy−x+y2 where 0 ≤ y ≤ x ≤ 12 .
Taking the first order partial derivative with respect to x, we obtain kx(x, y) =
−13(1− y)(3x+ y − 1)2 − 13(y3 + 3y2 + 2− 3y) < 0 where 0 ≤ y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Therefore,
k(x, y) is decreasing in x ∈ [y, 12 ], and k(x, y) ≤ k(y, y) = −(1 − y)2y(1 − 2y) < 0
for any 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Hence, g(x, y) <
y
(1−x)(1−xy)(x+y−xy)k(x, y) < 0 for any




(1− xy)x+y(x+ y − xy)x+y
]
g(x, y) < 0,
for any 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Thus, f(x, y) is decreasing in x ∈ [y, 12 ], and f(x, y) > f(12 , y)
for any 0 < y ≤ x < 12 , since f(12 , y) = 1/
(
9
8 − 18(1− 2y)2
)y+ 1
2 < 1 for any 0 <
y ≤ x < 12 . Continuity of f(x, y) implies that limx→ 1
2
− f(x, y) = f(12 , y) < 1 for any
y ∈ (0, x]. Therefore, f(x, y) < 1 for any 0 < y ≤ x < 12 as long as x is close enough
to 12 . As a result, there exists a unique ᾱ
π
i (αj) ∈ (0, 1) such that{
πC ≥ πD for αi ≤ ᾱπi (αj),
πC < πD for αi > ᾱ
π
i (αj).
Next, consider the implicit function f(x, y) = 1 where 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . When y = x,
the solution to f(x, y) = 1 is {x = y = 0.2892}. When, instead, y is close to zero, say
y = ȳ = 10−6, the solution to f(x, y) = 1 is {x = x̄ ≡ 0.3856, y = ȳ}. Since, given the
above derivation, fx(x, y) < 0 for any 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 , we consider 0 < x ≤ x̄. Taking
the first order partial derivative of f(x, y) with respect to y, we obtain
fy(x, y) = −
(1− x)(x+ y)
x+ y − xy +
x(x+ y)
1− xy + log
1− x
(1− xy)(x+ y − xy) .





(x+ y − xy)2 −
1− x
x+ y − xy +
x(1 + x2)
(1− xy)2 .







(x+ y − xy)3 +
(1− x)2
(x+ y − xy)2 > 0,




(2−x)2x(1−x2)2 . Define g(x) ≡ x5− 6x3 + 6x2 +x− 1 where 0 < x ≤ x̄.
Taking the first order derivative, we obtain gx(x) = 5x
4 − 18x2 + 12x + 1 = −(1 −
x)(5x3 + 5x2− 13x− 1). Define h(x) ≡ 5x3 + 5x2− 13x− 1 where 0 ≤ x ≤ x̄. Taking
the first order derivative, we get hx(x) = 15x
2 + 10x− 13 = 15(x+ 13)2 − 443 < 0 for
any 0 ≤ x ≤ x̄. Therefore, h(x) is decreasing in x ∈ [0, x̄] and h(x) < h(0) = −1 < 0
for any 0 < x ≤ x̄. It follows that gx(x) > 0 for any 0 < x ≤ x̄, and hence g(x) is
increasing in x ∈ (0, x̄], and g(x) ≤ g(x̄) = −0.0578 < 0 for any 0 < x ≤ x̄. As a
consequence, fyy(x, y) < fyy(x, x) =
2
(2−x)2x(1−x2)2 g(x) < 0 for any 0 < y ≤ x ≤ x̄.
Hence, fy(x, y) is decreasing in y ∈ (0, x], and fy(x, y) < fy(x̄, ȳ) = −4.9187×10−6 <















































































Since the RHS in (A.25) is the same as the RHS in (A.23), it follows that{
uCj ≥ uDj for αi ≤ ᾱei (αj),
uCj < u
D




We finally prove that
1
2
< ᾱπi (αj) < ᾱi(αj) < ᾱ
e
i (αj) < ᾱ
c
i (αj) < 1.
We proceed in five steps, by showing sequentially that, for any αj ∈ (0, 1): (1) 12 < ᾱπi (αj);
(2) ᾱπi (αj) < ᾱi(αj); (3) ᾱi(αj) < ᾱ
e
i (αj); (4) ᾱ
e
i (αj) < ᾱ
c
i (αj); and (5) ᾱ
c
i (αj) < 1.
(1) Since in part (vii) of this proof we show that ᾱπi (αj) is decreasing in αj , the lowest
value of ᾱπi (αj) is ᾱ
π
i (αi) = 0.5784 >
1
2 .
(2) Since (1 − bC) > (1 − bD) for any αi and αj ∈ (0, 1), and since πC < πD for any
αi > ᾱπ(αj), it follows that v
C = (1 − bC)πC < vD = (1 − bD)πD for any αi >
ᾱi(αj) > α
π
i (αj) and αj < αi.





is the same threshold above which eCj < e
D
j . Since uj = (1 − αj/2)(1 − φ)bπ and






Assume by contradiction that ᾱi > ᾱ
e
i , and consider ᾱ
e
i ≤ αi < ᾱi, implying that






























































Define g(x) ≡ 2 − 4x +
(
2(x − 1)x + 1
)
log x1−x where x ∈ (0, 12 ]. Taking the first
order derivative, we obtain gx(x) =
1
x(1−x) − 2(1− 2x) log x1−x − 6. Taking the second
144
order derivative, we obtain gxx(x) =
−4x3+6x2−1
(1−x)2x2 + 4 log
x
1−x < 0 for any x ∈ (0, 12).
Therefore, gx(x) is decreasing in x ∈ (0, 12). Since limx→0+ gx(x) > 0 and gx(12) =
−2 < 0, using the Mean Value Theorem, it follows that there exist a unique x? ∈ (0, 12)
such that gx(x) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ (0, x?] and gx(x) < 0 for any x ∈ (x?, 12), where
x? = 0.2694. Hence, g(x) is increasing in x ∈ (0, x?] and decreasing in x ∈ (x?, 12).
Since lim x→ 0+g(x) < 0, g(x?) = 0.3175 > 0, and g(12) = 0, using again the
Mean Value Theorem, it follows that there exist a unique x?? ∈ (0, x?) such that
g(x) ≤ 0 for any x ∈ (0, x??] and g(x) > 0 for any x ∈ (x??, 12), where x?? = 0.1284.





/[2(x− 1)x+ 1]2, it follows that fx(x) ≤ 0 for any
x ∈ (0, x??] and fx(x) > 0 for any x ∈ (x??, 12). Therefore, f(x) is decreasing in
x ∈ (0, x??] and increasing in x ∈ (x??, 12). Since f(0) = 1, f(x??) = 0.8781 < 1, and
f(12) = 1, it follows that f(x) < 1 for any x ∈ (0, 12). This implies that vC < vD,
which is a contradiction. As a result, we can conclude that ᾱi(αj) < ᾱ
e
i (αj).
(4) Given the ratio eCj /e
D














Since in part (iii) of this proof we show that φCbC < φDbD, it follows that the second
term on the RHS of (A.27) id always larger than 1. Therefore, there must exists a
value of αi > ᾱ
e
i (αj) but close enough to ᾱ
e




j , but (1−φD)bD <
(1− φC)bC . When, instead, αi > ᾱci (αj), implying that (1− φD)bD > (1− φC)bC , it
must be that eDj > e
C
j , implying that αi > ᾱ
e
i (αj). As a result, we can conclude that
ᾱei (αj) < ᾱ
c
i (αj).
(5) Part (vi) of this proof implies that ᾱci (αj) < 1.
Proof of Proposition 1.4. Without loss of generality, we assume that
0 < αj ≤ αi < 1.
The optimal contracts in the delegated contracting scheme and the optimal contracts in the
centralized contracting scheme when agent j’s contract is public (i.e., when agent i observes
agent j’s contract but not vice versa) are given in Proposition 1.2 and in Proposition A.2
(Appendix A.1.2.2), respectively, and are equal to
bD = b′ =
2αi + 2αj − αiαj
4





2αi + 2αj − αiαj
,










































































Define f(x, y) ≡ ( xx+y−xy )x( 1x+y−xy )y where 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Taking the first order partial




x+ y − xy
)x( 1
x+ y − xy
)y 1
x+ y − xy×[
(y2 + (x+ y − xy) log
(
x
x+ y − xy
)]
.
Define g(x, y) = y2 + (x + y − xy) log(x/(x + y − xy)) where 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Taking
the first order partial derivative with respect to x, we obtain gx(x, y) = (1− y) log(x/(x+
y − xy)) + yx . Taking the second order partial derivative with respect to x, we obtain
gxx(x, y) = −y2/[x2(x + y − xy)] < 0 for any 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Therefore, gx(x, y) is
decreasing in x ∈ [y, 12 ], and gx(x, y) > gx(12 , y) = 2y + (1− y) log(1 + y)−1. Define k(y) ≡
y + (1 − y) log(1 + y)−1 where y ∈ (0, 12 ]. Taking the first order derivative, we obtain
ky(y) =
1+3y
1+y − log(1 + y)−1 > 0 for any y ∈ (0, 12 ], and k(y) > limy→0+ k(y) = 0 for
any y ∈ (0, 12 ]. Hence, gx(x, y) > k(y) > 0 for any 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Therefore, g(x, y)
is increasing in x ∈ [y, 12 ], and g(x, y) ≤ g(12 , y) = y2 + 12(1 + y) log(1 + y)−1 for any
y ∈ (0, 12 ]. Define w(y) ≡ y2 + 12(1 + y) log(1 + y)−1 where 0 < y ≤ 12 . Taking the first order
derivative, we obtain wy(y) =
1
2(4y − log(y + 1) − 1). Taking the second order derivative,
we get wyy(y) = 2 − 12(1+y) > 0 for any y ∈ (0, 12 ]. Therefore, wy(y) is increasing in
y ∈ (0, 12 ]. Since limy→0+ wy(y) = −0.5 < 0 and wy(12) = 0.2973 > 0, there exists a unique
y? = 0.3193 ∈ (0, 12 ] such that wy(y) ≤ 0 whenever y ∈ (0, y?] and wy(y) > 0 whenever
y ∈ (y?, 12). Hence, w(y) is decreasing in y ∈ (0, y?] and increasing in y ∈ (y?, 12 ]. Since
limy→0+ w(y) = 0 and w(
1
2) = −0.0541 < 0, it follows that w(y) < 0 for any y ∈ (0, 12 ].
Hence, g(x, y) ≤ w(y) < 0 for any y ∈ (0, 12 ]. As a consequenc, fx(x, y) < 0 for any
0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 .






























Define m(y) ≡ −y − 12 + (y + 1) log 2y+1 where 0 ≤ y ≤ 12 . Taking the first order derivative,
we obtain my(y) = log
2
1+y − 2 < 0 for any y ∈ [0, 12 ]. Therefore, m(y) is decreasing in
y ∈ [0, 12 ]. Since m(0) = 0.1931 > 0 and m(12) = −0.5685 < 0, there exists a unique
y?? = 0.1406 ∈ (0, 12 ] such that m(y) ≥ 0 for y ∈ [0, y??] and m(y) < 0 for y ∈ (y??, 12 ].
This implies that hy(y) ≥ 0 for y ∈ [0, y??] and hy(y) < 0 for y ∈ (y??, 12 ]. Hence, h(y) is
increasing in y ∈ [0, y??] and decreasing in y ∈ (y??, 12 ]. Since h(0) = 1, h(y??) = 1.0133 > 1,
and h(12) = 0.9429 < 1, it follows that there exists a unique y
??? = 0.2891 ∈ (y??, 12 ] such
that h(y) ≥ 1 for y ∈ [y??, y???] and h(y) < 1 for y ∈ (y???, 12 ]. This implies that f(x, y) > 1
for 0 < y ≤ y???. So, for any y ∈ (0, y???] there does not exist a value of x ∈ [y, 12) such
that f(x, y) ≤ 1. However, f(12 , y) < 1 for any y ∈ (y???, 12). Since fx(x, y) < 0 for any
0 < y ≤ x ≤ 12 , continuity of f(x, y) implies that limx→ 1
2
− f(x, y) = f(12 , y) < 1 for any
y ∈ (y???, x]. Therefore, (
x
x+ y − xy
)x( 1
x+ y − xy
)y
< 1,
for any y??? < y ≤ x < 12 as long as x is close enough to 12 . As a result, given ᾱj ≡ 2×y??? =
0.5638, there exists a unique ᾱi(αj) ∈ (ᾱj , 1) such that{
v′ ≤ vD for αj > ᾱj ∧ αi > ᾱi(αj),
v′ > vD otherwise.
Next, consider the implicit function f(x, y) = 1 where y??? ≤ y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Taking the
first order partial derivative with respect to y, we obtain
fy(x, y) =





x+ y − xy .
Define n(x, y) ≡ −(1− x)(x+ y) + (x+ y− xy) log 1x+y−xy where y??? ≤ y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Taking
the first order partial derivative with respect to y, we obtain ny(x, y) = −(1−x)(2− log(x+




and log(x + y − xy)−1 ≤ 0.7251. This implies that ny(x, y) < 0 for any y ∈ [0.2819, x].
Therefore, n(x, y) is decreasing in y ∈ [y???, x] and n(x, y) ≤ n(x, y???) = −(1 − x)(x +
y???) + (x + (1 − x)y???) log(x + (1 − x)y???)−1. Define q(x) ≡ −(1 − x)(x + y???) + (x +
(1−x)y???) log(x+ (1−x)y???)−1 where y??? ≤ x ≤ 12 . Taking the first order derivative, we
obtain qx(x) = −2((1−y???)−x)+(1−y???) log(x+(1−x)y???)−1. Taking the second order
derivative, we obtain qxx(x) = 2−(1−y???)2/(x+(1−x)y???) = 2−0.7181/(x+0.3926) > 0
for any x ∈ [y???, 12 ]. Therefore, qx(x) is increasing in x ∈ [y???, 12 ] and qx(x) ≤ qx(12) =
−0.1168 < 0 for any x ∈ [y???, 12 ]. It follows that q(x) is decreasing in x ∈ [y???, 12 ] and that
q(x) ≤ q(y???) = −0.0537 < 0. This implies that n(x, y) < 0 for any y??? ≤ y ≤ x ≤ 12 ,
which further implies that fy(x, y) = n(x, y)/(x+y−xy) < 0 for any y??? ≤ y ≤ x ≤ 12 . Since
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We next compare the threshold ᾱi(αj) with the threshold ᾱi(αj), for any αj ∈ (ᾱj , 1). To
this purpose, we first compare the principal’s expected payoff in the centralized contracting
scheme with one public contract with that in the centralized contracting scheme with two










































































Define F (x, y) ≡ (1 − xy)/(1 − x)y where 0 ≤ y ≤ x < 12 . Taking the first order partial
derivative with respect to x, we obtain Fx(x, y) = xy(1−y)/(1−x)y+1 > 0 for any x ∈ [y, 12).
Therefore, F (x, y) is increasing in x ∈ [y, 12) and F (x, y) ≥ F (y, y) = (1 + y)(1 − y)1−y
for any x ∈ [y, 12). Define G(y) ≡ F (y, y) where 0 ≤ y < 12 . Taking the first order
derivative with respect to y, we obtain Gy(y) = −(1−y)1−y (y + (1 + y) log(1− y)). Define
H(y) ≡ y+ (1 + y) log(1− y) where 0 ≤ y < 12 . Taking the first order derivative, we obtain
Hy(y) = log(1− y)− 2y1−y < 0 for any y ∈ [0, 12). Therefore, H(y) is decreasing in y ∈ [0, 12)
and H(y) < H(0) = 0 for any y ∈ (0, 12). Hence, Gy(y) > 0 for any y ∈ (0, 12), implying
that G(y) is increasing in y ∈ [0, 12), and that G(y) > G(0) = 1 for any y ∈ (0, 12). It follows
that F (x, y) ≥ F (y, y) > G(0) = 1 for any 0 < y ≤ x < 12 . As a result,
v′ > vC .
Consequently, the lowest value of αi that makes v
D ≥ v′ need to be larger than the lowest
value that makes vD ≥ vC , that is ᾱi(αj) > ᾱi(αj), for any αj > ᾱj .
Optimal allocation of the public contract. Suppose the principal could choose to sign a public
contract with only one agent. Who would the principal optimally pick, knowing that the
public contract will be observed by the other agent? Without loss of generality, we assume
0 < α2 < α1 < 1.
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We denote with v′obs=1 the principal’s expected payoff in the centralized contracting scheme
when agent 1 observes agent 2’s (public) contract but not vice versa. Similarly, we denote
with v′obs=2 the principal’s expected payoff when it is agent 2 observing agent 1’s (public)

















































Therefore, we conclude that v′obs=1 > v
′
obs=2 when α1 > α2.
A.1.2 Contracting Schemes with Public Contracts
In this appendix, we derive the optimal contracts in a centralized contracting scheme when
both contracts (Section A.1.2.1) or only one of the two contracts (Section A.1.2.2) are
public. Table A.1 summarizes the optimal contracts for the different contracting schemes
considered and discussed in this paper.
A.1.2.1 Centralized Contracting with Public Contracts (Second-best)
We consider a centralized contracting scheme where contracts are public. We refer to the
optimal contracts in this scheme as second-best, and we denote the corresponding compen-
sation budget and allocation by (b∗, φ∗).
Proposition A.1. When contracts are public, the optimal compensation budget and allo-









Proof. Agent i’s and agent j’s maximization problems in stage two are{








ej(b, φ) = arg max
ej
(1− φ)b ei(b, φ)αiejαj −
e2j
2 .
The first order conditions are{
φb αiei
αi−1ej(b, φ)
αj − ei = 0,
(1− φ)b ei(b, φ)αiαjejαj−1 − ej = 0,
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and the second order conditions are{
φb αi(αi − 1)eiαi−2ej(b, φ)αj − 1 < 0,
(1− φ)b ei(b, φ)αiαj(αj − 1)ejαj−2 − 1 < 0,
since αi and αj ∈ (0, 1). The first order conditions imply that{
φb αiei(b, φ)
αi−1ej(b, φ)
αj = ei(b, φ),
(1− φ)b ei(b, φ)αiαjej(b, φ)αj−1 = ej(b, φ).






















In order to induce a strictly positive probability of success of the risky project, both agents
need to exert effort in equilibrium, which requires b > 0 and φ ∈ (0, 1).
The principal’s maximization problem in stage one becomes
(b∗, φ∗) = arg max
b, φ























































b = 1 is not a solution to the first equation as φ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, b, φ, αi, and αj are all
bounded in (0, 1). The first order conditions can be reduced to−b
αi+αj






















































































(1 − φ)2 −
2 αi2−αi−αj φ
αj






= − αiαj(αi+αj)(2−αi−αj) < 0 for φ = φ
∗,
and αi and αj ∈ (0, 1). Hence, b∗ and φ∗ maximize the principal’s objective function.




j ∈ (0, 1). The equilibrium


















which is also ∈ (0, 1). As a consequence, the expected payoff for the principal, v∗ =












(1− φ∗) b∗π∗ > 0.
A.1.2.2 Centralized Contracting with One Public Contract
We consider a centralized contracting scheme where only one contract is public. In partic-
ular, we assume that the contract offered to agent i is private, while the contract offered to
agent j is public. Therefore, agent i can observe agent j’s contract but not vice versa. We
denote the compensation budget and allocation characterizing the optimal contracts in this
scheme by (b′, φ′).
Proposition A.2. When only the contract of agent j is public, the optimal compensation
budget and allocation with centralized contracting are respectively equal to
b′ =





2αi + 2αj − αiαj
. (A.31)
Proof. Since the contract observability in this scheme is the same as that characterizing the
delegated contracting scheme (one agent observes the contract of the other agent, but not
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vice versa), agent j’s and agent i’s optimal effort levels are equal to the effort level of the
Subagent in (A.10) and of the Agent in (A.12), respectively:























In order to induce positive effort from each agent, we consider (and later verify that) b > 0
and φ ∈ (0, 1).
The principal’s maximization problem is
(b′, φ′) = arg max
b, φ


































































b = 1 is not a solution to the first equation as φ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, b, φ, αi, and αj are all
bounded in (0, 1). The first order conditions can be reduced to−b
2αi+2αj−αiαj





















Solving the above system of equation in (b, φ), we obtain
b′ =




2αi + 2αj − αiαj
.







































































(1 − φ)2 −
2 αi2−αiφ
2αj







= − 2αiαj(2−αi)(2αi+2αj−αiαj) < 0
for φ = φ′. Hence, b′ and φ′ maximize the principal’s objective function.
Agent i’s equilibrium compensation is φ′b′ = αi(2−αj)/4 ∈ (0, 1), while agent j’s equi-




Substituting (A.34) into the first order condition of agent j’s effort (A.32) and the first































































j ∈ (0, 1). The equilibrium


















which is also ∈ (0, 1). As a consequence, the expected payoff for the principal, v′ = (1−b′)π′,
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A.2 Appendix for Chapter 2
A.2.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. In the angel financing scheme, the consultant’s maximization
problem is
e(Ŝ, T ) = arg max
e
εea(Ŝ, T )(XL − ŜL − TL + x− ŝ− t)
+(1− εea(Ŝ, T ))(XL − ŜL − TL)− β e
m
m ,
a(Ŝ, T ) = arg max
a
εe(Ŝ, T )a(TL + t) + (1− εe(Ŝ, T )a)TL − γ a
n
n .
The first order conditions are{
εa(Ŝ, T )(x− ŝ− t)− βe(Ŝ, T )m−1 = 0,
εe(Ŝ, T )t− γa(Ŝ, T )n−1 = 0,
and solving the system of first order conditions in (e(Ŝ, T ), a(Ŝ, T )), we obtain
a(Ŝ, T ) =
ε
m









The angels’ inferred effort from the consultant in stage two is
e(Ŝ, T̂ ) = arg max
e
εea(Ŝ, T̂ )(XL − ŜL − T̂L + x− ŝ− t̂)
+(1− εea(Ŝ, T̂ ))(XL − ŜL − T̂L)− β e
m
m ,
a(Ŝ, T̂ ) = arg max
a
εe(Ŝ, T̂ )a(T̂L + t̂) + (1− εe(S, T̂ )a)T̂L − γ a
n
n .
The first order conditions are{
εa(Ŝ, T̂ )(x− ŝ− t̂)− βe(Ŝ, T̂ )m−1 = 0,
εe(Ŝ, T̂ )t̂− γa(Ŝ, T̂ )n−1 = 0,
and solving the system of first order conditions in (e(Ŝ, T̂ ), a(Ŝ, T̂ )), we obtain
a(Ŝ, T̂ ) =
ε
m









The angels’ inferred effort from the entrepreneur in stage two is then
e(S, Ŝ, T̂ ) = arg max
e
εea(Ŝ, T̂ )(XL − SL − T̂L + x− s− t̂)



















The angels’ inferred probability of higher cash flow state, P (S, Ŝ, T̂ ), is
P (S, Ŝ, T̂ ) = εe(S, Ŝ, T̂ )a(Ŝ, T̂ ) =
ε
mn












so the angels’ expected payoff in stage two, I(S, Ŝ, T̂ ), is















The entrepreneur’s optimal effort choice in stage two is
e(S, Ŝ, T ) = arg max
e
εea(Ŝ, T )(XL − SL − TL + x− s− t)


















and therefore her expected payoff is
E(S, Ŝ, T ) = εe(S, Ŝ, T )a(Ŝ, T )(XL − SL − TL + x− s− t)
+ (1− εe(S, Ŝ, T )a(Ŝ, T ))(XL − SL − TL)− β













+XL − SL − TL. (A.41)






























+ SL ≥ K,
s ≥ 0,
t > 0,
x− s− t > 0,
SL ≥ 0,
TL ≥ 0,
XL − SL − TL ≥ 0,














+XL − SL − TL,
then ∂L∂SL < 0 and
∂L
∂s < 0 imply that SL = s = 0 which violates the angels’ individual




































































































Hence, s = 0 and no matter what value of SL ∈ [0, XL] be, still violates angels’ individual
rationality condition due to (2.2), the riskiness of the project.


















































If Z ≤ 0, then ∂L∂s < 0; if Z > 0, then ∂L∂s < ∂L∂s |λ=1 < 1. Hence, SL = s = 0 still violates
the investors’ individual rationality condition.
Therefore, we must have λ > 1. Then, since
∂L
∂SL
=− 1 + λ > 0,
we get SL = XL − TL, and
∂L
∂TL
=− 1 < 0,
we get TL = 0. As a result, we have S
A
L = XL, and T
A
L = 0. To simplify the expressions,
we define



















(m−1)(mn−m−n) (x− s− t) mm−1 t mmn−m−n
+ λ
(



















f(s, t) ≡ (x− s− t) nmn−m−n t mmn−m−n s (A.45)











− ns+ (mn−m− n)(x− s− t)
)
,
and from the previous steps, we know that ∂f(s,t)∂s > 0 from λ > 1. Therefore, we get






















































where the first inequality is due to t ∈ [x−sn , xn ] and the second inequality is due to s ∈






∂t > 0, ∀ s ∈ [0, mn−m−nmn x] and t ∈ [x−sn , xn ].
(A.48)
This implies that the investos’ expected payoff increases with s and t and for a fixed level
of k, a lower t requires a higher s, and vice versa. Since f(0, t) = 0 < k and in order to





























Therefore, in order to avoid credit rationing, we require that
x ≥ xA ≡
( n2

























Under conditions x ≥ xA and (2.9), sA exists and uniquely determined in f(sA, x−sAn ) = k.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. In the venture capital financing scheme, the LPs’ maximiza-
tion problem in stage two and the venture capitalist’s maximization problem in stage three
is{
e(B,S) = arg max
e
εea(B,S)(XL −BL + x− b) + (1− εea(B,S))(XL −BL)− β e
m
m ,
a(B,S) = arg max
a
εe(B,S)a(BL − SL + b− s) + (1− εe(B,S)a)(BL − SL)− γ a
n
n .
The first order conditions are{
εa(B,S)(x− b)− βe(B,S)m−1 = 0,
εe(B,S)(b− s)− γa(B,S)n−1 = 0,


























The LPs’ expected payoff, therefore, is











and the venture capitalist’s expected payoff is
A(B,S) = εe(B,S)a(B,S)(BL − SL + b− s)














+BL − SL. (A.54)


























+ SL ≥ K,
s ≥ 0,
b− s > 0,
SL ≥ 0,













then ∂L∂SL < 0 and
∂L
∂s < 0 imply that SL = s = 0 which violates the LPs’ individual






























=− 1 + λ,
∂L
∂s



























































Hence, s = 0 and no matter what value of SL ∈ [0, BL] be, still violates LPs’ individual
rationality condition due to (2.2), the riskiness of the project.








































If Z ≤ 0, then ∂L∂s < 0; if Z > 0, then ∂L∂s < ∂L∂s |λ=1 < 1. Hence, SL = s = 0 still violates
the LPs’ individual rationality condition.
Therefore, we must have λ > 1. Then, since
∂L
∂SL
=− 1 + λ > 0,
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we get SL(B) = BL and s(B) is determined in
ε
mn






+BL −K = 0. (A.55)
Therefore, SL only depends on BL while s depends on both BL and b.













+ BL − K. According to the

































− nmn−m−n(b− s(B))s(B) + mmn−m−n(x− b)s(B)
(x− b)(b− s(B))− mmn−m−n(x− b)s(B)
. (A.57)
The entrepreneur’s optimal effort choice in stage one is{
e(B) = arg max
e
εea(B)(XL −BL + x− b) + (1− εea(B))(XL −BL)− β e
m
m ,
a(B) = arg max
a
εe(B)a(b− s(B))− γ ann .
The first order conditions are{
εa(B)(x− b)− βe(B)m−1 = 0,
εe(B)(b− s(B))− γa(B)n−1 = 0,

























Therefore her expected payoff is































x− b > 0,
BL ≥ 0,



































































(mn−m− n)b− (mn− n)s(B) .







(mn−m− n)x−mns(B) + x+ ns(B)
(mn−m− n)x−mns(B) − 1 > 1,
where (mn−m− n)x−mns(B) > 0 by A.47.
As a result, we have BV CL = XL, and b
V C − sV C = xn . This implies that tV C = xn .
Define
f(s, t) ≡ (x− s− t) nmn−m−n t mmn−m−n s (A.61)
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− ns+ (mn−m− n)(x− s− t)
)
,
and from the previous steps, we know that ∂f(s,t)∂s > 0 from λ > 1. Therefore, we get






Hence, we must have (mn −m − n)(x − s − xn) > ns, which implies s < mn−m−nmn x. Take











































where the first inequality is due to t ∈ [x−sn , xn ] and the second inequality is due to s ∈




∂t > 0, ∀ s ∈ [0, mn−m−nmn x] and t ∈ [x−sn , xn ].
(A.63)
This implies that the LPs’ expected payoff increases with s and t and for a fixed level of
k, a lower t requires a higher s, and vice versa. Since f(0, t) = 0 < k and in order to have


















x ≥ k. (A.64)
Therefore, in order to avoid credit rationing, we require that













Under conditions x ≥ xV C and (2.9), sV C exists and uniquely determined in f(sV C , xn) = k.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Following the derivations before, we know that in both financ-
ing scheme










+XL − SL − TL, (A.66)
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(x− sV C − tV C)n−1tV C
(x− sA − tA)n−1tA . (A.67)
Since the right hand side of the last equation increases in sA, using the fact that sV C < sA






(x− sV C − tV C)n−1tV C
(x− sV C − tA)n−1tA . (A.68)
Since the right hand side of the above equation decreases in tA,
∂ (x−s




V C − tV C)n−1tV C
(x− sV C − tA)n(tA)2 (−nt
A + x− sV C) < 0,
as −ntA + x− sV C = −(x− sA) + x− sV C = sA − sV C > 0, combining tA < tV C (we prove






(x− sV C − tV C)n−1tV C
(x− sV C − tV C)n−1tV C = 1. (A.69)
Hence,
EV C > EA. (A.70)
We know from Proposition 2.1 and Proposition 2.2 that
xA =
( n2






























































, where m ≥ 2, n ≥ 2,
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and define
h(m,n) ≡ log g(m,n),





















≥ log 1 = 0,
therefore, h(m,n) also increases in m ≥ 2.
Define
f(n) ≡ h(2, n) = n(2 log n− log(2 + n)− log(n− 1)) + 2(log 2 + log n− log(2 + n)),
where n ≥ 2. Since
f ′(n) =
n− 2





−3(n− 53)2 + 133
n2(n− 1)2(2 + n) ,
we know that f ′′(n) ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ [2, 2.8685] and f ′′(n) < 0 ∀n ∈ (2.8685,∞). Therefore,
f ′(n) increases in n ∈ [2, 2.8685] and decreases in n ∈ (2.8685,∞). As f ′(2) = 0 and
lim
n→∞
f ′(n) = 0, we know that f ′(n) ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ [2,∞). Hence, f(n) increases in n ∈ [2,∞).
As a result, h(m,n) > h(2, 2) = 0 ∀m,n ∈ (2,∞). This implies that g(m,n) > 1. Hence,
xV C < xA. (A.72)









• For the venture capitalist’s compensation t,
tV C > tA, (A.73)
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since sA > 0.
• We know that
I(S, T ) =
ε
mn







Since I(SV C , T V C) = I(SA, TA) = K, we know that it must be
(x− sV C − tV C) nmn−m−n (tV C) mmn−m−n sV C = (x− sA − tA) nmn−m−n (tA) mmn−m−n sA.
From the previous steps, we also know that
f(s, t) ≡ (x− s− t) nmn−m−n t mmn−m−n s
increases in s and t. As tV C > tA, it must be that
sV C < sA. (A.75)
• We know that
I(S, T ) = πs+ SL, (A.76)
and since sV C < sA and SV CL = S
A
L = XL, it must be that
πV C > πA. (A.77)








= − s[m(x− s− t)− nt]
t[(mn−m− n)(x− s− t)− ns] .
Define
g(s, t) ≡ s[m(x− s− t)− nt]− t[(mn−m− n)(x− s− t)− ns],
= [ms− (mn−m− n)t](x− s− t).
Suppose ms− (mn−m− n)t ≥ 0, then since t ∈ [x−sn , xn ], we must have ms− (mn−
m − n)xn > 0, so s > mn−m−nmn x which contradicts to (A.132). Therefore g(s, t) < 0.
This implies that −1 < dsdt < 0. This means that when t increases by ∆, s decreases
less than ∆. As a result, s+ t increases. Hence, tV C > tA implies that
sV C + tV C > sA + tA. (A.78)
• (A.78) implies that
x− sV C − tV C < x− sA − tA. (A.79)
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• We know that











I(S, T ) =
ε
mn







Since T V CL = T
A




L = XL, and I(S
V C , T V C) = I(SA, TA) = K, we

















As tV C > tA and sV C < sA, it must be that





















(x− sV C − tV C)n−1tV C








eV C > eA. (A.87)



















x− sV C − tV C











x− sV C − tV C















x− sV C − tV C




(x− sV C − tV C)n−1tV C
(x− sA − tA)n−1tA > 1, (A.90)
where the second to the last inequality is derived using x −V C −tV C < x − sA − tA
again and the last inequality is derived due to (A.69). Hence,
aV C > aA. (A.91)
Proof of Proposition 2.4. From Proposition 2.2 and Proposition A.4 in Section A.2.2.2,
we know that





EV C = ESB. (A.93)
Proof of Corollary 2.2. When the LPs cannot verify B, the LPs’ maximization problem
in stage two becomes{
e(B̂, S) = arg max
e
εea(B̂, S)(XL − B̂L + x− b̂) + (1− εea(B̂, S))(XL − B̂L)− β e
m
m ,
a(B̂, S) = arg max
a
εe(B̂, S)a(B̂L − SL + b̂− s) + (1− εe(B̂, S)a)(B̂L − SL)− γ a
n
n .
The first order conditions are{
εa(B̂, S)(x− b̂)− βe(B̂, S)m−1 = 0,
εe(B̂, S)(b̂− s)− γa(B̂, S)n−1 = 0,


























The LPs’ expected payoff, therefore, is











The venture capitalist’s expected payoff stays the same as that in the venture capital
financing scheme,
A(B,S) = εe(B,S)a(B,S)(BL − SL + b− s),














+BL − SL (A.97)


























+ SL ≥ K,
s ≥ 0,
b− s > 0,
SL ≥ 0,













then ∂L∂SL < 0 and
∂L
∂s < 0 imply that SL = s = 0 which violates the LPs’ individual






























=− 1 + λ,
∂L
∂s




























































Hence, s = 0 and no matter what value of SL ∈ [0, BL] be, still violates LPs’ individual
rationality condition due to (2.2), the riskiness of the project.









































If Z ≤ 0, then ∂L∂s < 0; if Z > 0, then ∂L∂s < ∂L∂s |λ=1 < 1. Hence, SL = s = 0 still violates
the LPs’ individual rationality condition. Therefore, we must have λ > 1. Then, since
∂L
∂SL
=− 1 + λ > 0,
we get SL(B̂, B) = BL and s(B̂, B) is determined in
ε
mn






+BL −K = 0. (A.98)
Therefore, SL only depends on BL while s depends on both BL and b̂. From now on, we
suppress the dependent variables, and denote SL(BL) and s(b̂, BL).
The entrepreneur’s optimal effort choice in stage one is
e(b̂, BL, b) = arg max
e
εea(b̂, BL, b)(XL −BL + x− b)
+(1− εea(b̂, BL, b))(XL −BL)− β e
m
m ,
a(b̂, BL, b) = arg max
a
εe(b̂, BL, b)a(b− s(b̂, B))− γ a
n
n .
The first order conditions are{
εa(b̂, BL, b)(x− b)− βe(b̂, BL, b)m−1 = 0,
εe(b̂, BL, b)(b− s(b̂, B))− γa(b̂, BL, b)n−1 = 0,
and solving the system of first order conditions in (e(b̂, BL, b), a(b̂, BL, b)), we obtain














a(b̂, BL, b) =
ε
m










Therefore her expected payoff is
E(b̂, BL, b) = εe(b̂, BL, b)a(b̂, BL, b)(XL −BL + x− b)






























x− b > 0,
BL ≥ 0,
XL −BL ≥ 0.
where, in equilibrium,























EU = EA. (A.103)
Proof of Proposition 2.5. Replacing SV C and T V C by their values derived in Proposi-
tion 2.2, (2.71) can be rewritten as{
XL = D,
XL + s
V C + 0 + xn = α(XL + x),
and we get
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D = XL, (A.104)
α =
XL + s
V C + xn
XL + x
. (A.105)
Similarly, (2.72) can be rewritten as
x
n
= β(XL + s












A.2.2 Optimal Contracts with Verifiable Efforts and/or Contracts
In this appendix, we derive the optimal contracts when both efforts and contracts are
verifiable (Section A.2.2.1) or only contracts are verifiable (Section A.2.2.2).
A.2.2.1 Optimal Contracts with Verifiable Efforts and Contracts (First-
Best)
We consider a financing scheme where both efforts and contracts are verifiable. We refer
to the optimal contracts in this scheme as first-best, and we denote the corresponding
compensation by (SFB, TFB).
Proposition A.3. When both efforts and contracts are verifiable, under the assumption
of (2.9) and the condition x ≥ xFB, the optimal compensation for the investors and the
advisor are respectively equal to


















Proof. According to the social value of investing the project (2.6) and under assumption
(2.9),














efforts from the entrepreneur and the advisor are determined as
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{
eFB = arg max
e
εeaFBx− β emm ,
aFB = arg max
a
εeFBax− γ ann .
(A.110)
The first order conditions are {
εaFBx− β(eFB)m−1 = 0,
εeFBx− γ(aFB)n−1 = 0,
























Clearly, both the entrepreneur and the consultant exert effort in equilibrium, since x > 0,













by (2.9). Since we assume competitive capital and labor markets, the entrepreneur will offer
SFB and TSB to the investors and the advisor such that their expected payoffs equal to
their outside options, which are K and 0, respectively:{
IFB = εeFBaFB(SL + s) + (1− εeFBaFB)SL = K,




There are multiple solutions to the above equations, and one particular solution is

















Therefore, the entrepreneur’s expected payoff is
EFB = εeFBaFB(XL − SFBL − TFBL + x− sFB − tFB) (A.113)


















= S(eFB, aFB), (A.114)
which coincides with the optimal social value of investing the project. To avoid credit
rationing, we require that
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EFB ≥ 0, (A.115)
that is













A.2.2.2 Optimal Contracts with Verifiable Contracts
Next, we consider a financing scheme where only contracts are verifiable. We refer to the
optimal contracts in this scheme as second-best, and we denote the corresponding compen-
sation by (SSB, TSB).
Proposition A.4. When the contracts are verifiable, under the assumption of (2.9) and
the condition x ≥ xV C , the optimal compensation for the investors and the advisor are
respectively equal to
SSBL = XL, (A.116)





and sSB exists and is determined uniquely in
ε
mn










+XL −K = 0. (A.118)
Proof. The entrepreneur’s and the advisor’s maximization problems in stage two are
e(S, T ) = arg max
e
εea(S, T )(XL − SL − TL + x− s− t)
+(1− εea(S, T ))(XL − SL − TL)− β e
m
m ,
a(S, T ) = arg max
a




The first order conditions are{
εa(S, T )(x− s− t)− βe(S, T )m−1 = 0,
εe(S, T )t− γa(S, T )n−1 = 0,
and solving the system of first order conditions in (e(S, T ), a(S, T )), we obtain




























In order to induce a strictly positive probability of success of the risky project, both the
entrepreneur and the advisor need to exert effort in equilibrium, which requires
x− s− t > 0, (A.121)
t > 0, (A.122)
and the probability of success is
εe(S, T )a(S, T ) =
ε
mn


















where the first inequality is due to limited liability, S ∈ [0, X] and T ∈ [0, X − S], and the
second inequality is due to (2.9).
The expected payoffs of the three players are
E(S, T ) = εe(S, T )a(S, T )(XL − SL − TL + x− s− t)














+XL − SL − TL > 0, (A.123)














+ TL > 0, (A.124)











since m > 2 and n > 2, and combining limited liability, monotonic contract, and positive
efforts, we get 
s ≥ 0,
t > 0,
x− s− t > 0,
SL ≥ 0,
TL ≥ 0,
XL − SL − TL ≥ 0.
(A.126)



































+XL − SL − TL,
then ∂L∂SL < 0 and
∂L
∂s < 0 imply that SL = s = 0 which violates the investors’ individual





























=− 1 + λ,
∂L
∂s



























































Hence, s = 0 and no matter what value of SL ∈ [0, XL] be, still violates nvestors’ individual
rationality condition due to (2.2), the riskiness of the project.
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If Z ≤ 0, then ∂L∂s < 0; if Z > 0, then ∂L∂s < ∂L∂s |λ=1 < 1. Hence, SL = s = 0 still violates
the investors’ individual rationality condition.
Therefore, we must have λ > 1. Then, since
∂L
∂SL
=− 1 + λ > 0,
we get SL = XL − TL, and
∂L
∂TL
=− 1 < 0,
we get TL = 0. As a result, we have S
SB
L = XL, and T
SB
L = 0. To simplify the expressions,
we define



































∂s = 0 and
∂L
∂t = 0 imply that t
SB = xn .
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A.3 Appendix for Chapter 3
A.3.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1. In the scarce venture capital financing scheme, the venture


























+ SL ≥ K + κ,
s ≥ 0,
b− s > 0,
SL ≥ 0,
BL − SL ≥ 0.
Using the same logic used in the proof for Proposition 2.2, we know the lagrangian for






















+ SL −K − κ
)
,
where λ > 1, implying LPs’ individual rationality condition is binding. Then, since
∂L
∂SL
=− 1 + λ > 0,
we get SL(B) = BL and s(B) is determined in
ε
mn






+BL −K − κ = 0. (A.130)
Therefore, SL only depends on BL while s depends on both BL and b.

















x− b > 0,
BL ≥ 0,
XL −BL ≥ 0.
Using the same logic used in the proof for Proposition 2.2, we know that BSV CL = XL, and
bSV C − sSV C = xn . This implies that tSV C = xn .
Define
f(s, t) ≡ (x− s− t) nmn−m−n t mmn−m−n s, (A.131)





∂t > 0, ∀ s ∈ [0, mn−m−nmn x] and t ∈ [x−sn , xn ].
(A.132)



















(K + κ−XL). (A.134)
Clearly 0 < k < k′. Since f(0, t) = 0 < k′ and in order to have f(s, t) = k′, using the Mean



















Therefore, in order to avoid credit rationing, we require that













Under conditions x ≥ xSV C and (2.9), sSV C exists and uniquely determined in f(sSV C , xn) =
k′.
Proof of Corollary 3.1. We know from Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 2.2 that




ISV C = K + κ = K > IV C .
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• The credit rationing threshold x, by equations (A.135) and (A.65)
xSV C > xV C . (A.136)








and f(s, t) increases with s. This implies that
sSV C > sV C , (A.137)
which further implies that
x− sSV C − tSV C < x− sV C − tV C . (A.138)





x− sSV C − tSV C
x− sV C − tV C
) n−1
mn−m−n
< 1 ⇒ eSV C < eV C . (A.139)





x− sSV C − tSV C
x− sV C − tV C
) m(n−1)
mn−m−n
< 1 ⇒ ESV C < EV C . (A.140)





x− sSV C − tSV C
x− sV C − tV C
) 1
mn−m−n
< 1 ⇒ aSV C < aV C . (A.141)





x− sSV C − tSV C
x− sV C − tV C
) n
mn−m−n
< 1 ⇒ ASV C < AV C . (A.142)
• eSV C < eV C and aSV C < aV C imply that
πSV C < πV C . (A.143)
























increases in κ ∈ (0,∞). This implies that xSV C ≥ xA when
κ ≥ κx ≡
[(
n2











For the rest of the proof, let’s work on the assumption that x is large enough such that
x > max{xSV C , xA}. (A.146)























































sSV C = sV C < sA (A.149)
we know that
sSV C ≤ sA, ∀ 0 < κ ≤ κs, (A.150)
sSV C > sA, ∀ κ > κs. (A.151)
(A.79) and (A.138) imply that
x− sSV C − tSV C < x− sA − tA. (A.152)






















x− sSV C − tSV C













creases in κ. Define by κe such that(
x− sSV C − tSV C





where tSV C = xn and t
A = x−s
A


































ESV C > EA, ∀ 0 < κ < κe, (A.155)
ESV C ≤ EA, ∀ κ ≥ κe. (A.156)





















x− sSV C − tSV C











Accordingly, the same threshold κe > 0 from above implies that
eSV C > eA, ∀ 0 < κ < κe, (A.158)
eSV C ≤ eA, ∀ κ ≥ κe. (A.159)




(x− sSV C − tSV C) nmn−m−n (tSV C)
n(m−1)
mn−m−n











x− sSV C − tSV C














creases in κ. Define by κa such that(
x− sSV C − tSV C






where tSV C = xn and t
A = x−s
A






























ASV C > AA, ∀ 0 < κ < κa, (A.162)
ASV C ≤ AA, ∀ κ ≥ κa. (A.163)




(x− sSV C − tSV C) 1mn−m−n (tSV C)
m−1
mn−m−n










x− sSV C − tSV C













Accordingly, the same threshold κa > 0 from above implies that
aSV C > aA, ∀ 0 < κ < κa, (A.165)
aSV C ≤ aA, ∀ κ ≥ κa. (A.166)
• According to (A.81) and the relation that
I(S, T ) = π(S, T )s+ SL, (A.167)
we know that
π(S, T ) =
ε
mn












(x− sSV C − tSV C) nmn−m−n (tSV C) mmn−m−n







x− sSV C − tSV C












in κ. Define by κπ such that(
x− sSV C − tSV C





where tSV C = xn and t
A = x−s
A
































πSV C > πA, ∀ 0 < κ < κπ, (A.171)
πSV C ≤ πA, ∀ κ ≥ κπ. (A.172)
Finally, we need to show (3.20). To do that, first we will show that κe < κπ < κa, then
we show that κe < κs and κs < κπ.
• sA > 0 implies that













Therefore, (A.154), (A.170), and (A.161) imply that
sSV C |κ=κe < sSV C |κ=κπ < sSV C |κ=κa . (A.173)
As sSV C increases in κ, (A.155), (A.171), and (A.162) imply that
κe < κπ < κa. (A.174)









x− sA − tSV C










(n− 1)n−1(x− sA)n . (A.175)

























(n− 1)n−1(x− sA)n |sA→0+ = 1.
Therefore, we must have ESV C < EA. Hence,
κe < κs. (A.176)
• Suppose κπ ≤ κs, then κ = κs implies that sSV C = sA and πSV C ≤ πA. When






x− sA − tSV C









(n− 1)n(x− sA)m+n .
(A.177)



























(n− 1)n(x− sA)m+n |sA→0+ = 1.
Therefore, when κ = κs, we have πSV C > πA which is a contradiction. Hence,
κs < κπ. (A.178)
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Kaplan, S. N. and Strömberg, P. E. (2004). Characteristics, contracts, and actions:
Evidence from venture capitalist analyses. The Journal of Finance, 59(5):2177–
2210.
Katz, M. L. (1991). Game-playing agents: Unobservable contracts as precommit-
ments. The RAND Journal of Economics, pages 307–328.
Katz, M. L. (2006). Observable contracts as commitments: Interdependent contracts
and moral hazard. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 15(3):685–706.
194
Kerr, W. R., Lerner, J., and Schoar, A. (2011). The consequences of entrepreneurial
finance: Evidence from angel financings. The Review of Financial Studies, 27(1):20–
55.
Laffont, J.-J. and Martimort, D. (1998). Collusion and delegation. Rand Journal of
Economics, pages 280–305.
Lerner, J. (1994). Venture capitalists and the decision to go public. Journal of
financial Economics, 35(3):293–316.
Lerner, J. (1995). Venture capitalists and the oversight of private firms. the Journal
of Finance, 50(1):301–318.
Lerner, J. (1998). “angel” financing and public policy: An overview. Journal of
Banking & Finance, 22(6-8):773–783.
Lerner, J. (2016). The rise of the angel investor: a challenge to public policy, avail-
able at https://www.thirdway.org/report/rise-of-the-angel-investor-a-
challenge-to-public-policy.
Lerner, J., Schoar, A., Sokolinski, S., and Wilson, K. (2018). The globalization of
angel investments: Evidence across countries. Journal of Financial Economics,
127(1):1–20.
Liu, Q. (2020). Optimal financing contracts in venture capital partnerships. Working
paper.
Marx, L. M. (1998). Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity.
Review of Economic Design, 3(4):371–387.
Mas, A. (2017). Does transparency lead to pay compression? Journal of Political
Economy, 125(5):1683–1721.
McAfee, R. P. and Schwartz, M. (1994). Opportunism in multilateral vertical con-
tracting: Nondiscrimination, exclusivity, and uniformity. American Economic
Review, pages 210–230.
Melumad, N. D., Mookherjee, D., and Reichelstein, S. (1995). Hierarchical decentral-
ization of incentive contracts. The RAND Journal of Economics, pages 654–672.
Melumad, N. D., Mookherjee, D., and Reichelstein, S. (1997). Contract complexity,
incentives, and the value of delegation. Journal of Economics & Management
Strategy, 6(1):257–289.
Mookherjee, D. (2006). Decentralization, hierarchies, and incentives: A mechanism
design perspective. Journal of Economic Literature, 44(2):367–390.
195
Obloj, T. and Zenger, T. (2017). Organization design, proximity, and productivity
responses to upward social comparison. Organization Science, 28(1):1–18.
O’Brien, D. P. and Shaffer, G. (1992). Vertical control with bilateral contracts.
RAND Journal of Economics, pages 299–308.
Ortner, J. and Chassang, S. (2018). Making corruption harder: Asymmetric infor-
mation, collusion, and crime. Journal of Political Economy, 126(5):2108–2133.
Perez-Truglia, R. (forthcoming). The effects of income transparency on well-being:
Evidence from a natural experiment. American Economic Review.
Poitevin, M. (2000). Can the theory of incentives explain decentralization? Canadian
Journal of Economics, 33(4):878–906.
Prat, A. (2005). The wrong kind of transparency. American Economic Review,
95(3):862–877.
Prendergast, C. (1993). A theory of “yes men”. American Economic Review, pages
757–770.
Qian, Y. (1994). Incentives and loss of control in an optimal hierarchy. Review of
Economic Studies, 61(3):527–544.
Rahman, D. (2012). But who will monitor the monitor? American Economic Review,
102(6):2767–97.
Rayo, L. (2007). Relational incentives and moral hazard in teams. Review of
Economic Studies, 74(3):937–963.
Renucci, A. (2006). Optimal relationships with value-enhancing investors. Working
paper, available from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255580144,
UPPA.
Repullo, R. and Suarez, J. (2004). Venture capital finance: A security design ap-
proach. Review of Finance, 8(1):75–108.
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